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DISARMAMENT IN PERSPECTIVE:

An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament
Agreements Between the World Wars, 1919-1939


VOLUME I

DISARMAMENT AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE

ACDA/RS-55

PREPARED FOR

THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY



PREPARED BY

CALIFORNIA STATE COLLEGE AT LOS ANGELES FOUNDATION

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Volume I: DISARMAMENT AND THE PEACE CONFERENCE

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THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Prepared By

CALIFORNIA STATE COLLEGE AT LOS ANGELES FOUNDATION

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PREFACE

Arms control and disarmament measures of the 1920's and 1930's have been the subject of numerous monographs, articles and PhD dissertations most of which have featured the unique aspects of individual episodes. Whatever contribution this study has to offer comes from our attempt to pose a number of similar questions, some general and some specific, to each signed agreement. We have inquired into how arms control proposals were initiated, whether they originated as thought-out, well developed policies or whether they arose as political compromises in the arranging of general political settlements. We have investigated the negotiatory processes to determine the roles of statesmen, popular opinion and military professionals in the development of these agreements. We were concerned, too, with the extent of compliance enjoyed by these pacts, whether there were efforts at revision, and how they affected national security needs. And finally, we have sought to highlight the significant features of each treaty as it developed, step by step.

To accomplish these objectives, we have opened each chapter, and most major subsections, with a statement of the most significant issues or essential points we found relative to the formulation of arms control ideas. Some readers may find this arrangement a little disconcerting for it establishes initially our conclusions and then uses the accompanying text to demonstrate their validity. The advantage of this method, from our point of view, was that it allowed us to hew directly to the major themes of our study without extensive narrative development. We have not been reticent in pressing our views opinions and judgments.

For those readers interested in probing more deeply into a particular treaty episode, the footnotes should provide a substantial bibliography. We have used, wherever possible,

the published documents and studies most readily available; only when we could not find answers to specific questions have we resorted to archival research. We wish to emphasize that this study would have been impossible without the scores of earlier research efforts; if we have failed to properly acknowledge all of our debts to these earlier scholars, we apologize. For whatever errors of omission or commission exist in the following text, we take full responsibility.

A final suggestion for the reader: the extended Table of Contents and short Index should provide relative easy access to most themes and issues. However, we do suggest that, in keeping with the style of this study, you read the concluding chapter first; it is the best introduction to our methods, arrangement and findings.

Finally, this study could not have been concluded without the encouragement and understanding shown by our wives and the Agency; the latter of whom received by far the greater share of our time these last many months. In particular, we wish to acknowledge the valuable aid of Dr. R. William Nary and Mr. Robert Lambert who assisted us through many troublesome issues. And, too, we cannot forget the administrative agents, Mr. Richard Conkings and Mr. M. O. Zimmerman, who patiently and cheerfully bore with us.

R.D.B.
D.U.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- F.R. Foreign Relations of the United States
P.R.: Peace Conf., 1919 The Paris Peace Conference
D.B.F.P. Documents on British Foreign Policy
D.G.F.P. Documents on German Foreign Policy
S.I.A. Survey of International Affairs
D.I.A. Documents on International Affairs
Cong. Rec. U.S., Congressional Record
H.C. Debs. G.B., House of Commons Debates
I.M.T. International Military Tribunal
(Germany)

Chapter 1

THE ARMISTICES, 1918

Four armistice conventions brought an end to the First World War in late 1918. Although hostilities were technically only suspended, the armistices presented to Bulgaria, Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and Germany precluded--in fact and by design--a resumption of warfare. In spite of their broad resemblance, the armistice agreements were negotiated under quite different circumstances and imposed widely contrasting conditions. The first three armistice conventions, with Bulgaria on September 29, Turkey on October 30, and Austria-Hungary on November 3, were primarily military in character and embodied conditions equivalent to unconditional surrender.¹ Not only were there provisions for the surrender of specified numbers of ships, planes and weapons, but the armies of Bulgaria, Turkey, Austria and Hungary were to be immediately demobilized, with allowance only for a limited force to preserve internal order. In contrast, the German armistice signed on November 11, imposed not only military conditions but sought to achieve political and economic objectives as well. Moreover, the German armistice was not unconditional surrender for prearmistice agreements between Germany and the Allies established the Fourteen Points as the basis for the conclusion of hostilities.²

In assessing the role of disarmament in the negotiations leading up to and following the armistice, several points stand out. First, disarmament as a policy objective found only gradual acceptance among the Allies during the war and, even after gaining limited currency in 1918, never figured prominently in Allied war aims. Second, in the negotiations over the prearmistice agreement both the Allies and Germany committed themselves to disarmament by their acceptance of Wilson's Fourteen Points. This commitment implied, however, the implementation of general disarmament rather than unilateral imposition. No prearmistice agreement was reached with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria or Turkey. Third, while a variety of arms control measures were included in the German armistice, neither

disarmament or demilitarization--in the conventional usages of the terms--was imposed. Disarmament, indeed, was deliberately rejected for inclusion in the German armistice, largely due to the influence of Marshal Foch. By contrast, disarmament was among the arms control provisions included in the armistices imposed on Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. Fourth, while the armistice terms were perceived by the defeated Powers as being unnecessarily onerous, the vital military conditions were, with minor exceptions, carried out in Germany, Bulgaria and Austria; in Turkey and Hungary the execution of the armistice provisions proved more difficult.

Disarmament In Allied War Aims

As the hostilities were transformed into "total war," the traditional objectives of warfare changed. Abandoned was the old idea that wars were fought only to the point where an ultimate victory could be foreseen. Gone too was the notion that wars were fought for limited objectives. In their place emerged two relatively new concepts: that the war had to be "fought to the finish" and that the enemy's power was not merely to be reduced but destroyed. Therefore, while war aims were seldom articulated during the early months of the war, once raised--beginning in early 1915--they appeared in the general context of a demand for a war à outrance and for a Carthagian peace. This was the basis for the Anglo-French understanding of April, 1915, between Lord Berite, the British Ambassador in Paris and the French Foreign Minister, Théophile Delcassé. The two representatives agreed, as Lord Bertie noted in his diary, that The Allies "ought to deprive /the Germans/, as far as humanly we can, of any power to injure us for as long a period as possible: there must be destruction of all their war-plant and weapon-producing factories, disbandment of their military forces, and every possible difficulty placed in the way of a resuscitation of those forces."⁴

If the disarmament of Germany was only vaguely articulated in the context of the demand for an end to Prussian militarism, general disarmament was even less affirmatively advanced. Indeed, aside from a few unofficial proposals for an end to armaments and warfare, there exists little evidence that "disarmament", as an operational concept, ranked prominently among the major Allied war aims.⁵ Apparently neither the governments, nor influential civic or political organizations within these countries, gave much thought to the problems, procedures, and consequences of a disarmed world prior to the armistice discussions. Even among those writers who favored the creation of a postwar league of nations, disarmament was seldom included

in their plans and blueprints for a future world order.⁶

Not until December, 1917, did general disarmament find a major sponsor within the allied countries. At this time the British Labour Party, seeking a moderate campaign platform, came out for abolition of compulsory military service, limitation of armaments, and termination of private arms manufacture. This stand prompted British Prime Minister David Lloyd George to liberalize his conditions for permanent peace and to include the demand for "the creation of some international organization to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war." In addition to anticipating most of the ideas found in the Fourteen Points--to be enunciated three days later--the Prime Minister for the first time since assuming office condemned the "vast waste of wealth and effort involved in warlike preparation" and "the increasing evil of compulsory military service."⁷ But Lloyd George's declaration did not commit the British government to disarmament; in fact the Foreign Office's drafts for a League during the last year of the war made no mention at all of this concept. Nor for that matter did any major segment of the British public, save the most liberal elements.⁸

President Wilson's enunciation of the Fourteen Points on January 8, 1918 marked a watershed in the consideration of the disarmament question. Although the American chief executive had called, in a general manner, for the reduction of armaments on several previous occasions, Point Four of the Fourteen Points was the first time disarmament was officially introduced as a condition of peace.⁹ Point Four read: "Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety."

Point Four and the Prearmistice Negotiations. On October 3 the German government asked Wilson to end the hostilities and five weeks later, on November 11, an armistice was signed. For analytical purposes, these five weeks may be divided into two slightly overlapping periods. The first period begins with the German note of October 3 and ends with the German note of October 27. During this phase negotiations were carried on exclusively between the United States and Germany. In all, seven notes were exchanged between the two countries. As the correspondence between the two governments has been reviewed extensively elsewhere, it need not be recapitulated here in any detail.¹⁰ In the context of the present study, the primary question is whether disarmament was proposed either implicitly or explicitly by either country as a condition of peace.

The second period begins with Wilson's consignment of the correspondence to the Allies on October 23 with the recommendation that they follow up the negotiations and ends with Secretary of State Robert Lansing's note of November 5 to the German government formally offering, on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers, an armistice to end hostilities. During this phase the Allies had to decide whether to accept the conditions of peace contained in the German-American correspondence and if so, with what qualifications or reservations. Important for this study is the determination of the extent to which Point Four was examined, analyzed or discussed during these Allied negotiations leading up to the drafting of the Armistice terms.

In response to the German request for peace, President Wilson formulated three sets of conditions which would have to be accepted: conditions to be carried out by Germany prior to the conclusion of an armistice; conditions which would have to be included in the armistice; and conditions which would serve as the basis for the final peace settlement.

As conditions to be carried out prior to the armistice, President Wilson insisted--and the Germans ultimately agreed--that there should be evacuation of all territories occupied by the armies of the Central Powers, that illegal and inhumane practices of warfare on the part of the German armed forces should cease, and that the German government should become responsible to the German people and the military subject to the civilian government. As for the specific armistice terms, few conditions were explicitly raised. The only reference to these terms in the armistice was that section of the November 5 note which stated that an armistice would have to "ensure to the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed." In essence Wilson demanded--and the Germans agreed--that the Armistice would guarantee the military supremacy of the Allies and the United States.

The third set of conditions--the conditions of peace--were settled between the two countries on the basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points. In accepting the Fourteen Points as a basis for a peace settlement Germany implicitly accepted the obligation to disarm. Point Four, however, implied a reciprocal obligation rather than a unilateral imposition. And in none of the correspondence was this reciprocal obligation altered or amended. But then it should be noted that in none of the correspondence was disarmament raised as a separate or distinct issue.

Having obtained German acceptance of the Fourteen Points, Wilson turned to the Allies for their approval. This proved more difficult for the British and French were wary of the Wilsonian formula. As one writer has remarked: the Allied leaders considered the "fourteen commandments" as a piece of "clever and effective propaganda, designed primarily to undermine the fighting spirit of the Central Powers, and to bolster the morale of the lesser Allies." Now, suddenly, the whole peace structure was supposed to be built upon that set of "vague principles, most of which seemed to them thoroughly unrealistic and some of which, if they were to be seriously applied, were simply unacceptable."¹¹ Indeed, in spite of the threat that the United States might conclude a separate peace with Germany if the Fourteen Points were not accepted, the Allies resisted and ultimately prevailed. Under no circumstances would the British accept Point Two calling for freedom of the seas. The right to impose a blockade, Lloyd George insisted, was the key to British survival. While Point Two was abandoned, the remaining points had to be reinterpreted to gain Allied approval. This interpretation, written by Frank Cobb and Walter Lippmann, served as the basis for the discussions between Wilson's emissary, Colonel Edward M. House, Lloyd George and French Premier Georges Clemenceau during early November, 1918. In the Cobb-Lippmann commentary, Point Four was interpreted as follows:

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

"Domestic safety" clearly implies not only internal policing, but the protecting of territory against invasion. The accumulation of armaments above this level would be a violation of the intention of the proposal.

"What guarantees should be given and taken, or what are to be the standards of judgment have never been determined. It will be necessary to adopt the general principle and then institute some kind of international commission of investigation to prepare detailed projects for its execution."¹²

Whatever the original meaning of "domestic safety", it could have been argued that the point obligated a country to reduce its national armaments down to the level of a domestic police force. The commentary, however, interpreted the point as an obligation to reduce a country's forces only down to that level which could be defined as a defensive army. And

an "army," even if only defensive, implied a far different level of forces than that implicit in the category of "police force."

While the Allies accepted Point Four without reservations, they also approved it without discussion. As far as can be ascertained from the diaries, memoirs and accounts of Allied negotiations, Point Four never came up for examination either within the Supreme War Council or in the informal discussions of the delegates during the pre-armistice negotiations. This lack of contention over Point Four may be interpreted, of course, in various ways. One possible explanation is that there was total harmony over the objective of disarmament and thus Point Four gave rise to no disagreement among the Allies. Another possible explanation--and one which seems more probable--is that the obligation contained in Point Four, especially under the Cobb-Lippmann interpretation, was in essence nonoperational, at least in the immediate future. For the Cobb-Lippmann interpretation indicated that for the present it would only be necessary "to adopt the general principle." Only afterward would it be necessary to "institute some kind of international commission of investigation to prepare detailed projects for its execution." Although imprecise in language, the commentary did give the impression that this "international commission of investigation" was not the same thing as a peace conference or that it need be part of the peace conference. Rather it implied a four-step process taking place over an extended period of time: first, an international commission of investigation would be established either at or following the peace conference; second, this international commission would "prepare detailed projects,: which, thirdly, would presumably be submitted back to the countries for approval; if and when approved the international commission would then supervise their execution. The whole process, as implied in the Cobb-Lippmann interpretation, would take years and would be subject to ultimate agreement (or rejection) by the Great Powers.

In contrast to the extensive obligations assumed under the pre-armistice agreement between Germany and the Allies, no commitments of any kind were assumed in the cases of Bulgaria and Turkey and only the vaguest moral commitment could be claimed by Austria-Hungary. Bulgaria, the first to surrender, simply asked for a cessation of hostilities as a result of her military defeat: no prior conditions were asked and none given. Thus, no political negotiations preceded the signing of the armistice, which went into effect on September 29. The armistice with Turkey, the second to be concluded, was similar in that no pre-armistice agreement was

made. Signed on October 30, it accepted, in essence, the unconditional surrender of the country.

The armistice with Austria-Hungary was, like that concluded with Germany, preceded by an exchange of diplomatic correspondence. This correspondence, however, did not culminate in a formal agreement, although a moral commitment to base the peace settlement on the Fourteen Points may be said to have been made.¹³ In any event, Point Four was neither raised or discussed.

Drafting the Military and Naval Terms

In the Allied discussions leading up to the armistice, there were two fairly distinct levels of negotiations: one was essentially political and centered around the controversy between the Allied Premiers and Colonel House over the Fourteen Points; the other involved the actual determination of the armistice terms and was carried out by the military. Although the political leaders occasionally intervened in the formulation of the specific armistice terms and passed on them when drafted, it was the military who had the greatest responsibility for working out the final conditions. While the Allies were brought into the political negotiations leading up to the prearmistice agreement only with Colonel House's arrival in Paris on October 26, the drafting of the military terms began when the first German note to Wilson was intercepted by French Intelligence on October 4. Having noted in the previous section that disarmament did not enter into the discussions among the political leaders over the pre-armistice agreement, it remains to be determined whether disarmament figured in the calculations of the military delegates charged with the drafting of the more specific armistice terms.

The negotiations over the military and naval conditions went through three stages of deliberation. The first stage lasted from October 4 to October 9. During this time three sets of draft proposals were circulated; but in only one of them was disarmament proposed. During the second stage, from October 10 to October 25, Marshal Foch gained control of the drafting process and, in the process, eliminated disarmament from the German conditions. In the final phase, a last minute attempt was made to reinsert disarmament in the armistice provisions, but the effort failed. Though the final terms contained a variety of arms control measures, Germany was not to be disarmed during the period of the armistice.

The First Stage. The Allied Premiers, in conference at

Versailles when Germany's note requesting peace was intercepted, formulated a rough draft of armistice terms on October 6 demanding only that the German army should evacuate French, Belgian and Luxembourg territory and withdraw to the right bank of the Rhine. They did not demand either the Allied occupation of German territory or the surrender of any weapons or equipment. They did, however, intend to maintain naval pressure through the continuation of the blockade and to demand at the same time that Germany cease all submarine operations immediately.¹⁴

When the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council were requested to submit terms a few days later, they concluded that the conditions included in the Premiers' draft were insufficient. They felt that the armistice should be based on two essentials: there should be the "disarmament of the enemy under the control of the Allies" and the Allies should obtain "material guarantees" in order to gain and maintain military supremacy. In addition to the provision for the evacuation of invaded territory by the German army, the Military Representatives proposed that Germany surrender "all arms and munitions of war and supplies between the present Front and the left bank of the Rhine" and turn over within forty-eight hours the fortresses of Metz, Thionville, Strasbourg, Neu-Breisach, and the town and fortifications of Lille.¹⁵

While the Military Representatives referred to their proposal as "disarmament," this was a strained interpretation of the concept. The surrender of weapons, even all the weapons, within a given zone was, at best, disarmament only in a very temporary and limited sense. It was limited in that only a portion of the German army was to be disarmed, that is, the part west of the Rhine; it was temporary in that once the "disarmed" portion of the German army had withdrawn to the other side of the Rhine, there was nothing to prevent its being rearmed. Therefore, while the Military Representatives proposed that "disarmament of the enemy under the control of the Allies" be carried out under the Armistice, the actual terms of their draft would have achieved only a partial realization of that objective.

In addition to the terms proposed by the Allied Premiers and the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, as Commander-in-Chief of Allied forces, proposed a third set of terms which left out entirely the disarmament of Germany. His objectives were the "liberation" of occupied territory, reparations and Allied occupation of German territory up to the Rhine. Indeed, he proposed that the Allies take over three bridgeheads on the Rhine at Rastadt,

Strasbourg and Neu-Breisach, each with an arc of territory on the right bank thirty kilometers in from the bridgehead. It was in the context of the German evacuation of the territory west of the Rhine that the only arms control provision appeared: the Germans were to abandon without destruction all war material which they were unable to remove within the evacuation period, stipulated as thirty days.¹⁶

The absence of disarmament from Foch's armistice proposals was not a careless oversight but a deliberate choice. Although the rationale for his opposition to disarmament would become clear only in the later negotiations of the peace treaty, Foch's main preoccupation was to preserve Allied military forces in being in event the Germans rejected the armistice and renewed hostilities. The disarmament of Germany, Foch assumed, would lead inexorably to Allied demobilization and perhaps even Allied disarmament. With American and British forces pulled off the continent, the Germans would be able to remobilize their forces and throw them into action long before the British and Americans could respond. The French, therefore, would again have to bear the brunt of the attack while awaiting help from abroad. And with the Allies disarmed, this help would probably never arrive in time.

Second Stage. In an effort to head off the Military Representatives with their proposals for disarmament, Foch began early to assert the claim that only the field commanders were qualified to define the armistice terms.¹⁵ With this accepted, Foch next had to gain the support of the other Allied Commanders Petain, Haig and Pershing. Meeting at Senlis on October 25, Foch scored a remarkable victory. Although the Commanders differed substantially in their views, and offered a variety of recommendations, none of them proposed disarmament for inclusion in the German armistice.¹⁶

The British Commander, Douglas Haig, based his armistice recommendations upon the premise that in Western Europe the territorial settlement would be limited to a restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the German evacuation of French and Belgian territories, and the Allied occupation of a few strategic points. He opposed the inclusion of additional conditions on both military and political grounds. Militarily, he felt that the German army was still capable of making a determined stand and that, if the Germans rejected the armistice conditions, the British troops would have to carry on the fighting and suffer the losses as the French army was exhausted and the American army yet unorganized. Politically, he recognized that once the French occupied the Rhine provinces under the armistice, for whatever pretext, it would

be difficult to reject their claim to more permanent occupation under the peace settlement. And he was not prepared to accept this territorial expansion of France. Therefore, he recommended that the conditions to be imposed on Germany be "moderate."

Foch challenged Haig's assumptions as being too pessimistic. He insisted, on the contrary, that the military situation was distinctly favorable to the Allies and discounted the need to impose a "moderate" armistice. Marshal Philippe Petain, speaking next, supported Foch. As the military situation was, in his view, favorable, he suggested that the best way to render the Germans incapable of further fighting was to deprive them of material. This could be accomplished indirectly by requiring the Germans to withdraw immediately from a given area within a short period of time. In this way, the Germans would find it impossible to remove their material, especially their heavy guns and ammunition. Therefore, he suggested that the Germans be forced to evacuate the left bank of the Rhine in fifteen days, that the Allies occupy bridgeheads on the right bank of the Rhine, and that they obtain a designated amount of railway equipment.

The American commanding general, John J. Pershing, was even more optimistic about the military situation and preferred in fact the continuation of the fighting to the point of an unconditional surrender. If an armistice was to be granted, he preferred the stricter terms of the French to the moderate conditions of the English. Pershing, therefore, proposed combining most of Haig's and Petain's points with some added stipulations concerning the surrender of submarines and submarine bases.

Following the meeting of the Commanders, Foch formulated a new set of terms which, while incorporating some of the provisions of the other military leaders, was closer to his original October 8 draft than to either the proposals of Haig or Pershing.¹⁷ The essence of Foch's proposal was--like his earlier draft--the "liberation" of Alsace-Lorraine, the occupation of the German Rhine provinces on the left bank and the establishment of Allied bridgeheads on the right bank. In addition, Foch included in the October 25 draft a new demand: a neutral zone twenty-five miles wide on the right bank of the Rhine. In his original draft, Foch had demanded only that "All the war material and supplies of every kind that cannot be removed by the German armies within the time prescribed must be left on the spot, their destruction is forbidden." In his October 25 draft, Foch changed this into a demand for the delivery of a specified number of weapons--

5,000 cannon, 30,000 machine guns and 3,000 minethrowers.¹⁸ While the delivery of weapons was intended to reduce Germany's military capability, it was not Foch's intention to introduce by this proposal a form of German disarmament. As there was nothing to prevent the evacuating forces from being rearmed nor was there any proposal to limit the size of the army, the delivery of arms was meant to weaken Germany not disarm it.

Foch had not included a single naval condition in his original draft and had expressed little concern with naval restrictions since that time. But as the British and Americans felt that naval conditions were important, although they differed in both goals and motivation, Foch included in his final draft most of the demands of the Allies--including not only the provision for the surrender of submarines, as Pershing had demanded, but restrictions on the surface fleet, the maintenance of the blockade, and the occupation of Cuxhaven and Heligoland, as the British demanded.

While Foch was willing to continue the war to obtain his territorial demands, he was not willing to do the same in order to guarantee the destruction of the German navy. But this was precisely what the British Admiralty thought should be achieved by the armistice. These differences in emphasis--initially hardly noticed--were eventually to divide not only the Allied military and political leaders, but the British delegation itself. Indeed, of the various issues raised during the armistice deliberations, the naval provisions became the most contentious.

The naval terms, like the military terms, evolved through a series of rival drafts presented by different, if not rival, agencies. The first draft formulated by the Allied Premiers on October 6 included only one condition affecting the German navy: the immediate cessation of submarine warfare.¹⁹ On October 7, when the Military Representatives were asked to suggest military terms for an armistice, the Naval experts were likewise asked to propose naval terms. These were submitted, together with military terms, the following day. And like the Military Representatives, the Naval experts had found the conditions formulated by the Premiers too moderate. To the demand for the cessation of submarine operations, they inserted three additional demands: 1) the island of Heligoland was to be surrendered to the Allied Naval Commander in Chief of the North Sea; 2) sixty submarines were "to proceed at once to specified Allied ports, and to stay there during the period of the armistice; 3) all enemy surface ships and naval air forces were "to be concentrated in bases specified by the Allies and to remain there during the Armistice."²⁰

Even these naval provisions were considered inadequate by the British Admiralty, which on October 16 submitted a third draft. This draft included one new demand which sought to introduce a final peace settlement into the armistice provisions--that was the demand for the surrender of the entire German fleet. However, as Lloyd George and other members of the Cabinet felt these terms too severe, and thus risked a German rejection of the armistice, the Admiralty was forced to reconsider its proposals. On October 28, it submitted a revised draft which demanded the surrender of all German submarines afloat, the flagship Baden, ten dreadnought battleships, six battle cruisers, eight light cruisers and fifty destroyers.²¹

But even these terms caused uneasiness and concern. Foch, for example, wrote to Clemenceau on October 29, warning him against "the tendency of some of our allies to show too great a severity in the matter of naval terms they might wish inserted in the armistice."²²

The Third Stage. During the final phase of the negotiations a new proposal was made which sought to reintroduce German disarmament into the armistice terms. This proposal was advanced by General Tasker H. Bliss, the American Military Representative to the Supreme War Council. Bliss had become convinced that in order to preserve peace in the future all militarism--and not just German militarism--had to be destroyed. Once militarism had been destroyed, he reasoned, Wilson's projected league of nations could then preserve the peace. "I am one of those who believe," he wrote to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, on October 9, "that the absolute destruction of all militarism, under any of its evil forms, is the only corner stone of the foundation of any League." A league of armed nations was, in his opinion, anomaly. "What can be more inconsistent, even absurd," he asked, "than to imagine a League of Nations for the maintenance of peace composed of nations all armed to the teeth--against whom?--against each other? That cannot give the slightest guarantee of peace."²³

During the period of the armistice deliberations, however, he became convinced that his views were not widely shared. "Judging from the spirit which seems more and more to animate our European Allies, I am beginning to despair that the war will accomplish much more than the abolition of German militarism while leaving European militarism as rampant as ever." Nor was he very optimistic over the fate of Point Four of the Fourteen Points. "There are few, so far as I can find here, who lay stress on the Fourth...of President Wilson's declarations.... Yet I think that the fourth declaration will be found to be

the very essence, the health-giving principle, of any attempted remedy for the cure of this war-sick world and without which the remedy will prove nothing but well-meant quackery."²⁴

Bliss, like Foch and Haig, was acutely conscious of the essential permanence of the armistice conditions and that the armistice terms would become the basis for the future peace settlement. Thus, while Foch sought to achieve territorial gains through the armistice, Bliss wanted to achieve disarmament. The first step toward this objective he felt, would be the disarmament of Germany; with this as the guiding principle in the armistice, general disarmament would become the pivotal issue at the peace conference. If only Germany would accept disarmament, he wrote to Secretary Baker on October 23, "then there will be hope that all will disarm."²⁵

Having concluded that the disarmament of Germany should be the principle condition of the armistice, Bliss met with Colonel House on October 27. He learned from House, however, that none of the Commanders or Foch had included disarmament in their armistice proposals. When, therefore, House asked Bliss to prepare a memorandum expounding his views, he wrote up his proposal for disarmament and presented them to the Allied Premiers on October 30. Later the same day, as Bliss wrote in his official report, Colonel House "handed me my memorandum stating that the Council had decided against the proposition for absolute and complete disarmament and demobilization of the enemy forces."²⁶

Having rejected disarmament as the basis for the armistice, the Allied Premiers turned to the alternatives presented by Foch. And at their first meeting, on November 1, Foch's military terms were formally accepted without debate. He had succeeded in keeping disarmament out of the armistice.

The drafting of the final naval terms was a lengthier process and raised both political and technical issues. Politically, there had to be a decision on the future disposition of the German fleet--whether it was to be destroyed, surrendered, interned, disarmed, or simply detained in port. Any of the alternatives, from a strictly military point of view, would have achieved the objective of restricting German sea operations during the period of the armistice. But as the method of restriction would provide that basis of the future peace settlement, the choice was more political than technical. The other issue involved the actual number and type of ships to be surrendered, interned, destroyed, or detained.

After lengthy discussion, the Inter-Allied Naval Council

endorsed the Admiralty draft of October 28 with only slight modification and it was submitted to the Allied Premiers for final approval.²⁷ The political leaders, however, raised a number of objections to the Admiralty's proposal. First, the French (with a few British civil authorities concurring) believed that these requirements were too severe and might cause Germany to reject the armistice; second, American naval officers became alarmed that the surrender and later division of Germany's warships would greatly increase British sea power.

Faced with both French and American opposition, Lloyd George retreated and agreed to accept the internment of the battleships in neutral ports, rather than their surrender. But this compromise pleased no one: the Inter-Allied Naval Council felt that Lloyd George had gone too far and refused to accept the revision; the Allied political leaders felt that he had not gone far enough and also refused to accept the proposal. While accepting the number and type of ships to be restricted, they remained opposed to the method of restriction. While battleships were to be interned, the remaining ships apparently were to be surrendered. Ultimately, during the November 3 and November 4 sessions of the Supreme War Council, Lloyd George capitulated and agreed to ask only for the surrender of submarines; all surface craft stipulated in the agreement were merely to be interned in a neutral or Allied port.

Lloyd George's retreat encountered bitter criticism from the Admirals on the Inter-Allied Naval Council. With the exception of the American representative, Admiral William S. Benson, they all thought it most dangerous to reduce the terms.²⁸ While the admirals felt the naval conditions to be too moderate, Marshal Foch opposed them to the end for being too severe. When he raised his objections at the final sessions of the Supreme War Council, he was told, as he later reported, to insert the naval clauses in the armistice conditions; "then if the enemy found them unacceptable, the matter of what²⁹ modifications to admit would be taken into consideration." As it turned out, the Germans accepted everything.

The Armistice Terms

The armistice terms were approved by the Supreme War Council on November 4, and four days later Marshal Foch presented them to the German delegation at Rethondes. During the negotiations several minor concessions were made, the most important of which was the granting of six additional days to complete the withdrawal from the neutral zone and the reduction of the neutral zone to 10 kilometers. On November 11, the

armistice was signed.

The provisions of the armistice called for a renunciation of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, with all German troops to be withdrawn behind the pre-war frontier. (An exception was made for the eastern front, where there was to be no immediate evacuation of German troops from territory formerly belonging to Russia.) All valuables removed from the occupied territories were to be returned and all gold was to be entrusted to the Allies for safekeeping. On the Western front the armistice called for the evacuation of France, Belgium, Luxemburg and Alsace-Lorraine within fifteen days. Within thirty-one days the German army was to have completely evacuated all German territory west of a ten kilometer neutral zone located on the right bank of the Rhine. The districts on the left bank were to be administered by local authorities under the control of the Allies. Allied troops were to take possession of the principal crossings of the Rhine at Mainz, Coblenz, and Cologne together with bridgeheads at these points controlling an arc of territory 30 kilometers (about 19 miles) on the right bank. All military equipment not withdrawn from the evacuated zone within the time period was to be left in tact and appropriated by the Allies. Also required to be left in tact were all industrial establishments, food supplies and transportation facilities. The Germans were required to surrender certain quantities of weapons--5,000 guns, half of which were to be heavy and the other half were to be field guns, 25,000 machine guns (Foch had originally demanded 30,000), 3,000 trench mortars, and 1,700 fighter and bombing planes. In addition to these weapons, 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 railway cars and 5,000 trucks were to be delivered within 36 days.

The naval provisions provided for the surrender of all German submarines, submarine cruisers, and minelayers with armament and equipment intact within fourteen days and the internment in neutral or Allied ports of 10 battleships, 6 battle cruisers, 8 light cruisers and 50 destroyers of the most modern design. All other surface craft--river boats included--were to be concentrated in German naval bases "and completely disarmed." The naval airforce was to be "concentrated and immobilized" in specified German bases, and the Allied blockade was to be continued. The remaining provisions dealt with repatriation of prisoners of war, mine sweeping, freedom of access to and from the Baltic, evacuation of occupied ports in Belgium and on the Black Sea and the restoration of captured merchant ships to country of origin.

The Armistice was to last 36 days, subject to renewal. To supervise the execution of the terms an International

Armistice Commission was created, with headquarters at Spa, which was to operate under the authority of the Allied High Command. In practice, it operated under the authority of Marshal Foch.

Armistice Renewals. Due to the delay in the convening of the peace conference, the German armistice had to be renewed three times, on December 13, January 16 and February 16. While the first two renewals included a number of new demands, the last--the subject of acrimonious debate among the heads of government at the Paris Peace Conference--was signed without modifications.³⁰

The main addition to the December 13 renewal was a provision which stipulated that Foch could occupy, as an additional guarantee, the neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine. The January 16 renewal was a much lengthier document and included a detailed scheme for substituting agricultural equipment for undelivered railway material and further military provisions. The original clause relating to submarines was in addition supplemented to insure that all U-boats and related equipment capable of being put to sea would be surrendered and those not surrendered would be "destroyed or dismantled." Submarine construction was also to cease immediately. Article 7 of the renewal reserved the right of the Supreme Allied Command to occupy further German territory "whenever it shall consider this desirable." The territory so designated was "the sector of the fortress of Strassburg" with a strip of territory extending from 5 to 10 kilometers in front of the fortress.

While the renewals permitted the Allies to occupy additional territory in the German Rhineland, they did not introduce any provision instituting disarmament or demilitarization.

The Other Armistices. In contrast with the German armistice, the armistices signed with Bulgaria (September 29), Turkey (October 30) and Austria-Hungary (November 3) each contained provisions requiring the complete demobilization of their respective armies. In addition, each of the agreements imposed a limitation on the size of the Army, a stipulation lacking in the German armistice. Article II of the Bulgarian Armistice required the "immediate demobilisation of all Bulgarian armies" and permitted the retention during the armistice period of only three divisions. Article V of the Turkish armistice provided for the "immediate demobilization of the Turkish army, except for such troops as are required for the surveillance of the frontiers and for the maintenance of internal order." The actual number to be permitted was to

be decided later "after consultation with the Turkish Government." And Article II of the Austro-Hungarian armistice provided for the "complete demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Army" with only 20 division--the size of their pre-war army--permitted during the armistice period.

It is questionable, of course, whether demobilizing by itself can be considered a form of disarmament. If demobilization was accompanied by no other restraint and the country was free to remobilize at any time, then it would appear that demobilization could not be classified as disarmament. What made the provisions of the three armistices a form of disarmament was less the requirement of demobilization than the requirement that the armies were to be reduced to a certain size and maintained at that level until decided otherwise by the final peace treaty. A similar restriction affecting the size of the army was to be imposed on Germany in the peace treaty, but no such provision was included in the armistice.

The terms relating to armaments and weapons were also more restrictive in these three earlier agreements than in the German armistice. Where the German armistice provided for the surrender of specified quantities of weapons, the Austro-Hungarian Armistice (Article III), required that "all military and railway equipment of all kinds (including coal) within these stipulated territories was to be left in situ and surrendered to the Allies and America." The Bulgarian Armistice required the "deposit" of all arms, ammunitions and military vehicles belonging to the demobilized units to be placed in designated places where they would come under the control of the Allies. The Turkish armistice left the disposition of the equipment surrendered by the demobilized army to future decision.

The naval clauses of the three armistices ranged from being non-existent in the Bulgarian armistice to the requirement in the Turkish armistice that the entire navy be surrendered. The Austro-Hungarian armistice provided for the surrender of 15 submarines, 3 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 9 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, 1 mine-layer, and 6 Danube monitors. All other warships were to be concentrated in designated ports and "completely disarmed."

German Compliance With the Armistice. Although numerous violations of individual provisions occurred, Germany did fulfill the armistice's most vital control measures. Where violations occurred, through commission or omission, they resulted mainly from the breakdown of that government's internal

control due to domestic strife. A Permanent International Armistice Commission (PIAC) was established, under Article XXXIV, "to insure the carrying out of the present agreement under the best conditions possible."³¹ While this supervisory body was to "function" under the authority of the Allied military and naval High Command,³² in actual practice final decisions rested in the hands of Marshal Foch. The detailed work of the PIAC was distributed among five major committees dealing with repatriation of war prisoners, surrender of weapons, transfer of machinery, transfer of railroad rolling stock, and financial question. Additionally, a committee for repatriation of prisoners of war was later organized in Berlin.

The most significant of the armistice provisions were those which dealt with the evacuation of occupied territories and repatriation of prisoners; the surrender of specified war materials; delivery of transportation materials; the internment of surface warships; and the surrender of all submarines. Those terms pertaining to troop movements and repatriation of Allied prisoners of war proceeded satisfactorily, according to Allied authorities. German military units carried out their evacuation of French and Belgium territories, as well as German territory on the left bank of the Rhine, within the specified time limit and the Allied forces moved forward as scheduled. The Germans did request, unsuccessfully, additional time because of the lack of transportation. The Germans were cited for foraging from the civilian populations (thereby, violating Article VI) in the occupied areas; their response however laid the blame for these conditions upon the Allies for making the retreat so difficult.³¹ Repatriation of Allied prisoners of war proceeded rapidly and satisfactorily; this task was facilitated by the soldier's desire to get home and the German's reluctance to share their dwindling food supplies. Even so the last American prisoners were not returned until February 5, 1919, because they had become "lost" in the administrative confusion that accompanied Germany's internal chaos.³²

The delivery of specified war material fell behind schedule; yet the full significance of this violation is difficult to assess. Colonel Shartle, a senior American delegate on the Armistice Commission, reported that, while the November terms called for the delivery to be completed within twenty days, final compliance was not achieved until March 8, 1919. "The whole period covered by the deliveries

was marked by protests and excuses on the part of the Germans for their failure to carry out the conditions to which they had agreed both in the original Armistice of November 11 and in the monthly renewals thereafter.³³ Yet Foch informed the Supreme War Council just prior to the second renewal that Germany had surrendered the required 5,000 guns and 25,000 machine guns. He then optimistically forecast that "We might be assured, therefore, that the whole of the war material involved would be in our hands within a few days."³⁴

A good deal of the confusion surrounding this transaction apparently hinged on the armistice's demands that the material was to be turned over in orderly deliveries and that these deliveries would consist of modern weapons in good condition. During the early period much of the designated equipment came into Allied hands by abandonment. While the Allies protested that this was not orderly delivery, the Germans protested that under the circumstances this was impossible. There can be little doubt that the general demoralization of the German Army, along with their rapid and difficult retreat, contributed heavily to the lack of "orderly deliveries."³⁵ The Armistice Commission also protested that the words "en bon état" contained in the November terms meant that the equipment delivered must be in condition permitting of immediate use. This concern was prompted when the commission found that the Germans were offering museum pieces to be counted as artillery delivered according to the armistice provisions. Hence, the definition of "modern" was established.³⁶

Another bothersome issue arose when the Germans insisted that it was impossible to turn over more airplanes as there simply were no more available in the country. Article IV of the second renewal of January 18, 1919, modified this stipulation to allow the Germans to furnish twenty horses for each airplane undelivered. "It is an interesting fact," Shartle notes, "that when confronted with this requirement the Germans found they had 600 airplanes and delivered them on time."³⁷ On January 9, 1919, Foch reported that the Allies had received the aircraft asked for.³⁸

Although substantial amounts of transportation material were delivered to the Allies, the total stipulated amounts were not turned over despite the Commission's repeated efforts. Foch reported on January 9, 1919, that the Allies had received 4,422 of 5,000 motor lorries and some 61,560, of 150,000 trucks and wagons demanded.³⁹ Robling stock was the most difficult to collect. Shartle reports that "There remained to be delivered on June 4th /1919/, the date of the last joint meeting of the Allied and German transport committees, 46

locomotives /of 5,000/, 6,172 railroad cars." Because of the difficulty in collecting these items and because of their natural desire to retain as much as possible of this critical equipment, the Germans disputed every delivery of railroad material. They were penalized in the January renewal with the alternative transfer of agricultural implements; however, the commission encountered almost as much difficulty in procuring these items for the Germans maintained that they lacked the necessary raw materials and fuel to manufacture them and that the plants were hampered by strikes.⁴⁰

Germany did clearly violate the naval terms of the armistice pertaining to surface warships. On November 13 the Germans received orders to disarm the stipulated vessels and to have them rendezvous off the Firth of Forth. The German government encountered great difficulty in persuading the mutinous crews (who had been the first to run up the Red flag of rebellion) to comply with Allied demands. However, by pointing out that the only alternative to internment of these vessels abroad was an Allied occupation of Heligoland, the authorities accomplished this task. On November 19, 69 German warships, reduced by accidents from the originally specified 74, passed through long lines of Allied vessels in an improvised version of a formal surrender and then proceeded to Scapa Flow in the Orkneys. Arriving at this barren naval outpost on November 27, the German ships remained at anchor attended by homesick, shadow crews pending the final disposition of the fleet by the peace conference. When Admiral von Reuter, who was in charge of the interned fleet, learned of the impending surrender of these warships as called for in Article 184 of the Versailles Treaty, he ordered them scuttled on June 21.⁴¹ The Allies promptly indicted the Germans for violating Article XXXI of the armistice; yet it is doubtful that American naval officers looked upon the scuttling with disfavor for they had long opposed the aggrandizement of the Royal Navy through a division of German warships.⁴² Indeed, some British admirals were relieved to have the Germans eliminate one source of Anglo-American tension.⁴³

Accounting for, and gaining control of, German submarines also proved troublesome. Although Germany had agreed to turn over all underwater boats to the Allies, the Naval Commission found that a December, 1918 inspection of German ports revealed that there were 65 submarines that could be towed to neutral ports, 125 others that could be completed in German shipyards, as well as more than 30 additional submarines located in ports not yet visited. The Commission recommended that the 65 boats be towed to British harbors, while the submarines under

construction be destroyed and all work in this line cease.⁴⁴ Although the Germans apparently abided by the latter suggestion, they violated the terms by destroying the completed U-boats in the North Sea rather than deliver them to the British.

Compliance with the Other Armistices. The low priority of these "secondary" armistices emerges more clearly as one considers the relative lack of concern shown by the Allies regarding their violation. Although the Bulgarian armistice created few difficulties, those involving Austria, Hungary, and Turkey proved perplexing and encountered varying degrees of noncompliance. None of these violations of stipulated arms control measures, however, endangered immediate Entente goals, although they did have substantial effect on certain longer range Allied interests.

Exhausted and anxious to accommodate the Allies, the Bulgarians sought to faithfully comply with the armistice conditions.⁴⁵ In this spirit, they facilitated the passage of Entente troops through Bulgarian territory to the Danube, thus meeting the immediate military necessities of Allied strategy. But the armistice with Austria-Hungary quickly became enmeshed in the political complications that accompanied the dissolution of the historic Empire. First, the succession of Hungary as an independent state necessitated a separate armistice. Then, given the preoccupation of the "Big Three" with Germany, supervision of the Austrian agreement fell largely to the Italians. With very few Allied troops other than Italians present, the ambitions of Italy collided with those of the new state of Yugoslavia, particularly over Fiume. But aside from the difficulties in the Adriatic, the Austrian terms appear to have been carried out with few violations.⁴⁶

The armistice with Hungary proved the most difficult to enforce. On November 2, 1918, Count Michael Karolyi repudiated the Austrian armistice, hoping to disassociate his regime from the fate of the defeated Empire. However, this action meant that Korolyi had to acquire new terms from French General Franchet d'Esperey, who represented the Allied Powers in South-eastern Europe and who had little sympathy for the young republic. The terms of the resulting armistice, signed on November 11, led to the dismemberment of Greater Hungary and became the source of friction between Allied governments and their Balkan partners, particularly Czechoslovakia and Romania. Banat and Borsha were given to the Serbians by the terms of the armistice; other articles limited Hungary to six infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions and implied that Hungary might be occupied if it did not comply with the armistice provisions. While Count Karolyi busily disarmed Hungary in

the misguided hope that the Allies would respond with leniency, his neighbors prepared to divide the spoils. Czechoslovakia moved first into Hungarian territory, occupying Pozsony, Slovakia, and Kassa in early December. By December 27, the Romanians, in turn, had occupied Transylvania and were looking about for greater opportunities.⁴⁷

In March 1919, leftist elements in Budapest brought to power a communist government under the direction of Bela Kun. Acting under a mandate of the Peace Conference, Rumanian troops ultimately overthrew the Bela Kun government and presented the Magyars with a third armistice. This called for the reduction of Hungarian troops to a 15,000-man police force and the dismantling of munitions factories for shipment to Romania as reparations.⁴⁹ Only after the Entente ordered a blockade of Romanian commerce were the latter's forces removed and, at that point, Admiral Nicolas Horthy with British and French backing, seized control of the government.⁵⁰ Although cited by the Entente for armistice violations, not all Allied officials agreed.⁵¹ General Tasker Bliss argued that the Hungarians had reduced their forces and had rearmed only when invaded.⁵²

With the Turkish armistice, the Allies (primarily Britain) inherited an enormous task of trying to control a great area extending from the River Maritza to the Indian Ocean and from the Caucasus to the Red Sea. What with the mounting quarrel with France over middle-eastern economic and territorial privileges and the overriding concern with Germany, the British gave little consideration to insuring Turkish compliance with the armistice's military provisions. As British concern centered on control of the Straits and the Black sea, insufficient forces were deployed to secure the disarmament of the Turkish army in accordance with the terms of the armistice. Nor were there sufficient personnel to guard the dumps of arms which had been surrendered. Consequently, Mustapha Kemal was able to arm his nationalist movement and wage war against the Greeks. The armistice demand for Turkish disarmament never was achieved.⁵³

Chapter 1 -- Footnotes

¹ Hungary subsequently declared its own sovereignty and negotiated a separate armistice with the Allies on November 13, 1918.

² See Harry R. Rudin, Armistice, 1918 (1944), p. 395.

³ After examining the war aims of Britain during the first three years of hostilities, Crosby concluded that, "Among men of all political faiths, from the intellectual Fabian Socialists to the 'terrible simplifiers' of the Daily Mail, the idea became accepted that the necessary condition of a peaceful and happy international order was a complete destruction of German power." Greda Richards Crosby, The Politics of the Disarmament Question in England, 1914-1919 (1957), pp. 20-22. The French statesman Andre Tardieu, noted that "All through the war, the Allies proclaimed, as first among their war aims, the destruction of German militarism." The Truth About the Treaty (1921), p. 125.

⁴ The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame, 1914-1918 (1924), p. 149.

⁵ Occasionally, in unofficial circles the defeat of Germany was loosely tied to the possibility, as H. G. Wells put it, of opening "the way to disarmament and peace throughout the earth." H.G. Wells, "The Sword of Peace," August 7, 1914, as quoted in Irene Cooper Willis, England's Holy War (1928), p. 88. Official declarations of war aims are found in J.B. Scott, ed., Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December, 1916-November, 1918 (1921); G.L. Di G.L. Dickinson, Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims (1919) and War Speeches of British Ministers, 1914-1916 (1917).

⁶ Crosby, Politics of Disarmament, p. 67.

⁷ Frederick Maurice, The Armistices of 1918 (1943), pp. 7-9. Laurence W. Martin believes this speech to be the "most comprehensive declaration of moderate terms yet made by any British statesman," Peace Without Victory (1958), p. 156. But it must be remembered that Lloyd George exempted the Royal Navy from this declaration against "warlike preparations" since the "Navy is a defensive weapon," see Willis, Holy War, p. 287.

⁸ See Crosby, Politics of Disarmament, p. 59

⁹ For example, Wilson's "Peace Without Victory" speech of January 22, 1917.

¹⁰ This correspondence has been traced in H.W.V. Temperley, (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (1920-24), I, 373-86; Ferdinand Czernin, Versailles, 1919 (1964), pp. 6-12; Ferdinand Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch (1931), pp. 451-55; John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War (1931), II., 342-48; Crosby, Politics of Disarmament, pp. 76-83; Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (1961), pp. 40-44; F. S. Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919 (1944) pp. 221-27; W. M. Jordan, Great Britain, France and the German Problem, 1918-1939 (1943), pp. 13-30; and Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (1941), pp. 3-22

¹¹ Czernin, Versailles, p. 23.

¹² See Ibid., pp. 10-20; and Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (1926-28), IV, 192ff.

¹³ Temperley concludes that on the basis of the correspondence there were "moral obligations binding upon the Powers and Austria-Hungary alike." This moral obligation stems principally from the American note of October 18 and the Austro-Hungarian note of October 27, the first merely qualifying the Fourteen Points in reference to Point Ten--the peoples of Austria-Hungary were to have not only an "opportunity of autonomous development" but of self-determination--and the latter accepting the principle of self-determination in general and the independence of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in particular along with the other Points. Temperley, History of the Peace Conference, I, 369-73.

¹⁴ Jordan, The German Problem, p. 14; and David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, (1933-34), VI, 3275.

¹⁵ Foch, Memoirs, pp. 456-58.

¹⁶ The Senlis Conference has been reviewed in Foch, Memoirs, pp. 459-61; Pershing, My Experiences, II, 360-62; Jordan, The German Problem, pp. 19-23; C. R. Cutwell, A History of the Great War, 1914-1918 (1933), pp. 586-97; Rudin, Armistice, pp. 177-82; and The Private Papers of Douglas Haig, 1914-1919 (1952), pp. 330-36.

17 The October 25 draft is in Foch, Memoirs, p. 461.

18 Rudin, citing Foch as his source, stated that the arms demanded in this provision comprised 1/3 of Germany's artillery and 1/2 of its machine guns. Armistice. p. 179n.

19 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, VI, 3275-76.

20 Jordan, The German Problem, p. 16.

21 Ibid., pp. 17, 28.

22 Foch, Memoirs, p. 461

23 Frederick Palmer, Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of Tasker H. Bliss (1934), p. 342.

24 Ibid., p. 340.

25 Ibid., p. 344

26 Bliss' final official repo^rt to the Secretary of State, February 6, 1920, quoted in Ibid., p. 347.

27 The negotiations leading up to the final drafting of the naval terms is based on Seymour, Papers of Colonel House, IV, 120-33; Lady Wester Wemyss, Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wemyss (1935), pp. 383-88, 394; Jordan, The German Problem, pp 28-29; Rudin, Armistice, pp. 302-04; and Marston, Peace Conference, pp. 23-24.

28 See Wemyss Life and Letters, p. 387.

29 Foch, Memoirs, pp. 464-65.

30 The Armistices and renewals are found in Temperly, History of the Peace Conference, I, 459-97.

31 Colonel Samuel G. Shartle, Spa, Versailles, Munich: An Account of the Armistice Commission (1941), pp. 49-50, 56, 58.

32 Ibid., pp. 56-58

33 Ibid., pp. 50-51.

34 F. R.: Peace Conf., 1919, III, 496. Shartle noted on January 11, 1919, that "The material has been almost all delivered," The Armistice Commission, pp. 50-53.

35 Shartle, The Armistice Commission, pp. 50-53.

36 Ibid. This war booty was divided among the Allies as follows: Belgian Army 1/10; American Army 2/10; British Army 3/10; and French Army 4/10.

37 Ibid., p. 53.

38 F. R.: Peace Conf., 1919, III, 470.

39 Ibid., p. 470.

40 Shartle, The Armistice Commission, p. 55.

41 Rudin, Armistice, p. 316fn. #24; for the German side of this story, see Vice Admiral Ludwig von Reuter, Scapa Flow: The Account of the Greatest Scuttling of all Time (1940).

42 "No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender, or restoration."

43 Admiral Lord Wemyss wrote about the scuttling just 48 hours before the Allies were to assume formal control of these vessels; "I must confess that I was beginning to think that they the Germans would never do it." Life and Letters, p. 432.

44 F. R.: Peace Conf., 1919, III, 474-76.

45 Palmer, Bliss, Peacemaker, pp. 414-415. Bliss' diary for August 4, 1919 reports that all Allied military officers agreed that Bulgaria had fully honored the terms of her armistice.

46 Maurice, The Armistices of 1918, p. 76.

47 F. R.: Peace Conf., 1919, I, 309, II, 183, 378; Admiral Nicolas Horthy, Memoirs (1956), p. 96; Count Paul Teleki, The Evolution of Hungary and Its Place In European History (1923), p. 137.

48 F. R.: Peace Conf., 1919, VII, 528-42, 547-55.

49 Ibid., pp. 566-69; Horthy, Memoirs, p. 400.

50 Soon after Bela Kun came to power, a counter-revolutionary movement began forming in Vienna under the protection and support of French General de Gondrecourt. Among the implements supplied by the French were airplanes. The British were not unsympathetic and assigned Col. Alexander Fitzgerald

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as liaison officer. Horthy, Memoirs, pp. 98-100.

51 F. R.: Peace Conf., 1919, VII, 317-21; D.B.E.P., Ser.1,
I, 18.

52 D.B.E.P., Ser. 1, I, 101-2.

53 Maurice, The Armistices of 1918, pp. 23-25.

Chapter 2

DISARMING THE VANQUISHED:The Versailles Treaty & German Disarmament

Meeting in Paris from January to June, 1919, the victorious Allies--led by the "big four", Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Great Britain, Premier Georges Clemenceau of France, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States, and Premier Vittorio Orlando of Italy--drafted a peace settlement, without German participation, which called among other things for the extensive disarmament of the defeated state.¹ Disarmament by "imposition" was not, in 1919, an innovation; indeed, this technique had a history which could be traced back at least as far as the Old Testament.² Nor was this the first German experience with this concept for it had been applied by Napoleon against Prussia at Tilsit in 1806 and expanded by the Treaty of Paris in 1808.³ What was new to this technique was the extensive refinements which were included in the Treaty of Versailles, imposing limitations on the size of the army and navy and the weapons they could have, control over armament production, restrictions on the method of military recruitment, limitations on trade, creation of demilitarized zones, restrictions on educational institutions, and external supervision and control.

The conditions for the disarmament of Germany were contained in Part V of the Versailles Treaty, comprising Articles 159 to 213. The more important provisions stipulated that the German army was to be limited to 100,000 and the navy was to be reduced to six battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats. No military or naval air force was to be permitted, nor was the army to have any tanks or heavy artillery while the navy was to be deprived of all submarines. The amount of armament and munitions Germany was permitted was greatly curtailed and specifically enumerated. All production of armaments was to be permitted in only Allied-approved factories and the importation and export of war material was forbidden. Universal compulsory service was

banned and the new army and navy were to be recruited on a voluntary, long-service basis. In the Baltic and North Sea, German fortifications were to be destroyed and certain islands were to be disarmed. Restrictions were placed on German military schools and provision was made to limit the number of customs officials, forest guards and coast guards. The left bank of the Rhine was to be demilitarized as was a zone 50 kilometers east of the Rhine. Finally, Inter-Allied Commissions of Control were to supervise the execution of the treaty terms.

In assessing the political process leading up to the final agreement on the military terms, the following points stand out. 1) German disarmament was initially proposed by the Allies not as a permanent imposition but as a temporary expedient. Advanced originally during the debate over the third renewal of the armistice, German disarmament was perceived more as a means to achieve Allied demobilization, than as a permanent feature of the peace settlement. 2) In the debate that took place during the initial stages of the discussion, it was Marshal Foch who was most vehemently opposed to German disarmament and Lloyd George who was most insistent. 3) The drafting of the military terms of the treaty gave rise to sharp differences between the Allies both over the degree of disarmament to be imposed on Germany and the procedures of enforcement. Especially contentious were the determination of the size of the German army, its method of recruitment, and the means and duration of supervision and control. 4) The main provisions relating to German disarmament were often decided less as a result of an assessment of military requirements than as a result of political needs. Not only was the debate over the size of the German army and its method of recruitment based largely on political criteria, but the decision on supervision and control involved more political than military considerations. 5) The drafting of the naval and aerial terms of the treaty was less contentious than confusing, and less political than technical.

The Decision to Disarm

Disarmament was first raised at the Paris conference as a procedural issue. On January 21, 1919, three days after the conference opened, British Foreign Minister, Lord Balfour, proposed to the Council of Ten that a committee be appointed to consider disarmament. As there had already been committees formed to consider the League of Nations, indemnities and the international labor question, Balfour's procedural recommendation suggested four policy implications: first, that disarmament should be given the same high priority by the peace

conference as that given to the League, indemnities and international labor; second, that the conference should concentrate on general disarmament, not simply the disarmament of Germany; third, that the actual terms of general disarmament should be established at the peace conference and not postponed for a future conference; and fourth, that decision-making authority should be broadened to include the smaller Powers not represented on the Council of Ten (as had already been decided for the other Committees).⁴

Two days later, on January 23, Lloyd George submitted a resolution to the Council of Ten which clarified Balfour's original suggestion. The resolution called for a disarmament commission to be composed of two representatives from each of the five Great Powers and five representatives from the other powers recognized at the conference. This Commission was:

- 1) to advise on an immediate and drastic reduction in the armed forces of the enemy;
- 2) to prepare a plan in connection with the League of Nations for a permanent reduction in the burden of military, naval, and aerial forces and armaments.⁵

The Lloyd George resolution retained the notion that the smaller powers were to share in the determination of German disarmament and general disarmament, but shifted the implementation of general disarmament to a postconference period. All the commission would do was "prepare a plan" for general disarmament which would be carried out later under the auspices of the League. In contrast to the Balfour proposal, the immediate concern of the delegates should be in German disarmament.

Lloyd George's demand for an "immediate and drastic reduction in the armed forces of the enemy" as a part of the third armistice renewal was as unique in motivation as it was curiously late in being forwarded. In spite of wartime talk about destroying German militarism, there had been no provision in the armistice terms for a drastic reduction of Germany's armed forces, nor had disarmament been proposed for the first or second renewals. Indeed, this was the first time since the end of hostilities that German disarmament was formally proposed by the head of a delegation.

The lack of urgency attached to German disarmament became clear in the discussions that took place during the next three weeks. In general, it was a calculated neglect on the part

of Marshal Foch. The French military leader reasoned that the disarmament of Germany could never be carried out effectively but it might lead to the immediate demobilization of the Allied forces. This would mean that the Allies would not have the power to enforce a peace treaty once defined and presented to the Germans. Foch felt that security was to be achieved less through German disarmament than through the maintenance of Allied strength and the occupation of German territory. Consequently, he insisted on armistice conditions which required the Allies to maintain powerful forces in the field.

But it was precisely the implications of Foch's armistice terms that prompted Lloyd George to suggest an alternative policy. Under pressure at home for the demobilization of the British army, he proposed German disarmament mainly for domestic political reasons. He noted that "unless the enemy's forces were immediately reduced, the British Government might be forced to maintain compulsory service," a policy which found little favor in Britain. Marshal Foch's request for the maintenance of a British army of 1,700,000, therefore, was "a very serious demand which would not be readily accepted by the country." He suggested as an alternative that when the armistice was next renewed "we should demand a drastic reduction of the armed forces of Germany to a fixed quorum, such as might suffice to maintain internal order."⁶

Lloyd George's resolution and the discussion that followed raised six important questions which were to occupy the delegates for the next month, although few were explicitly formulated or clearly defined. First was the question of approach: should Germany's forces be reduced or should Allied forces be maintained? Second was the question of timing: should German disarmament be carried out immediately or could it be dealt with later? A third point introduced the issue of authority: should the small Powers be included in the discussion or should the matter be decided by the Great Powers? Fourth was an important procedural point: should the disarmament of Germany be imposed or negotiated? Fifth was the question of jurisdiction: should the question of German disarmament be taken up for decision by the Peace Conference or be settled through a renewal of the Armistice? The sixth issue raised the question of degree: how far should Germany be disarmed?

These issues were discussed intermittently and somewhat randomly over the next three weeks in the Supreme War Council. Ad hoc committees were formed, numerous draft resolutions were presented, but for the most part decisions were made without

ever deciding. Thus, agreements were reached less through the formal procedure of passing on resolutions than by passing to the next subject.

The Question of Approach. Whether Germany was to be disarmed or Allied strength maintained was decided on January 24, the day following Lloyd George's introduction of his draft resolution. At that session, The Council of Ten convened as the Supreme War Council with the Allied military leaders in attendance. Lloyd George repeated his proposal for German disarmament to be part of the next renewal of the armistice. Foch objected: while admitting that there would be "no difficulty in adding such a /disarmament/ clause to the armistice" and that the Germans "would no doubt accept it," he opposed the proposal as "it would be extremely difficult to ensure its execution." He felt that German disarmament could not be effective because "the controlling parties would only be allowed to see what the Germans wished them to see." He also felt that it was doubtful that all the arms could be seized. And while munitions factories could be taken over, "it would be quite impossible to occupy them all." Finally, he noted that there was no guarantee that the conditions would be adhered to. For these reasons, he urged that the Allied governments "should make no reduction in the agreed strengths of the armies of occupation."⁷

Lloyd George responded by noting the logical implication of Marshal Foch's argument. It "really meant that Germany could never be trusted and, therefore, that the armies of occupation could never be materially reduced." Challenging Foch's basic premise, Lloyd George argued that disarmament could be made effective through the control of food, raw materials, and the seizure of arms.⁸

In the discussion that followed, the military leaders revealed a fundamental split in their ranks. While the French staff was vehemently opposed to the reduction of German armed forces, the American military representative, General Tasker Bliss, supported Lloyd George. The British delegates, General Sir Henry Wilson and Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, took a position somewhat between the French and the Americans: while acknowledging that the Germans could be disarmed, they emphasized the necessity of guarantees. Haig noted that "unless they could obtain guarantees that arms would be surrendered and munitions factories destroyed, they must maintain the forces laid down by Marshal Foch." The Italian military leaders, General Armando Diaz, on the other hand, tended to agree with both sides. He accepted the assumption that Germany continued to present a "grave" military danger, but

insisted that Italy could not "indefinitely remain on a war footing." He proposed, as "a way out of the difficulty," the destruction or control of "all the sources from which engines of destruction were produced" --munitions factories and mines.⁹

There was fundamental disagreement over how strong Germany was at that moment. Foch, supported for the most part by General Wilson and Haig, felt that Germany was potentially strong and capable of renewing hostilities at a moment's notice. Diaz, while not committing himself, appeared to agree. Lloyd George, on the other hand, felt that Germany was in no condition to renew hostilities and that Allied forces could therefore be reduced. In this appraisal he was supported by the Americans, Bliss and General John Pershing. Pershing noted that the military and food situation made it "impossible" for Germany "to resume offensive operations with any possible chance of holding her own." Wilson and Clemenceau were undecided while Orlando remained silent throughout the whole discussion.¹⁰

To resolve the developing impasse, Lloyd George proposed a procedural solution. He asked that a small committee be appointed "to consider and put forth proposals as to the best manner of disarming Germany." With the acceptance of this proposal, Lloyd George's policy won out over Marshal Foch's for implicit in the terms of reference of the committee was the idea that Germany was to be disarmed.¹¹ With the policy issue decided, the committee was chosen with Louis Loucheur as chairman and including Winston Churchill, General Bliss, General Diaz, and Marshal Foch.¹²

The Decision on Timing. The decision on timing was reached implicitly if not explicitly as a result of Lloyd George's subtle resort to diplomatic brinkmanship. This was the first, but not the last, instance of a decision being made on the basis of a point of privilege--i.e., as a result of the insistence of one member that the issue was so vitally important that there was no assurance that commitments could be fulfilled if refused. When Lloyd George presented his draft on January 23 calling for "an immediate and drastic reduction in the armed forces of the enemy," none of the other representatives saw any urgency to the matter or expressed any impatience over the issue of German disarmament. When, therefore, he presented his proposal again the next day to the Supreme War Council, he subtly linked the argument of importance with that of timing. In Great Britain, he noted, they were "compelled to face the problem of demobilization at once." Going even further, he said that he felt "compelled" to say that he was "doubtful" whether Great Britain could contribute the troops Marshal Foch asked for.¹³

With that the issue was settled: there was no further discussion of the question of timing. With the appointment of the Loucheur committee, it was no longer a question of whether Germany should be disarmed, but rather who should decide and to what extent. Lloyd George had scored another point, although the negotiating technique was not lost on the other delegates.

The Decision-making Authority. This issue was settled by ad hoc arrangements which became precedents and by precedents which became policies. When Lord Balfour originally suggested the formation of a disarmament committee on January 21, it was proposed on the model of the existing committees on the League of Nations, indemnities and international labor, all three of which were composed of representatives of small as well as Great Powers. Lloyd George's resolution two days later retained the representation from small as well as the larger powers. When the discussion foundered over the issue of the existing strength of Germany, Lloyd George proposed a technical committee --which became the Loucheur Committee--composed not unnaturally of representatives of the Great Powers then discussing the problem. Following the presentation of the report of the Loucheur committee on February 7, another technical committee was appointed--the Tardieu Committee--also composed of representatives of the Great Powers. Then on February 10, yet another technical committee chaired by Marshal Foch was appointed to make recommendations on economic as well as military matters pertaining to the armistice. This too was composed of delegates from the Great Powers only. Finally, on February 12, when the decision was made to work out the permanent military terms for inclusion in the peace treaty, the existing Foch committee served as the nucleus for the committee appointed to draft the terms. Thus the policy of excluding the smaller powers from the deliberations on German disarmament was never formally made but rather was based on procedural consistency and organizational inertia: once a procedural pattern was established, it was difficult to revise the system.

The Question of Procedure. The issue of whether to negotiate the terms with the Germans or impose them was resolved easily, with only feeble protests being raised by Wilson. When Lloyd George introduced the notion of disarming Germany on January 23, Wilson had asked whether this reduction of German forces could be done without consultation with the Germans.¹⁴

This vague suggestion, however, was not followed up by any of the other delegates. Not until the Loucheur report

was submitted two weeks later, on February 7, did Wilson return to the idea. He was apprehensive over the prospect of continually adding conditions to the armistice terms, conditions which might—if not carried out—require the resumption of hostilities as a means of enforcement. Therefore, Wilson suggested negotiating with the Germans on a quid pro quo basis: Germany would voluntarily reduce its forces in exchange for a reduction of the Allied army of occupation and a relaxation of the blockade.¹⁵

Clemenceau responded vigorously against negotiating with the Germans. He was supported by Orlando, who insisted that "whatever was wanted must be demanded in the form of an order and in a loud tone of voice."¹⁶ Although Lloyd George supported Wilson's proposals for negotiations, and even submitted a resolution to that effect,¹⁷ Clemenceau's opposition was so firm that the idea was permanently vetoed. After the February 7 discussion, nothing further was heard on the issue of negotiating German disarmament.

The Issue of Jurisdiction. Whether German disarmament was to be under the authority of the Supreme War Council and presented to the Germans as a condition for renewing the armistice or whether it was to be under the authority of the Supreme Council and presented as part of the peace treaty was one of the most contentious and confusing policy decisions of the Allies during these initial discussions. For implied in the issue of jurisdiction were the more fundamental questions of purpose and duration of German disarmament.

Lloyd George implied on January 23 that German disarmament be a condition for renewing the armistice. Orlando brought the question squarely before the delegates. He said that he would like to raise "a point of procedure"—that "the question of immediate reduction of the enemy's forces was not a Peace Conference matter but an Armistice matter."¹⁸ Orlando's "point of procedure" appeared to settle not only the technical question of jurisdiction, but the purpose and duration of German disarmament as well. In the discussions during the next two weeks, it was assumed that the main purpose of German disarmament was to permit the Allies to demobilize.¹⁹ This implied a determination on duration of the terms—that the disarmament of Germany was to last merely for the duration of the Armistice. Although some vague reservations were raised to this assumption, principally by Foch, no one at this time was planning for the permanent disarmament of Germany.

Only as a result of Wilson's growing opposition to using the forthcoming renewal of the armistice as a means of imposing

disarmament was consideration given to other approaches. And not until February 12 was a new scheme presented, completely altering the prevailing assumptions on German disarmament. On that day, the recommendations of an ad hoc committee appointed earlier to investigate means of enforcing the existing armistice were submitted to the Supreme War Council.²⁰ The committee recommended that in view of the difficulties in enforcing the existing armistice, it would be unwise to add new demands. They proposed that instead of inserting disarmament provisions in the armistice that the "Naval and Military terms of peace would be drawn up immediately by a commission appointed for that purpose and...imposed on the enemy."²¹

This proposal corresponded to a resolution which Balfour submitted to the Council that same day. His resolution proposed that the armistice be renewed without change and that the final military and naval terms of the peace treaty be immediately drawn up. Implied was the notion that the military terms should be isolated from the rest of the peace treaty and submitted separately to the Germans as a Preliminary Peace Treaty.²² Wilson responded enthusiastically noting that Balfour's proposal "for the first time seemed to suggest to him a satisfactory solution." All along, he continued, his difficulty had been that "little and irritating secondary demands were continually being added to the armistice conditions whilst at the same time reports were being received to the effect that the previously accepted terms had not been fulfilled."²³

While Wilson saw the idea of separating the military provisions of the treaty from the rest of the conditions as an ideal solution, Clemenceau foresaw complications. The acceptance of a Preliminary Peace Treaty would mean that once the military terms had been imposed, the other provisions of the peace treaty would have to be negotiated. If Germany disarmed and the Allied forces demobilized, how could the remaining terms be imposed? Grasping the implications of the new proposal, Clemenceau made a passionate speech--the longest single speech of the entire conference--against negotiating with the Germans. Specifically, he noted that the military terms depended largely on other terms. If the League became effective, the military terms would be different from what they would otherwise have to be. Consequently, he believed that the military terms "could not be separated from the political, economic and financial terms."²⁴

The Council convened again in the afternoon of February 12 to continue the discussion. Wilson was even more enthusiastic for a preliminary peace while Clemenceau came forth with additional objections--including that Wilson was returning temporarily to the United States. Clemenceau noted that he

"would not like to discuss a matter of such importance in the absence of President Wilson." Wilson parried adroitly, declaring that "in technical matters most of the brains he used were borrowed: the possessors of these brains were in Paris." He would, therefore, "go away with an easy mind if he thought that his plan had been adopted in principle." Clemenceau gave in and Orlando followed saying he was "extremely glad of this agreement." Balfour resubmitted his resolution calling for the immediate drawing up of the final military disarmament terms to be imposed on Germany. A drafting committee under the chairmanship of Marshal Foch was appointed, including the military advisers of the Great Powers only.²⁵

By February 12 most of the issues had been settled. It had been decided that German disarmament was not to be negotiated but was to be imposed; that the subject was to be taken up by the Peace Conference and not implemented through the armistice; and that the small Powers were not to share in the decision-making function. The only question not decided was the extent of German disarmament--a subject which would concern the delegates for another month. By March 17, however, the final terms had been agreed upon. Although the idea of a Preliminary Peace Treaty had been abandoned by that time, only minor alterations were made in the military terms after that date.

What is perhaps most significant about these early proceedings was that the decision to disarm Germany was prompted less by a desire to insure postwar peace than by a desire to permit the Allies to demobilize. While it had been suggested at one point that the conference should deal with general as well as German disarmament, this idea was not followed up in any of the discussions. (See Chapter 5.) Nor was there any suggestion that the disarmament of Germany required any reciprocal obligation on the part of the Allies. Indeed, the decision to include the disarmament of Germany in the peace treaty arose not out of an agreement over objectives but as a result of a disagreement over the terms of renewing the armistice.

Defining the Military Terms

When Lloyd George called for the reduction of German forces on January 23, he specified only that the reduction should be "drastic." This was enough, however, to cause Wilson some uneasiness. Wilson thought that the word "drastic" conveyed unnecessarily "the impression of a threat." Lloyd George assured the President that this was not to be communicated to the Germans, but was merely to serve as a guide to the Allies.

He wished only to convey to the committee, which would study this problem, "that the enemy's forces should be reduced to the minimum necessary for the maintenance of internal order."²⁶

But what was the size of the force needed to maintain internal order in Germany? Indeed, was the military to be reduced only to that necessary for internal order or might it not be necessary to permit Germany a force capable of resisting external attack? Police force or defensive army, that was the first question. Even if the military was reduced to the size of a police force, how were the Allies to ensure Germany's defense. Without some form of security, a disarmed Germany would be a temptation to its armed neighbors--like Poland--and, therefore, a defenseless Germany might lead to a new war in Central Europe. In the discussions that followed, it was--perhaps not unnaturally--the French who were the least worried with the consequences of a defenseless Germany and the British who were the most concerned.

The level of disarmament to be imposed on Germany was first discussed in the Loucheur Committee. Although originally designed to establish arms control only for the period of the armistice, the Loucheur report, submitted on February 7, served as the model for all subsequent discussions of German disarmament, even when the discussion shifted from temporary armistice conditions to permanent postwar arrangements. As the basis for disarmament, the Loucheur report recommended that the German army be reduced, that the amount of weapons permitted Germany be specifically enumerated, that production facilities be controlled, and that control and supervisory machinery be created. Under the terms of the report, the German army was to be reduced to 25 divisions and 5 cavalry divisions. While no specific numbers were mentioned at this point, it could be calculated on the basis of rifles authorized that the thirty divisions would permit an army of 330,000.²⁷

The fundamental problem raised by the Loucheur report was the determination of the number of weapons to be turned over to the Allies. Assuming that all weapons in excess of the designated figures were to be surrendered, the first and most troublesome question was--how many weapons did Germany have in excess of these figures? Here information was scarce and conflicting. To find a way out of the problem the Tardieu Committee was appointed, which reached the conclusion that the best thing to do was to ask the German government to supply the information. In the meantime, the Allies could request that a certain number of weapons be surrendered--the number of which were listed in detail.²⁸

The main objections to the Tardieu report came from Wilson who opposed the provision which demanded the surrender of some material now and some later, when more information became available.²⁹ As a result, the Foch committee, appointed on February 10, suggested that the delegates not seek disarmament through the armistice but instead should pass directly to the formulation of the final military and naval terms. As a result of the inability to determine how many weapons Germany should surrender during the armistice and Wilson's objection to the adding of new conditions to the agreement, it was decided to make disarmament a "Peace Conference matter" rather than an "armistice matter." On February 12 the Foch Committee was charged with the formulation of the final military terms of the treaty, which meant that the entire focus of analysis shifted from temporary to permanent conditions.

Limitating the Army. The report of the Foch Committee was first taken up by the Council of Ten on March 3, 1919.³⁰ Following a discussion, the draft was returned to the Foch Committee to incorporate the changes suggested. The revised terms were resubmitted to the Council on March 17, where they were once again examined. The terms accepted at the March 17 session constituted, with few exceptions, the final military provisions of the treaty.

These discussions focused on two related issues--the size of the German army and the method of its recruitment. The original terms proposed had suggested a German army of 330,000. The first draft of the Foch Committee reduced this figure considerably, for it provided that "the land forces of Germany shall not exceed a strength of 200,000 men (officers not included)--that the number of officers...shall not exceed 9,000." These forces were to be organized in no more than 15 infantry divisions and five cavalry divisions. And the method of recruitment--for enlisted men--was to be by conscription for a period of one year.³¹

When the report came up at the March 7 session, Lloyd George immediately challenged the recommendation for conscription. He pointed out that under the Foch scheme of short service, with 200,000 men recruited annually, in ten years 2,000,000 men would have been trained and in 20 years, 4,000,000 men would have had military training. "Was that," he asked, "really Marshal Foch's proposal?"³² Foch replied that by renewing the personnel annually, "soldiers of a sort" would be produced; but in any army, "it was not the common soldier that constituted the quality of an Army, but the 'cadres'." Under the provisions recommended, a large number of soldiers would undoubtedly come under training, but there

would be no corresponding staffs; "that was the weak point of the system that was to be imposed on Germany." On the other hand, "even a small standing army represented ready-made cadres for the training of a vast force."³³

Lloyd George did not think the reply given "met the real difficulty." He noted that Germany already had thousands of veteran officers and would have them for the next twenty-five years. This being the case, he asked somewhat rhetorically: "Why should the Allies present Germany a scheme which could enable her to raise four or five million men in the next twenty years?" He said that he "would be very sorry to leave France after the signing of peace with that threat facing her across the Rhine."³⁴

Secretary Lansing interjected--perhaps naively--a bit of logic into the argument at this point, which was appreciated by no one, since what they were talking about had little to do with the real issue. Lansing pointed out that Germany also had 2 or 3 million trained soldiers in addition to trained officers. "Consequently, the whole question was really one of disarmament, that is to say, the Germans must be made to surrender their surplus arms and armaments."³⁵ This was a solid point for, presumably, if Germany had no arms or armaments, the method of recruitment would be less relevant.

In reality, of course, Lloyd George and Foch were arguing a political issue in military terms. Lloyd George was attempting to make good on an electoral promise--a promise to abolish conscription, at least in Germany. For Foch, political considerations of a different sort were equally compelling. As one writer put it: "Foch may have believed profoundly in the truth of his technical arguments, but he appears to have been primarily concerned with preserving universal short-term compulsory service in France by perpetuating it in Germany."³⁶ There was, indeed, a discrepancy in Foch's reasoning. He objected to the voluntary long-term principle as permitting Germany to create a strong army based on trained cadres. Of the two systems--voluntary, long-term versus short-term conscription--Foch argued that the former, advocated by the British, would create a much stronger army in Germany. But if this system was superior, why did not the French adopt it? What was true for Germany, in Foch's logic, was not true somehow for France.

Lloyd George, after further argument, sought a new approach to the recruitment problem to which Foch protested vehemently. The military report, Foch noted, "had been unanimously accepted

after consulting all the Allied Commanders-in-Chiefs, Marshal Haig, General Pershing, and General Diaz, as well as other specially chosen military experts." Lloyd George then pulled rank: the question, he said, was not merely a military one-- it was also political. Therefore, "the Heads of Governments were entitled to express their view on the question." As Clemenceau agreed that "it would be the duty of the Heads of Government finally to decide the whole question," there was little basis for further protests by Foch.³⁷

The following day, Lloyd George presented his new approach, which could hardly have surprised anyone for he had canvassed widely for support and had even obtained Clemenceau's approval.³⁸ He proposed that the German armed forces should be raised "entirely by voluntary service", with minimum service for all ranks of 12 years. The army was also reduced by 9,000 men,³⁹ as the 200,000 figure was now to include "men of all ranks." Before discussion could proceed very far, Lloyd George again invoked a point of privilege: he announced that he "would never agree to an army raised in Germany by short conscript service. No general's opinion would shake his decision." Clemenceau accepted the ultimatum; he said that he was "also bound by his previous acceptance of these principles."⁴⁰ With that the discussion ended and the Military Commission was authorized to write the new provisions into the final terms.

On March 10, three days later, the revised terms were returned to the Council for examination. The revised draft duly included the new scheme for voluntary recruitment, but introduced a new change: the German army was reduced from 200,000 to 140,000 men. But even that was not enough, for Foch declared that it was "indispensable" to reduce the strength to 100,000. When the size of the German army came up for discussion, Balfour inquired "how the original number of 200,000 had been reduced to 140,000, which it now appeared Marshal Foch wished further to reduce to 100,000?" Clemenceau explained that "in the case of a short-term service half of the contingents were undergoing training and were therefore regarded as ineffective. Hence to obtain an equivalent of 200,000 short-term men, 140,000 long-service men were considered sufficient."⁴¹ Although Lloyd George raised no objections, Balfour asked for the American view. Bliss replied that they felt a 25% reduction should be made on a short-term army of 200,000 to give an equivalent in long-service men. While the 140,000 figure was considered appropriate, Bliss argued that "this figure should not be further diminished." He noted that "it was a matter of guess work to judge the number of troops that would be necessary to maintain order in Germany, but he felt that safety could not be ensured with less than 140,000."⁴²

With a further reduction opposed by the Americans, it was France's turn to invoke a point of privilege. And Lloyd George was not in a strong position to protest. He acknowledged that "France...was entitled to a decisive voice in the matter." It was inevitable, he continued, that "this interest should affect France more closely than Great Britain, and Great Britain more closely than America." Therefore, "if France felt strongly about this question, he did not think that the British or American Delegates had a right to withstand her views."⁴³ As they didn't, the figure of 100,000 was accepted without further debate.

Wilson left France on February 15 and did not return until March 15. During this month's absence the military terms were elaborated in the Foch Committee and examined in the Supreme War Council. And during this phase, House, who had taken Wilson's place, played the role of conciliator more than that of advocate. House did not enter actively in either the debate over conscription or that over the size of the German army. Even when Bliss testified in favor of the figure 140,000, House did not lend support. In essence, the United States played a passive role in the discussions on German disarmament until Wilson's return.

Back in Paris, Wilson tried to revise the military terms and reintroduce conscription. According to Sir Henry Wilson, the discussions in the Supreme War Council had to be postponed two days while the matter was again thrashed out, this time behind closed doors rather than in the full Council session. The matter was apparently unresolved until the Supreme War Council met on March 17, at which time the British Prime Minister threatened to withdraw support from the League Covenant if Wilson persisted in his support of conscription. Confronted with this ultimatum, Wilson did not reopen the issue.

For all the attention given to the size of army and method of recruitment in the Council, the analysis was remarkably superficial. On conscription the technical arguments were but a facade behind which a political controversy raged; yet the technical arguments were important. Foch's arguments over the military potential of trained cadres was a valid point. But as both sides were really interested in the political implications of the decision, the analysis of the military implications of the decision was quite shallow. The analysis of the size of the army Germany needed also lacked depth. In support of the low figure permitted Germany, Foch noted that with a population of 100 million, the United States had only a peace-time army of 100,000 and had no constabulary. Proportionately, Foch

concluded, 100,000 men would be "more than enough to police Germany." Lansing had replied that Foch's figures were somewhat misleading, for the United States also had 125,000 National Guards, thousands of men in the state constabulary, and tens of thousands in local police. Thus, with a population of about 20 million more than Germany, the United States had available 300,000 to 350,000 trained men. "With this term of comparison," he concluded, he "did not think the allotment made to Germany overly great."⁴⁴

As in the case of the debate over conscription, however, the decision was reached not as a result of careful analysis, but on the basis of political considerations. Clemenceau had pointed out that the larger the German army, the larger the required Allied counter-force. Given the political pressures to demobilize, France would probably have to oppose Germany alone. He felt, therefore, it was his "duty" to say "with the greatest emphasis" that to lighten France's burden, Foch's figures ought to be adopted. The others agreed; but German military requirements were not examined. Having reduced the size of the army, the question of German security remained unsettled. Balfour attempted to put the issue in perspective: if the Germans were to be told that no plan for general disarmament existed and that they could have an army of only 100,000, they could legitimately complain "that the Allied Powers were leaving them at the mercy even of their small neighbors." Some guarantee, he concluded, "would have to be found if the Conference made Germany powerless for attack and weak for defense."⁴⁵ Clemenceau responded that while the question was "a very important one," its solution lay with the League, "one of whose functions was to prevent sudden aggression by any of its members."⁴⁶ One commentator has noted that when Clemenceau assured Balfour that the League would provide an adequate solution "his irony must have been deliberate, because by this time the French protests against the inadequacy of League guarantees were notorious."⁴⁷ With this, Wilson inserted in the introduction of the Military Clauses a provision calling for general disarmament. Having been deprived of the means for self-defense, Germany's future security was dependent on an organization of which it was not a member--and would not be for some time if the French had their way--and on the vague promise that all other states would disarm themselves sometime in the future.

Supervision and Control. The only other issue over which disagreement arose related to the supervision and control of the military terms. That an agency was to be created to supervise the execution of peace terms there was no question. The only issues to be decided were: how long was this control to

be imposed and under whose jurisdiction? The first question involved whether control was only to verify the execution of the peace terms (that is, for the few months given Germany to implement the terms) or was it to guarantee continued compliance with the peace terms? The second question involved the agency of control--whether the Allies were to rely on the traditional mechanism of supervision, military attachés, or whether a formal, imposed commission was to be utilized? And if a permanent commission was to be created, was it to operate under the League or some other agency?

The duration of Allied control proved to be a long and bitterly divisive issue. In the Foch Committee, the French attempted to insert a clause which would have provided for permanent control. The American representatives on the Committee, Generals Bliss and Pershing, however, vigorously opposed the scheme. Bliss noted that, in all probability, the Senate would reject a treaty which committed United States occupation troops abroad on a permanent basis. He insisted, therefore, that Allied control be established on a temporary basis.⁴⁸ The British too were apprehensive over permanent control. But the French returned to the issue repeatedly during the conference sessions that followed. Eventually, French persistence paid off, for they ultimately obtained many of their demands.

The differences which emerged in the early discussions of the issue remained throughout the deliberations. The English differed from the French over contrasting expectations of a practical and strategic nature: continued Allied control, they argued, would give rise to animosities which would undermine the very bases of peace the treaty was attempting to ensure. The French, distrusting the League, wanted to build a permanent control mechanism into the Peace Treaty which could operate independently. The Americans not only differed from the French in their greater faith in the League but also from the British in basing their opposition to continued supervision on legalistic arguments. Once the peace Treaty was signed, the Americans argued, Germany would again become a sovereign nation and external control was--legally--incompatible with sovereignty. Therefore, they could not accept, in a peace treaty returning sovereignty to Germany, permanent control measures which violated that condition. If long-term control was necessary--and they did not accept this premise--then this could be achieved only through an agency which would include the party to be controlled, that is, the League with Germany as a member.

On March 17, over French protests, the English and American position prevailed: it was decided to include a time limit

on supervision. The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control would supervise only those military, naval and aerial conditions "for which a time limit is fixed."⁴⁹ As defined later, the military conditions were to be carried out in time periods ranging from one month to March 31, 1920 and those clauses which did not have a time limit were to take effect immediately.⁵⁰ Therefore, the control commissions would phase out their functions over the following months, and terminate them completely by March 31, 1920.

The March 17 decision left unexamined the question of long-term supervision. Therefore, on April 2, the French submitted a draft clause which read:

If one of the signatory Powers considers that Germany has violated any of the above clauses...it will have the right to bring the matter before the Executive Council of the League of Nations which will at once proceed to verify the facts stated. Germany undertakes to submit to the said verification made in the interest of peace and to facilitate its execution.⁵¹

Crucial here was the provision that verification was to be automatically and immediately authorized, without a vote in the Council. On April 12, Wilson wrote the French that the clause would be superfluous for the right to bring a treaty violation to the attention of the League Council already existed.⁵² But Wilson missed the point the French were making: they did not want the right merely to bring a violation "to the attention of the League Council;" they wanted the Council to be obligated to act. Whereas Wilson would grant permissive action, the French wanted prescriptive action.

On April 15, the French again submitted a memorandum on control, and two days later Wilson formulated an acceptable compromise. The Wilson draft read:

As long as the present Treaty remains in force, a pledge will be taken by Germany to respond to any inquiry that will be deemed necessary by the Council of the League of Nations.⁵³

Although André Tardieu later noted that "this was the very object of our proposition," in reality it was far weaker than the original French proposal. Instead of binding the League Council to action, the Wilson compromise left the Council with discretionary power; and instead of the League carrying out its verification through outside intervention, the

compromise merely required Germany to respond to any inquiry from the League.

The French were able to salvage, however, more of their program. To avoid the necessity of unanimous decision in the Council before action could be taken, the French proposed, and the others accepted, the amendment that the Council "would act by a majority vote." And they were able to salvage substantially more before the final treaty was completed. Although it is not clear from the available literature now or when the amendment was further amended, the final draft reinserted the provision for external investigation which had earlier been rejected.⁵⁴ Thus, Article 213 of the final treaty read:

So long as the present treaty remains in force, Germany undertakes to give every facility for any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary.

The Naval Terms. The drafting of the naval terms of the Versailles treaty was neither contentious or prolonged. Except for one technical question--the disposition of submarine cables--the terms were completed in two sessions, March 6 and 17, of the Supreme War Council. Except for two or three relatively minor issues, the terms were settled without dissension.

The main provisions of the naval terms had been worked out during the "armistice period" of the peace conference, that is, prior to February 12. On February 8, the Naval Committee, headed by Admiral Wemyss of Great Britain, demanded the destruction of all German submarines and related equipment, the destruction of all surface craft then interned in Allied or neutral ports, and the delivery to the Allies of 8 battleships, 8 light cruisers, 42 destroyers and 50 torpedo boats still in the possession of the Germans, which would be sunk or broken up.⁵⁵ The report further called for the cessation of naval construction, the demilitarization of Heligoland and the shores between the North Sea and the Baltic, and the opening up (but not demilitarization) of the Kiel Canal. It further assumed that Germany was to be deprived of its colonies and was to pay reparations, as well as assume minesweeping in designated areas.⁵⁶

When it was decided not to add new military provisions to the Armistice, the draft naval armistice proposals became the nucleus of the final terms. The February 8 report was

expanded to include the size of the peacetime German navy, the number of authorized naval personnel, and the provisions for inspection and control. As to the size of the navy, this March 6 report stipulated that Germany could retain six battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, and twelve torpedo boats. All other warships were to be turned over to the Allies for subsequent destruction. Naval personnel was to be limited to 15,000 officers and men serving on a "long-service" basis. (The actual method of recruitment--conscription or voluntary--was not mentioned.) Finally, a special naval control commission was to be established to supervise "all measures prescribed in the Naval clauses," which implied that control measures would last until the terms had been carried out, presumably in a matter of months.

During the discussion, aside from technical and stylistic questions, only three points were challenged. The French opposed the provision that the ships surrendered by Germany be sunk or broken up. Although a final decision was to be reached later, it was clear that the French wished to distribute the ships among the Allies rather than carry out their destruction.⁵⁷ The issue was ultimately settled by the Germans: on June 21, 1919, most of the German navy was scuttled at Scapa Flow. The second objection, raised by Lloyd George, pertained to the method of recruitment. Although the draft terms had not set forth the method of recruitment, Lloyd George preempted the decision by noting that he was not prepared to agree to 15,000 men being trained every year on a conscription basis. And in the final draft, submitted eleven days later on March 17, the British position prevailed as it had in the military terms: the method of recruitment was to be based entirely on the voluntary principle with a minimum naval service of 25 consecutive years for officers and warrant officers and 12 consecutive years for petty officers and men.⁵⁸

The American and Japanese admirals raised the third objection, that pertaining to German coastal fortifications. The original clause in the March 6 draft read:

All fortified works and fortifications within 50 kilometers of the German coast or on German islands off the coast shall be disarmed and dismantled. The construction of any new fortifications within the same limits is forbidden.⁵⁹

In the Naval Committee, Admirals Benson and Takeshita had made reservations to this clause, and in the discussion

Lansing supported his naval adviser. Since the German navy was being sharply reduced, why, he asked, should Germany not be allowed to defend her own coasts? Lloyd George acknowledged that "there was a good deal of force" in this position. It would be unwise, he said, to give the impression the "Allies had been merciless and had displayed a spirit of revenge." He proposed that the admirals "distinguish between fortifications maintained for offense and those maintained for defensive purposes."⁶⁰

The second draft of March 17 found the admirals reversing their previous position. Whereas the first draft stipulated that all fortified works within 50 kilometers were to be dismantled, the second draft, with the exceptions of Heligoland and the Baltic routes, provided that "all fortified works and fortifications...now established within 50 kilometers of the German coast or on German islands off that coast shall be considered as of a defensive nature and may remain in their existing condition." The only prohibitions were that no new fortifications could be built in the 50 kilometer zone and that the number and calibre of guns were to remain the same as at the date of signature of the treaty. It was also understood that the stocks of ammunition for these guns were to be reduced and maintained at a fixed level.⁶¹

The final draft of the Naval terms accepted on March 17 retained most of the original provisions of February 8 as amended and presented on March 6. In essence, the drafting of the naval terms gave rise to few polemics or controversies. Differences were settled less by threats than by compromise and political pressures appeared far less in evidence than during the elaboration of the military terms.

The Air Terms. No specific provisions relating to the German air force had been included in the original armistice, except for those clauses prohibiting military air operations. Later, however, when the Supreme Council decided to work out a Preliminary Peace, an Aerial Commission was set up. Under the chairmanship of French General Maurice Duval, the preliminary draft of the air terms was submitted to the Supreme War Council on March 6.⁶² The draft provided for the prohibition of military and naval airplanes and dirigibles, and the abolition of air fields within a zone 150 kilometers east of the Rhine, 150 kilometers west of the eastern frontier and 150 kilometers north of the southern frontier.⁶³ Free passage of Allied aircraft over German territory was guaranteed "until complete evacuation of German territory by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers." The manufacture of aircraft--military and commercial--was temporarily prohibited and a list of items to be turned

over to the Allies was given. A supervisory commission was authorized until Germany fulfilled the conditions stipulated, which implied temporary rather than permanent control. Finally, a clause stipulated that "the rules relative to the organization of a commercial air service in Germany" were to be set forth in the final Peace Treaty.

The discussion of the air terms in the Supreme War Council was more confusing than contentious. The confusion arose over attempts to prohibit a peacetime military air force while permitting commercial air operations. Was there a distinction between commercial and military aviation? If everyone agreed that there was, they also acknowledged that commercial aircraft could be converted easily to military purposes. But having established this--after considerable qualifications and reservations--the delegates split over the implications: the French and Italians, and to a lesser degree the British and Japanese, were inclined to conclude that since commercial aircraft could be converted to military use, then German commercial aircraft would have to be controlled, even after the signing of the peace treaty. The Americans demanded that a distinction between military and commercial aviation be worked out so that only the military aspects need be restricted. As Lansing pointed out on March 12, the aircraft problem presented the same difficulties as horses, which could be used to draw guns or to draw ploughs. He was "far more impressed with the necessity for the removal of the guns and armaments in the aeroplanes, in preference to depriving the Germans of the use of flying machines which would be of value to them for purely commercial purposes."⁶⁴

At the Council's March 17 session, the issue came up again. General Duval noted that the British, Italian, Japanese, and French delegates had asked for extended Allied control over all German aviation. In spite of the overwhelming support given for continuing controls over commercial aviation, the Americans resisted. Wilson observed that railway trains could be used to carry guns and asked "should the manufacture of trains therefore be limited?" Some types of ships also could be readily converted to military use; should ship construction be limited on this account? Inasmuch as military equipment had already been limited under other articles in the treaty, he was personally "not willing to go any further in that direction."⁶⁵ This was the closest Wilson came to issuing an ultimatum in the discussions over military terms and it was sufficient. No further discussion took place: peacetime control over German commercial aviation was rejected.

The final draft of the air terms, submitted on March 17,

remained essentially the same as the March 6 draft. The main provision--that prohibiting a German military air force--was accepted without debate. Also there had been no dissension over the prohibition of airfields within the 150 kilometer zone once it was explained that this applied only to military airfields.

The Terms of the Treaty

After the acceptance of the military, naval and air clauses on March 17, these sections of the treaty were considered final. From that time until well into April, the Supreme Council concerned itself with other treaty matters. The Council, however, took up Part V again in mid-April and introduced some last minute changes, most of which were minor and technical. Although there was some unhappiness over the terms, particularly among the American and British, no major revision was proposed. The most important change was to introduce a provision--quite significant in later developments as it turned out--tying German disarmament with general disarmament. On April 26, Wilson suggested that it would make the military, naval and air terms "more acceptable" to Germany if they were presented as preparing the way for a worldwide limitation of armaments.⁶⁶ This was agreed to--without further discussion--and a new introductory section to Part V was added stating, in effect, that arms control in Germany was the first step toward general disarmament.⁶⁷

Part V of the Versailles Treaty, the Military, Naval and Air Clauses, contained Articles 159 through 213.⁶⁸ Articles 159 through 163 dealt with effectives and cadres of the German Army. The German army was given until March 31, 1920, to reduce their forces to 100,000 men, with the total number of officers not to exceed 4,000; the Greater German General Staff was declared dissolved and was not to be reconstituted in any shape or form; and the number of persons employed as customs officers, forest and coast guards, were not to exceed the number of persons doing these same tasks as of 1913.

The second chapter of the Treaty, entitled Armament, Munitions and Materials, took in Articles 164-172. These restricted the amount of armament Germany was permitted until such time as it was admitted to the League, while Germany agreed that, even after admission to the League, any change in armaments was to be decided by the League Council.⁶⁹ The stock of munitions in Germany was not to exceed amounts as fixed by the Treaty⁷⁰ and the stores were to be located at places made known by the government to the Allies. Further,

the amount and number of armaments present in German fortresses when the treaty went into force were stipulated and ammunition for these weapons was to be fixed. Article 168, restricted arms and munitions manufacture to only Allied-approved factories. Article 169, stipulated that German arms, munitions and weapons in excess of allowable quantities were to be surrendered to the Allies "to be destroyed or rendered useless." Article 170 forbade German import or export of war material of any kind, while Article 171 applied the same restrictions to devices of gas warfare. Article 172 stipulated that within three months the Allies were to be notified by the Germans of "the nature and mode of manufacture of all explosives, toxic substances or other like chemical preparations used by them in the war or prepared by them for the purpose of being so used."

Chapter III, Recruiting and Military Training, extended from Article 173 to 179. Compulsory military service was banned in Germany and the new army was to be recruited by volunteers: non-commissioned officers and enlisted men were to serve a consecutive twelve years. Men released before their enlistment expired were not to exceed in any one year, five percent of the new army. German officers who remained in the postwar army had to stay until forty-five years of age, while new officers were appointed for twenty-five years. The same restrictions on release of officers applied as in the case of the enlisted personnel. The Allies permitted only those military schools required for supplying any vacancies in the officers' ranks. Article 177 stated that educational establishments, universities, societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs and, "generally speaking, associations of every description," were not to occupy themselves with military matters. "In particular they will be forbidden to instruct or exercise their members, or allow them to be instructed or exercised, in the profession or use of arms." Finally, Germany was not to exchange military missions with foreign countries and was to prevent German nationals from serving in the armed force of any other nation, or going abroad for military training.

The final portion of the military clauses, Chapter IV, concerned itself with German fortifications. Article 180 of the Treaty stated that all fortified works within German territory west of a line drawn 50 kilometers east of the Rhine were to be demolished within a period of two to four months. The system of fortified works of the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany, however, was to be maintained in its existing state.

The second Section dealt with Naval Clauses, and contained sixteen articles, 181-197. Germany was to have six battleships (of the Deutschland type), six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, and twelve torpedo boats. The allocation did not include any submarines, and excess warships were to be put into reserve or turned to commercial use. Personnel was set at 15,000 men with officer and warrant officer strength not to go over 1,500. No reserve force was to be organized unless its strength was deducted from the above number. All German warships not in German ports at the time of the Treaty were to cease to belong to Germany (those ships already at that time in Allied ports were considered surrendered) while the ships in neutral ports were to be turned over to Allied authorities.⁷¹ Several of the Articles dealt specifically with arms, munitions, and mines that Germany was to surrender, retain, or destroy, while Article 194 set the service of naval personnel: twenty-five years for officers and warrant officers, with the same five per cent restriction per yearly turnover as with the army, while enlisted personnel had to enlist for a twelve year hitch. A further restriction prohibited the training of merchant personnel by the navy.⁷² German naval fortifications in the Baltic and in the North Sea were to be destroyed and certain islands that had fortifications were specifically named to be completely disarmed. Article 197 restricted the use of designated wireless stations for military and naval messages.

Section III was devoted to the Air Clauses. It stated in the Article 198 that Germany was not to have any military or naval air forces. Germany was allowed a temporary number of seaplanes--not over one hundred--to be used for the search of mines, but their use was to cease by October, 1919. According to the provisions of Article 200, the Allies had freedom of passage over Germany for their own aircraft as well as access to landing facilities; these provisions were to remain in force until the final Allied withdrawal from German territory. Article 201 prohibited German manufacture or import of aircraft and engine parts. The last article detailed the air material that Germany was to deliver to the Allies, including all aircraft, plants for the making of hydrogen, engines, sheds, aircraft instruments, photographic equipment, and armaments.

Section IV was entitled "Inter-Allied Commissions of Control" and read in part: "All the military, naval and air clauses contained in the present Treaty, for the execution of which a time-limit is prescribed, shall be executed by Germany under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the Principal Allied and

Associated Powers." The Commissions of Control were given the express duty of supervising the delivery or destruction of items specified by the Allied governments, the expense of which was to be borne by the German government. Commissions were to be established at the seat of German government, and could, if they deemed necessary, send teams to any part of German territory. The German government was ordered to give them all available aid and to bear the costs of Commissions activities.

Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, corresponding to each of the three services, had the responsibility to verify that the provisions of the Treaty for their specific service arms were carried out. In practice, each Commission inspected the receiving of arms, the destroying of ammunition stores, the reduction of personnel, and the demolition of fortified works.

The last section, entitled "General Articles," consisted of Articles 211 to 213. Article 211 stipulated that, within three months of the coming into effect of the Treaty, German laws were to conform to the Treaty. Article 212 enumerated those sections of the Armistice which were to remain in force "so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulation." These sections prohibited damage or destruction in the areas evacuated by the enemy and required the surrendered material to be delivered intact. Finally, Article 213 provided for long-term supervision and control. It stated that "So long as the present Treaty remains in force, Germany undertakes to give every facility for any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary."

Chapter 2 Footnotes

¹ A brief list of documents, memoirs, and accounts on the Paris Peace Conference include: Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (1924-1947). 13 vols.; Paul Mantoux, Les Deliberations du Conseil des Quatre (1955), 2 vols.; H.W.V. Temperly (ed.) A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (1920-1924), 6 vols.; Documents of British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 1st Series, (1948); and Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (1941). Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (1926-1928), 4 vols. and Memoirs of the Peace Conference (1939), 2 vols.; Andre Tardieu, The Truth about the Treaty (1921); Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations (1921) and War Memoirs of Robert Lansing, Secretary of State (1935); Ferdinand Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch (1931); Stephen Bonsal, Unfinished Business (1944); David Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, (1924), 21 vols.; Sir C. E. Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (1927), 2 vols.; Harold Nicholson, Peacemaking (1965); F. S. Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919 (1944); Ferdinand Czernin, Versailles, 1919 (1964); S.P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 (1961); Paul Birdsall, Versailles: Twenty Years After (1941); David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (1928), 2 vols.; Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Last Peace (1944); Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (1922).

² First Book of Samuel 13:19,20.

³ See William O. Shanahan, Prussian Military Reforms, 1786-1813 (1945), pp. 100-102.

⁴ F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, III, 669.

⁵ Ibid., p. 702; also Marston, Peace Conference, p. 143.

⁶ F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, III, 694.

⁷ Ibid., p. 708.

⁸ Ibid., p. 709.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 710-12

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 708, 710.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 713.

12 Although Churchill was originally designated a member of the Committee, making him one of the two civilian members, he gave up the post and his place was taken by General Sir Henry Wilson. Ibid., p. 910.

13 Ibid., p. 709

14 Ibid., p. 695. The failure of Allied leaders to establish an order of procedure for their meetings tended to complicate their handling of issues, see Seymour, Papers of Colonel House, IV, 271-73.

15 Wilson recommended "the institution of a civil commission to meet a similar German commission, to negotiate with them and to say--that if Germany would reduce her forces and yield a proper proportion of her mischievous equipment, the Allies would reduce their army of occupation... (and) relax the blockade." F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, III, 901.

16 Ibid., pp. 903, 907.

17 Lloyd George's resolution read in part: "The Supreme War Council agree 1) that a Civilian Commission shall be appointed at once to negotiate an agreement with the Germans on the following lines: --that food and raw material of war shall be allowed to enter Germany on the following conditions: (M. Loucheur's Committee to insert the conditions in their report.)" Ibid., p. 904.

18 Ibid., p. 696.

19 In the discussion of the Loucheur report on February 7, for example, President Wilson said that he wished to call attention "to the fact that what was desired was to find means for reducing the Allied forces." Ibid., p. 898.

20 The committee was appointed on February 10 and met under the chairmanship of Marshal Foch. It included General Bliss and Mr. Norman Davis for the United States; Mr. Clementel and General Degoutte for France; Lord Robert Cecil and General Thwaites for Great Britain and Mr. Crespi and Brig. General Cavallero for Italy. They were assisted by the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied forces. Ibid., p. 980.

21 Ibid., p 986.

22 Ibid., p. 979.

23 Ibid., p. 973; Wilson's dissatisfaction with the practice of expanding the Armistice terms is noted also in Seymour, Papers of Colonel House, IV, 324ff.

24 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, III, 974-78.

25 Ibid., pp. 1003-4; also, see Seymour, Papers of Colonel House, IV, 327-29.

26 Peace Conf., 1919, III, 694-95.

27 Ibid., p. 924.

28 Ibid., pp. 937-38.

29 Ibid., pp. 929-33.

30 No accounts of the deliberations of the Foch Committee have been published, and Foch in his memoirs has added little to our understanding of the deliberations.

31 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, IV, 183-84.

32 Ibid., p. 216.

33 Ibid., p. 217.

34 Ibid., pp. 217-18. It has been occasionally suggested that the arguments against a short-term reserve training system for Germany were prompted by the myth that the Prussians had circumvented the Tilsit restrictions of 1806 by this technique. See Shanahan, Prussian Military Reforms, pp. 159-78 for an expose of this legend.

35 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, IV, 218.

36 Birdsall, Versailles: Twenty Years After, p. 162. Greda Richards Crosby notes: "Doubtless, in the minds of both the French military men and statesmen was the fear that, if conscription were abolished in Germany, pressure might be great for the abolition of conscription in other continental countries, including France." The Politics of the Disarmament Question in England, 1914-1918 (1957), p. 121. By 1925 the French were firmly lined up behind the principle of universal conscription. Major General A.E. Temperley, a British military advisor to the Preparatory Commission meeting at Geneva, has recorded that conscription was with the French "a democratic principle" and that "the idea of égalité in service was vital to them...No French Government could

remain in office a week which proposed to abandon this sacred principle." The Whispering Gallery of Europe (1938), pp. 62-3.

37 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, IV, 219.

38 Lloyd George notes in his memoirs: "M. Clemenceau, with whom I had discussed the subject, also preferred a small long-service army of volunteers to a conscript army." Memoirs of the Peace Conference, I, 398.

39 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, IV, 263.

40 Ibid., p. 264.

41 Ibid., pp. 295-96. The French generals were not happy with the "politician's" decision, see Birdsall, Versailles: Twenty Years After, p. 164, and Marston, Peace Conference, p. 151.

42 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, IV, 296.

43 Ibid., p. 298.

44 Ibid., pp. 296-97.

45 Ibid., p. 298.

46 Ibid.

47 Birdsall, Versailles: Twenty Years After, p. 163.

48 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, XI, 80-81; Crosby, Politics of Disarmament, p. 124.

49 The article read: "All Military, Naval, and Air Clauses contained in the present stipulations for which a time limit is fixed, shall be executed by Germany under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the Allied and Associated Government." F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, IV, 376.

50 See "Time Limits of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, Signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919," in F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, XIII, 748-54.

51 Tardieu, Truth about the Treaty, p. 138.

52 For Wilson's reply, see Ibid.

53 53 Ibid., pp. 139-40.

54 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, XIII, 362.

55 The Naval Committee also included Adm. Benson (USA), Vice Adm. de Bon (Fr), Adm. di Revel (Italy), and Vice-Adm. Takeshita (Japan), see F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, III, 939.

56 Ibid., pp. 938-43.

57 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, IV, 220.

58 Ibid., pp. 221, 395.

59 Ibid., p. 249.

60 Ibid., pp. 224-25, 249.

61 Ibid., p. 397.

62 Ibid., pp. 239-42.

63 One hundred "hydroplanes and water gliders" were to be temporarily permitted "for a period not longer than 1st October, 1919...for purposes of seeking out submarine mines."

64 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, IV, 337.

65 Ibid., p. 372.

66 Birdsall, Versailles: Twenty Years After, p. 169.

67 The final draft of this section reads: "In order to render the initiation of a general limitation of armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow." F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, XIII, 309.

68 The United States did not, of course, become a signatory to the Treaty. It was submitted to the Senate by President Wilson on July 10, 1919, and failed of ratification on November 19, 1919, and again on March 20, 1920. A treaty between the United States and Germany, which restored friendly relations, was finally signed at Berlin in August of 1921. It formally ended the state of war that had existed since April 6, 1917. According to the provisions of this peace treaty the United States and Germany agreed that most of the terms already in existence as part of the Treaty of Versailles would apply. Part V of the Treaty was included in the United

States-German settlement.

69 According to Table No. II of this section of the Treaty the maximum number of weapons authorized (not including stocks) was for seven infantry divisions at 12,000 rifles per division, 108 heavy machine guns, 162 light machine guns, 9 medium trench mortars, 27 light trench mortars, 24 7.7 cm. guns, and 12 10.5 cm. howitzers. The cavalry division (Germany was permitted three) was authorized 6,000 carbines, 12 heavy machine guns, and 12 7.7 cm. guns. The two army corps headquarters were to draw their weapons from the divisions.

70 Table No. III, Maximum Stocks Authorized, did not provide for any maintenance of weapons over the number allowed in Table No. II in above fn. Table No. III simply spelled out the amount of ammunition permitted on hand for the authorized weaponry. Rifles and carbines combined were to have no more than 40,800,000 rounds, while light and heavy machine guns were to be allowed 15,408,000 rounds. Medium trench mortars 25,200 rounds; light trench mortars 151,200 rounds; 7.7 cm. guns 204,000 rounds; and 10.5 cm. howitzers 67,200 rounds.

71 The American President Wilson sailed to Europe aboard a captured German ship which had been built in Germany and christened the George Washington.

72 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, XIII, 346-50.

Chapter 3

THE VERSAILLES TREATY AND TERRITORIAL DEMILITARIZATION

Aside from arms limitations, the Versailles settlement contained five provisions affecting the demilitarization of German territory--the Rhineland, the Saar, Heligoland, the Baltic Channels and Germany's North Sea coast. These provisions varied as to type of restrictions imposed and degree of demilitarization attained. According to a strict definition of terms demilitarization was not included in any of the treaty provisions, if by that is meant that all military forces, equipment and activity were to be prohibited from the designated area.¹ As none of the treaty terms met these criteria, the final demilitarization provisions of the Versailles treaty can be classified only as partial arrangements.

The demilitarization of the Rhineland was set forth in two sections of the Versailles Treaty and one article of the "Agreement with Regard to the Military Occupation of the Territories of the Rhine," commonly referred to as the Rhineland Agreement, signed with the Versailles Treaty on June 28, 1919. These provisions were first referred to in Articles 42 to 44. Article 42 stipulated that Germany was forbidden "to maintain or construct any fortification either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the East of the Rhine." Article 43 stated, rather equivocally, that in the area defined above "the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden." Although the article reads as a general restriction, prohibiting the assembly and maintenance of all armed forces--Allied as well as German--it was meant to imply that this was a unilateral imposition, binding on Germany for the duration of the Allied occupation. Article 44 stated that in case Germany violated the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, "she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as calculated

to disturb the peace of the world." Implied here, although not precisely stated, was the threat that in event of any infraction of the stated terms the Allies could intervene militarily in the "demilitarized" zone.

The second section dealing with the demilitarization of the Rhineland appeared in the military terms. Article 180 repeated the provision that all fortifications in German territory to the west of the line drawn 50 kilometers to the east of the Rhine were to be disarmed and dismantled, but went further to establish time limits and an important distinction based on whether the area was actually occupied by Allied troops or not. Within that territory not occupied by Allied troops, fortified works were to be disarmed within two months from the coming into force of the treaty and were to be dismantled within four months. In the territory occupied by Allied troops, however, the fortified works were to be disarmed and dismantled "within such periods as may be fixed by the Allied High Command." The article went on to stipulate that the construction of "any new fortification, whatever its nature and importance," was forbidden in the zone defined. Finally, the article noted that only the western frontier of Germany was to be demilitarized. The system of fortified works on the southern and eastern frontiers, the article concluded, were to be maintained in their "existing state."

The final provision respecting the demilitarization of the Rhine provinces appeared in Article I of the Rhineland Agreement. Although the Agreement was designed to define the administrative details of the Allied occupation, Article I provided that no German troops, except prisoners of war in process of repatriation, were to be admitted to the occupied territories, even in transit. The only armed forces permitted in the area, aside from the local police, were to be the Allied occupation troops.

The demilitarization of the Saar was provided in the Annex to part III, Section IV of the Versailles Treaty, which dealt with the "Saar Basin." Article 30 called for a limited form of demilitarization. It stipulated that there was to be no military service, either compulsory or voluntary, in the Saar Basin and prohibited the construction of any fortifications in the area. "Only a local gendarmerie for the maintenance of order," the article noted, "may be established." On a superficial reading, the terms give the impression of imposing far-reaching restrictions--not only were restraints placed on the recruitment of local citizens into the armed services and prohibitions placed on the construction of

Local fortifications, but it appeared that all armed forces were to be prohibited. The provision, however, was only partially restrictive: while only a local gendarmerie could be "established" in the area, it left unrestricted the stationing of troops "established" elsewhere, for example, in France. By authorizing, implicitly, the quartering of outside troops in the Basin--a right the French utilized for fifteen years--the terms provided for only a partial form of demilitarization.

The demilitarization of the island of Heligoland was set forth in Article 115 of the Versailles Treaty. The article stipulated that the "fortifications, military establishments, and harbours of the Islands of Heligoland and Dune shall be destroyed under the supervision of the Principal Allied Governments by German labour and at the expense of Germany within a period to be determined by said Government." These fortifications, military establishments and harbours were "not to be reconstructed," nor were "any similar works to be constructed in the future." As no prohibition was included in the article, it could be assumed that German troops were to be stationed on the islands. According to these provisions Heligoland and Dune were not to be demilitarized, but defortified.

The naval terms of the Versailles Treaty contained two provisions dealing with territorial restrictions which deserve mention. Article 195 required the destruction of the fortifications in the Baltic channels in order "to ensure free passage into the Baltic to all nations." Not only were the existing fortifications to be destroyed, but Germany was not to be permitted to erect "any fortifications" in the area in the future.

Article 196, dealing with Germany's coastal fortifications, provided for a different type of restriction. The article acknowledged that the existing fortifications were defensive and therefore could remain "in their existing condition." However, the article stipulated that no new fortifications were to be constructed within 50 kilometers of the German coast or on the German islands off that coast.

Neither article established, strictly speaking, demilitarization. As the stationing of troops was authorized along the Baltic channels, Article 195, like the provisions relating to Heligoland, was designed to eliminate only fortifications. While Article 195 provided for defortification, Article 196--dealing with coastal fortification--was

even less restrictive. By permitting Germany to retain existing armaments, subject only to the prohibition that no new ones be constructed, and by not restricting the stationing of troops or military activity, the provision was neither defortification or demilitarization, but only a future operative military restriction.

In evaluating the negotiation of territorial demilitarization at the Paris peace conference, several generalizations can be made. First, the demilitarization terms gave rise to little controversy among the Allies. Although agreement on the political terms of the Rhineland and the Saar issues was bitterly contested, the military terms were easily reached. Second, not only were the demilitarization terms approved without conflict, they were also approved without analysis or discussion, at least in the Supreme Council. Little time was devoted to the demilitarization terms when they came up for review; and for the most part they were approved without debate. Third, demilitarization was considered by the government leaders to be a military matter. They saw few political implications in the demilitarization terms and therefore deferred to the judgement of their military experts. Fourth, while the Germans posed numerous objections to the original draft treaty, they accepted the demilitarization provisions without protest.

The Rhineland

There were two distinct issues affecting the "Rhineland settlement" at the peace conference, one of which led to perhaps the most bitterly contested decision at the Paris meeting, while the other was settled without debate. The first arose over defining the western frontiers of Germany and involved a determination of the political status of the German territory lying west of the Rhine river. Was the area to be annexed by France, recognized as an independent state, occupied by the Allies for a long period of time or returned unconditionally to Germany? The second issue involved the military status of the Rhine provinces. Were the frontier zones in general and the Rhineland in particular to be unilaterally demilitarized, reciprocally demilitarized or allowed to retain a certain level of armaments?

Defining Status of the Rhineland. The political status of the Rhineland was by far the more important issue of the two; indeed, it was considered by the French as the most vital issue of the peace conference. Distrusting both the League and German disarmament as adequate for future defense,

the French from the outset placed a high priority on obtaining "physical security," i.e., control of the territory lying between the French border and the Rhine river. The French demand was, however, as unexpected as it was late in being advanced. While numerous French writers during the war had advocated the separation of the Rhine provinces from Germany, the government had not included this proposal in its official war aims.³ Not until 1917 did the French sound out the Allies about including a revision of Germany's western frontiers in the postwar settlement. Following extensive secret negotiations, the French obtained the Tsar's support in January 1917 for the separation of the Rhine provinces from Germany --in exchange for French support of Russia's claim to the Straits. Both the Agreement and its secrecy were short-lived as the Tsarist government was almost immediately overthrown and the Bolsheviks, upon ascension to power, disclosed the agreement.³⁻

While the French had been negotiating with the Russians, they were also cautiously probing the British with, however, little success. On January 12, 1917, Premier Briand sent a confidential letter to the French Ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, suggesting that he sound out the British Government on the future status of the Rhineland. "In our opinion," Briand wrote, "Germany should no longer have a foothold beyond the Rhine."⁴ Cambon, anticipating British opposition, did not immediately communicate the French proposals to the government. About six months later he informally noted to British Foreign Secretary, Balfour, that the French desired "to see the territory to the West of the Rhine separated from the German Empire and erected into something in the nature of a buffer State."⁵ Balfour apparently did not attach any importance to the communication and, therefore, did not raise it with the Prime Minister or the War Cabinet. As Lloyd George later noted, the French Ambassador never pressed the point, but "in the true Cambon manner he threw the idea out lightly as a possible suggestion and Mr. Balfour probably thought it was just a 'try on.'"⁶

With the termination of the war, the French achieved through the military provisions of the Armistice what they had been unable to accomplish through diplomacy. The Armistice provided for an Allied occupation of German territory up to the Rhine river and four bridgeheads on the right bank. Presumably these were interim measures to be abandoned with the signing of the peace treaty. At the peace conference however the French persistently sought to convert the temporary occupation of the Rhine provinces into a permanent barrier.

During the lengthy negotiations at Paris, the British and Americans were sympathetic to the French concern for security, but for them French security could not be obtained through the disarmament of Germany and the League of Nations. They were also willing to accept the demilitarization of the Rhineland and an area fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine. Ultimately they would propose a tripartite alliance of mutual assistance as a substitute for the detachment of the Rhineland from Germany. The British were convinced that the separation of the Rhineland would create another irredenta, like Alsace-Lorraine, and perpetuate hostile Franco-German relations precluding the establishment of peace. The Americans were opposed to a modification of the Rhineland without the approval of the inhabitants as a violation of self-determination. The French, to the end, remained unconvinced and unsatisfied: more important than disarmament and the League, than frontier demilitarization, than even a guarantee of military assistance, was "physical security"--a buffer between the Rhine and the French frontier.

Demilitarization of the Rhineland. The controversies over that buffer zone at the peace conference have been the subject of frequent and extensive analysis. While the deliberations leading to the political settlement are important, they are only marginally relevant to the policy decisions on demilitarization. The two issues were raised separately and were decided largely without reference to each other. The "solution" to the political issue--the compromise establishing a fifteen year Allied occupation with phased withdrawals--was reached through personal exchanges between Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson outside the formal deliberations. The "solution" to the military issue--the demilitarization of the Rhine provinces--was reached in the deliberations over the military terms of the treaty. While French solutions to the political question were sharply challenged by the British and Americans, their proposals for demilitarizing the Rhineland were approved without controversy.

Provisions for demilitarization appeared first in the original draft of the military terms prepared by the Foch Committee and presented to the Supreme War Council on March 3. Although the wording was rather vague, the intent was unmistakable. The article (Chapter II, Article 8) read: "All fortified works, fortresses and land forts at a distance of less than 50 kilometers from the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled."⁸

At the first reading on March 3, attention focused on the different time limits proposed in the military terms and no discussion took place over specific conditions in the draft. Between March 3 and March 6, when the terms were taken up again, the demilitarization of the Rhineland was reworded and expanded. Article 8, as amended, read:

a) All fortified works, fortresses and land forts which are situated in German territory west of the line traced 50 kilometers east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled.

The construction of any new fortifications, of whatever importance or nature, within this zone is forbidden.

b) The status quo is and shall be preserved as regards fortified works on the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany.

The remaining section of the article dealt with the level of armament permitted in the fortifications which Germany was allowed to retain; in later drafts this section was shifted to another article. But another article was added, Article 9, which introduced provisions more closely resembling demilitarization, although the term was not at this point used. Article 9 read: "No military force or establishment shall exist on the left bank of the Rhine and till further orders police control shall be ensured by Allied troops."

At the March 10 session of the Supreme War Council, the demilitarization articles were subjected to the most searching scrutiny given them at the peace conference, which was, as it turned out, exceedingly slight. When Article 8, dealing with the defortification of the Rhine provinces and the fifty kilometers east of the river, came up for discussion, Balfour inquired why defortification was recommended for the western frontier but not for the southern and eastern frontiers.

General Degoutte explained that the Germans had only two fortresses on their southern frontier, at Ulm and Ingolstadt, both of which were more than fifty kilometers from the frontier. There was, therefore, no case for disarming the southern fortifications. As for the fortifications on the eastern frontier, their dismantling was rejected as there was a possibility that they might end up in Polish hands. There were also two small fortresses in the Mazurian region, but Degoutte said that the committee considered it undesirable to

demand their destruction. Although they would doubtless remain in German possession, they might serve as protection against Bolshevism. With that explanation, the discussion ended and the article was accepted without amendment.⁹

Article 9 had been rewritten following the March 6 session in an attempt to clarify the implications of demilitarization. Indeed, the article mentioned the concept specifically for the first time and outlined an exceptionally complete summary of the policy implications of the term. After noting that all territory on the left bank of the Rhine which remained a part of Germany would be "demilitarized," the article went on to explain: "That is to say, the inhabitants of this territory will not be permitted to bear arms or receive any military training or to be incorporated in any military organization either on a voluntary or compulsory basis and no fortifications, depots, establishments, railway construction or works of any kind adapted to military purposes will be permitted to exist within the area. Nor will this territory be allowed to contribute directly or indirectly in money or in material of any description towards the armies of Germany."¹⁰

When the article came up for discussion, Clemenceau pointed out that it was premature to decide on the military status of the area before its political status had been settled. He suggested that the article be reserved and the other members of the Supreme Council agreed.¹¹ This was, indeed, the last ever seen of the article and the last time demilitarization was specifically referred to in the Rhineland terms. The postponement of the decision on demilitarization at the March 10 session was one of the few occasions where the military "solution" for the Rhine was affected by the negotiations over the political "solution" or more appropriately, by the failure to reach agreement on the political conditions.

The French had been pressing since the peace conference opened--indeed even earlier--for Allied approval of a scheme which would perpetuate the detachment of the Rhine provinces from Germany. On January 10, 1919, just prior to the official convocation of the peace conference, Foch circulated a lengthy memorandum on the subject, which was more of a "trial balloon" than an official proposal. After tracing the history of the Prussianization of Germany, he concluded that the creation of a Republic of Germany would not remove that country's historic military orientation. Nor would the creation of a league of Nations--at least in its formative

years--remove the military threat to France. Given the population differences between France and Germany, he proposed that: "Henceforward the Rhine ought to be the Western military frontier of the German countries. Henceforward Germany ought to be deprived of all entrance and assembling ground, that is, of all territorial sovereignty on the left bank of the river." This he regarded as "an indispensable guarantee of peace." As for the future political status of the Rhine provinces, this was a problem which could be decided by the peace conference.¹²

The immediate reaction of the British was cool. Lloyd George noted that this was "a characteristic soldier's argument, based primarily on force." The western frontier in Foch's proposal, Lloyd George complained, "was to be fixed without regard to the sentiment or the wishes of the population severed from their fellow-countrymen across the Rhine. The territorial arrangements which he proposed were based exclusively on his conclusions as to what was necessary from a military point of view....The argument with which Moltke overruled Bismarck in 1870 and forced the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was identical with that used by Marshal Foch after his victory in 1919."¹³

In conversations prior to Wilson's return to the United States in mid-February, Lloyd George and the President had agreed that the French proposals were unacceptable. "We regarded it," Lloyd George recalled, "as a definite and dishonourable betrayal of one of the fundamental principles for which the Allies had professed to fight...We were also convinced that any attempt to divide Germany into two separate communities would ultimately fail, and that meanwhile it would cause endless friction and might provoke another war."¹⁴

To prevent a deadlock over the Rhineland question, an ad hoc committee was formed to examine the French proposals. This committee, with Philip Kerr representing Great Britain, André Tardieu representing France, and Dr. S. E. Mezes representing the United States, was scheduled to meet on March 11. The day before, however, Clemenceau had proposed the postponement of Article 9 establishing the demilitarization of the Rhineland. For the French the demilitarization of the left bank was dependent on the ultimate political arrangement decided. It was not a primary objective to be advanced under any condition, but a conditional objective dependent on other political arrangements.

The ad hoc committee on the Rhineland, as might have been expected,¹⁵ failed to resolve the differences and a stalemate ensued. To break the impasse, Lloyd George proposed a new scheme to meet French fears and at the same time prevent the truncation of German territory. After consultation with Wilson, who had just returned to Paris, Lloyd George proposed on March 14 a joint military guarantee by America and Britain to France against any future German aggression. They informed Clemenceau at the same time that they "would not consent to any occupation of the left bank of the Rhine except a short occupation as provisional guarantee for payment of the German debt."¹⁶

The French, pleased with the offer, remained unsatisfied. While they abandoned the notion of detaching the Rhine provinces from Germany, they insisted on the right of a lengthy if not permanent occupation of the left bank. Equally important they insisted on the right of reoccupation in the event Germany violated its pledges. In Clemenceau's reply of March 17, he reiterated the arguments advanced earlier that as a guarantee against future German aggression "the military occupation of the Rhine border is indispensable to France." France had "a far smaller population than Germany," was "deprived of Russia's alliance" and was "without good natural frontiers." The limitation of the military forces of Germany was "not a sufficient guarantee against this danger until experience has proved the method efficacious." Nor was "the league of Nations...a sufficient guarantee." Hence, Clemenceau, concluded that "a physical guarantee" was necessary. This "physical guarantee" was, he repeated, "the military occupation of the Rhine and the control of its bridge traffic."¹⁷

The French counter-proposal was precisely what the military alliance was designed to deter. The British-American proposal was offered as a substitute for Allied occupation, not a supplement to it. But the French wanted both the alliance guarantee and the physical guarantee. With that an impasse was again reached. Lloyd George's proposal had not solved the problem; it had merely added a new factor to the equation.

After a month of continued negotiations--during which Wilson threatened to break up the peace conference--a compromise, decidedly closer to the French position than to the English or American stand, was reached. Instead of a thirty year occupation, as the French originally demanded, the delegates accepted a fifteen year occupation. This period was far longer than had been implied in the original British and

American proposals. One added compromise was that the occupation was to have phased withdrawals, so that the entire area was not to be occupied for the full fifteen years. There was to be an occupation of fifteen years at the Mainz and Kehl bridgeheads, an occupation of ten years at the Coblenz bridgehead, and a five year occupation of Cologne.

More important than the duration of the occupation was the Allied acceptance of France's right to perpetuate the occupation and to reoccupy the territory even after withdrawal. The first concession was included as a contingency measure in event either the United States or the British failed to ratify the treaties of mutual assistance. Thus, it was agreed in Article 429 that: "If, at that date at the end of fifteen years, the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany are not considered sufficient by the Allied and Associated Governments, the evacuation of the occupying troops may be delayed to the extent regarded as necessary for the purpose of obtaining the required guarantees."

The second concession, authorizing the French to reoccupy the territories, was included in Article 430.

In case either during the occupation or after the expiration of fifteen years referred to above the Reparation Commission finds that Germany refuses to observe the whole or part of her obligations under the present Treaty with regard to reparation, the whole or part of the areas specified in Article 429 will be reoccupied immediately by the Allied and Associated forces.

While the political issue had been bitterly contested throughout February, March, and into April, the military issues were settled on March 17. They were adopted without debate or, indeed, analysis. Wilson tried to focus attention on the implications of nondemilitarization of Germany's eastern and southern frontiers, but his point was not grasped and therefore incorrectly rejected as having been resolved.

What Wilson wanted to know was whether sufficient thought had been given to securing Germany's new neighbors from future German aggression. He noted that "Germany's ambition had always leant towards the South and East," and that following the peace settlement Germany would be confronted in these areas with a number of new and weak independent states.

Lloyd George replied that an earlier explanation by General Degoutte covered Wilson's objections. But the General did not: What he was responding to was the question, why were not the southern and eastern frontiers of Germany demilitarized? To this he replied that there were not very many fortifications situated less than fifty kilometers from the eastern and southern frontiers. But Wilson's question went beyond this by inquiring what was being done to secure Germany's new and weaker neighbors against possible German aggression. Implied here was something more than defortification. Although not explicitly raised, it appears that Wilson was thinking about recommending the establishment of a genuine demilitarized zone on the southern and eastern frontiers as a means to promote peace and security in these areas. Instead of pressing his point, Wilson accepted Lloyd George's explanation. Had Wilson been present earlier when General Degoutte replied to Balfour's inquiry, the demilitarization terms of the treaty might have been extended. As it was, the discussion ended following a brief inquiry from Clemenceau as to whether some railway sidings along the Franco-German frontier were of any importance. Foch replied that they were not and that ended the analysis of demilitarization at the peace conference.¹⁸ On April 22, Clemenceau submitted a slightly revised draft of the article on demilitarization, becoming Articles 42 and 43 of the treaty, which was accepted without further discussion.¹⁹

The final draft therefore provided for two types of restrictions: Article 42 and Article 180 introduced restrictions on fortifications and Article 43 placed restrictions on the stationing of troops in the zone. But the final provisions, aside from not mentioning the term "demilitarization", were much less comprehensive than the original Article 9, which had been "temporarily" set aside on March 10 while awaiting the final determination of the political status of the Rhine provinces. When the political status was settled, Article 9 was never reintroduced. Thus, the final terms did not forbid the inhabitants to bear arms or receive military training; they did not prohibit depots, establishments, railway construction or works adapted to military purposes in the area; and they did not stipulate that the territory was not to be allowed to contribute directly or indirectly in money or in material of any description toward the armies of Germany. Rather the final final article (Article 43) read:

In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works of mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.

The German response to the military provisions of the Rhineland settlement was temperate and accomodating. In the May 29 counterproposals, the Germans accepted without protest the terms calling for the dismantling of the western fortifications and the creation of a "demilitarized" zone in the area, although their agreement assumed an early entry into the League of Nations and ultimate reciprocity. Thus, the German counterproposal stated that: "Under the presumption that Germany shall enter the League of Nation upon the conclusion of peace and in expectation of further reciprocity, Germany is prepared....to dismantle the fortresses in the west and establish a neutral zone."²⁰ The acceptance of the provision was repeated in another part of the reply: "Germany has no misgivings in renouncing the fortification on her western frontier."²¹

The Saar

Like the negotiations on the Rhineland, the conflict over the Saar at the peace conference centered on the question of the future political status of the territory. At issue were two interrelated problems: was France to regain sovereignty over a small portion of the Saar valley which it had temporarily taken in 1792 only to lose in the peace of 1815; and was the remaining portion of the valley to be detached from Germany and reconstituted into an independent state?

The negotiations over these political issues lasted for ten days and so irreconcilable were the positions and so divisive were the debates that the very continuation of the conference was threatened. At one point, President Wilson called for the USS George Washington to be made ready to leave. He had had enough, he reported, of the "mass of tergiversations." He was not going to discuss "anything with them any more."²² The threat was sufficient to force a compromise, although the final agreement became one of the most criticized sections of the treaty.

While the political settlement provoked considerable dissension among the Allies, the decision to demilitarize the area was reached effortlessly. Indeed, the military issue never came up for discussion among the ranking delegates on the Council of Four. The recommendation of the technical experts was approved without debate or analysis.

The conflict over the political status of the Saar stemmed in large part from France's unexpected territorial demand for control over the Saar valley. The French had not included any territorial demands relating to the Saar in their publicized war aims, nor had they forewarned the Allied of any change in policy prior to the opening of the peace conference. Once the conference convened, however, the French circulated a memorandum prepared by André Tardieu which introduced three new policies; first, restoration of the French frontier of 1814, i.e., a return of the southern sector of the Saar valley which France had controlled for twenty-odd years prior to 1815. second, detachment of the remaining portion of the valley from Germany and the creation of a "special political administration" for the area; and third, transfer of the full ownership of the coal mines in both sectors to France.

The arguments advanced by Tardieu in support of the French claims were based on historic possession and reparation needs. While the former argument was greeted with a certain skepticism by Lloyd George and with outright opposition by President Wilson, the latter was more favorably received. Both Wilson and Lloyd George agreed that France was entitled to reparation damages and they conceded that part of the reparations should come from the rich mines of the Saar basin. This would compensate for the German's flooding of the French mines at Lens and Valenciennes. The problem for the British and Americans was to find a way to let France have the coal of the Saar valley without granting possession of the territory. As the ethnic composition of the area was overwhelmingly German, this would be a clear violation of the principle of self-determination and an indication that the Allies intended to apply that principle only against enemies.

For the French, the goal was not only to obtain coal as reparations, but to deprive Germany of industrial and population resources. As Lloyd George astutely noted, French attempts to detach territory from Germany were not due to greed of possession. They were prompted by the fact that, in spite of the wartime victory, Germany still had a population nearly twice that of France. That accounted, according to Lloyd George, for the French urge to "chip off from the German bulk towns and territories in the Eastern and Western frontiers containing in the aggregate a preponderant German population numbering several million."²⁴

In his memorandum on the Saar issue, Tardieu developed a formula which would have achieved both the economic and

strategic objectives. As Lloyd George later acknowledged, "the argument was an ingenious one."²⁵ Tardieu's first premise was that the French were entitled to reparation damages, a position that no one challenged. His second premise was that the French were entitled, based on prior possession, to the frontier of 1814; that is, possession, of the southern sector of the Saar basin. As this would give them only an insignificant part of the industrial and coal producing area, Tardieu's first conclusion was that the French would have to be given ownership of all the mines in the Saar basin. While this might fulfill the economic objections, possession of the mines and a small section of the valley would not satisfy French strategic goals. To achieve this, Tardieu's second conclusion was that the remaining portion of the valley should be detached from Germany and placed under a "special political administration." As this could not be justified on an historic basis or on ethnic composition, Tardieu developed a new justification. This was the ingenious argument of logical interdependence. The population of the Saar basin, Tardieu pointed out, was an integrated community; while the mines were in one area, a large portion of the miners lived in another. According to Tardieu, "the Saar Basin forms an entity, the three elements of which are: a mining zone (very incompletely developed), an industrial zone, which is the outgrowth of the former; and finally a workers' zone, which extends beyond the other two and is connected with them by railroads." These were so interdependent, Tardieu maintained, that "any artificial separation would be ruinous...and a source of innumerable vexations for the inhabitants." Even more important, the restoration of only part of the area to France and the return of the remaining part to Germany would "render the operation of the mines impossible or in any event exceedingly difficult." Therefore, he concluded that separation "should not be considered."²⁶

The logic was impeccable. If the French were justified in claiming the coal of the Saar Basin as reparation for the destruction of their mines and if they were to be allowed possession of the 1814 frontier, then it was only right that he obtain possession of the entire area, as an artificial separation would render unattainable the first premise. Thus to obtain coal from the Saar, which was not contested, the entire area would have to be detached from Germany, a point which was contested.

Although the Tardieu memorandum had circulated during January and February, it was not until late March that the

Saar issue was taken up by the Council of Four. On March 28, Tardieu and Loucheur were invited to the Council session in order to present the French proposals. "The moment we entered the meeting", Tardieu later recalled, "our impression was formed. Mr. Lloyd George did not attribute first rate importance to this matter. President Wilson on the contrary, wore a quizzical smile that fore-shadowed objections."²⁷

Tardieu began by recapitulating the arguments which he had developed in his earlier memorandum. Lloyd George immediately agreed to the demand for the French ownership of the mines. With regard to the territorial demands, however, he was less accommodating. He admitted that an autonomous organization might be established for the entire area, but he opposed French claims to the 1814 frontier and to the assumption that the entire area should be controlled by France. He repeated the formula so often heard during the discussion: "Let us not renew the mistake committed by Germany in 1871 in the name of a fictitious historical right. Do not let us create a new Alsace-Lorraine."²⁸

While Lloyd George accepted a part of the French proposal, Wilson rejected every point. He conceded that France should obtain a quantity of coal from the Saar equal to the deficit from the plundered mines, but he refused to accept French ownership of the mines, the frontier of 1814 and the detachment of the rest of the Saar from Germany. "Never has France, in any public document," Wilson complained, "claimed the frontier of 1814. The bases of peace accepted by her speak reparation for the wrong which she suffered in 1871--not in 1815." He accepted the argument that the Saar was an interdependent entity, but came to the opposite conclusion as Tardieu. "The frontier of 1814 does not correspond to any economic reality. It would ruin the basin by cutting it in two, without assuring coal to France." Therefore, he concluded, the cession of territory, without an immediate plebescite, would be "inadmissible."²⁹

That night, Tardieu and Loucheur met with Clemenceau to go over the situation. As the demand for the frontier of 1814 was opposed by the British and the Americans, they agreed that the claim had to be abandoned. The ownership of the mines and the creation of an autonomous state were opposed by Wilson but were supported by Lloyd George. They decided, however, not to give up the claim to take over the mines or to detach the area from Germany. But instead of the veiled annexation implied in the original proposal, they agreed that "for the time being /the Saar/ will not be placed under the protection of the League of Nations." After

fifteen years, there would be a plebescite "to decide justly and freely as to its sovereignty." In the meantime, the French would occupy the entire area and exercise all central governmental authority.³⁰

These proposals were circulated on March 29.³¹ At the March 31 session of the Supreme Council, Wilson conceded the right of France to obtain full ownership of the mines. But he again rejected the idea of an independent state.³²

With the French dropping their claim to the frontier of 1814 and the Americans abandoning their opposition to French ownership of the Saar mines, the only remaining point of disagreement was over administering the territory. To examine alternative control arrangements, an ad hoc committee was appointed on March 31, consisting of Tardieu of France, C. H. Haskins for the United States, and Headlam-Morley for the British. After extensive negotiations, the British and American delegates conceded that French administrative control should be established.³³ This could be achieved, they agreed, in three ways: alternative one would leave the area under the sovereignty of Germany but would transfer the administration to France; alternative two would transfer the sovereignty to the League of Nations, but give the administration to France; alternative three would establish a separate state but place the area under a French protectorate.

It was in the elaboration of the administrative arrangements under the three alternatives that provisions for the demilitarization of the Saar first appeared. After describing the executive and legislative procedures under the three alternatives, one article described the military status of the territory. The provisions were lifted directly from the March 10 draft of the Rhineland agreement.

The Governor shall organize a gendarmerie for the policing of the Saar Basin, but subject thereto the inhabitants of the Basin will not be permitted to bear arms or receive any military training or to be incorporated in any military organization either on a voluntary or compulsory basis, and no fortifications, depots, establishments, railway construction or works of any kind adapted to military purposes will be permitted to exist within the territory. Nor will the territory be allowed to contribute directly or indirectly in men, money or in material of any description towards the armies of Germany.³⁵

These provisions required only minor changes under the three alternatives: as the second and third alternatives would deprive Germany of sovereignty over the area, the last sentence prohibiting the territory from contributing men, money or material to the German army was irrelevant and could be dropped if one of these alternatives was adopted. Other than that, the restrictions recommended by the committee were identical in each of the three alternatives.

While the committee's draft articles served as the basis for the final Saar agreement, the only issue to be raised in the Supreme Council was that of political control. Neither the principle or the procedures of demilitarization for the Saar was examined by the Supreme Council. Not until April 10, after a week of further proposals and counterproposals, was a compromise finally reached. Wilson broke the impasse by proposing that the sovereignty of the Saar be suspended in practice while retained in theory for a period of fifteen years. During that period the administration of the Saar would be carried out by a special commission appointed by the League of Nations. After fifteen years a plebiscite would be held to determine the ultimate fate of the territory--whether to be placed under French rule, become independent or revert back to Germany. This plan together with the provision for the French ownership of the mines and the creation of a customs union between France and the Saar, formed the basis of the final settlement. The military provisions as reworded by the Drafting Committee were much less comprehensive than the original draft of March 31. Now patterned after the final draft of the Rhineland articles, Section 30 of the Saar Annex read:

There will be no military service, whether compulsory or voluntary, in the territory of the Saar Basin, and the construction of fortifications therein is forbidden.

Only a local gendarmerie for the maintenance of order may be established.

It will be the duty of the Governing Commission to provide in all cases for the protection of persons and property in the Saar Basin.³⁶

The German reaction to the Saar agreement was strongly critical. While the Germans conceded to the French the right to a quantity of coal from the Saar as reparations, they vehemently opposed the scheme to detach the area from Germany for fifteen years. No opposition, however, was made to the demilitarization provisions. They were not even

referred to in the various notes and counterproposals submitted by the German delegation.

Heligoland

That the fortifications on the islands of Heligoland and Dune were to be destroyed there was no question at the peace conference. The provision was included in the original naval terms and was unchallenged. Debate over the islands focused instead on two issues: first, whether Germany was to retain possession of the islands; and second, whether harbors and breakwaters were to be destroyed along with the fortifications. The British raised the first point and advocated the detachment of the islands from Germany; the United States provoked the second issue by opposing the destruction of naval facilities which might be used for commercial purposes. The British found no support for their recommendation and abandoned the scheme without protest. The Americans and British split over the second issue; but Wilson, while pressing the point, ultimately abandoned his objections graciously. Thus, the final treaty terms remained as originally proposed by the naval experts.

Provisions affecting the defortification of Heligoland appeared for the first time in the original draft of the naval clauses prepared by the Naval experts and were submitted to the Supreme War Council in March. The original draft stipulated that: "The fortifications, military establishments and harbours of the Islands of Heligoland and Dune shall be destroyed under the supervision of Allied Commissioners by German labour and at the expense of Germany, within a period to be determined by the Commissioners, which shall not exceed one year from the date of the Convention." The clause went on to identify what was meant by "harbours" and included designated breakwaters and reclamation works as well as "all naval and military works, fortifications and buildings constructed and under construction" between certain demarcated lines. Finally, the clause raised the issue of the future disposition of the islands, noting that this should be decided by the peace conference.

During the formulation of the naval terms the American representative, Admiral Benson, while accepting the policy of razing the islands' fortifications, objected to the destruction of the harbors. His protests were not, however,

sufficient to sway the other naval experts and he had to be content with appending the reservation.³⁷

The naval clauses were first taken up by the Council of Ten on March 6, during Wilson's absence from the peace conference. At this session, Lloyd George demanded that the islands be detached from Germany. The disposal of the islands, he said, was "a question of great importance to Great Britain." His main concern, he pointed out, was that the islands "should not be left in the hands of the Germans." Admiral Wemyss repeated the point saying that he "did not mind what happened to the islands, as long as they did not revert to Germany."³⁸ While no one opposed the British position, neither did they support it. With no further discussion forthcoming from the delegates, the article was set aside for future consideration.

The naval terms were not taken up again until March 17. During the interval, the British found no support for their policy of detachment and "the question of great importance" was quietly forgotten; no one again raised it at the peace conference. While it was decided to authorize German possession of the islands, it had not been decided how extensive the "demilitarization" was to be. With Wilson back in Paris, the question came up at the March 17 session of the Supreme Council. After acknowledging that he was entirely in sympathy with the destruction of the fortifications on the Islands of Heligoland and Dune," Wilson thought "the destruction of the breakwaters was a rather serious matter from the humane point of view, as these formed havens for fishermen in case of storms in the North Sea." If the destruction of the island fortifications could be assured, he continued, there was "no real justification for destroying harbours." Granted that these harbors and breakwaters had been constructed for military purposes, "they were there now and were extremely useful as fishing harbours."

Lloyd George replied that the fishing harbors were quite different and separate from the naval harbors. Balfour conceded that the clause was "not well expressed;" what was meant, he pointed out, was that only the purely naval harbors should be destroyed. Admiral de Bon agreed. Wilson was still not satisfied; he wanted more than a distinction to be made between naval and commercial harbors. He noted that the German navy was to be reduced to a minimum and the internal fortifications were to be destroyed. Why, then, was there any need to destroy any harbors? it was his contention "that the artificial harbours were useful places of refuge."³⁹

Wilson's protests had a temporary impact on Lloyd George, who said that in view of the President's statement he would look further into the question. He suggested that the article be put aside for later consideration.⁴⁰

By the time the article again came up for discussion--at the Council of Four meeting of April 15--the British had decided to insist on the destruction of the "military" harbors as well as the fortifications. In the face of Balfour's persistence, Wilson reluctantly yielded and the original provisions of the article stood.⁴¹ The final draft of the article, Article 115 of the Versailles Treaty, provided that "The fortifications, military establishments and harbours of the Islands of Heligoland and Dune shall be destroyed." The only modification in the original draft was the inclusion of a clause prohibiting the rebuilding of these fortifications, military establishments and harbours in the future.⁴²

The provisions for the "demilitarization" of Heligoland--originally criticized by Balfour as "not well expressed"--were no clearer in the final draft than they were in the first draft. As no distinction was made between naval harbors and fishing harbors, the article appeared to demand the destruction of all harbors, commercial as well as military. This was not the only point of confusion in the article. While presumably the inhabitants of the islands retained the right to bear arms and receive military training, it was unclear whether the stationing of armed forces on the islands was prohibited. All that the article said on this point was that "military establishments" were forbidden; but its precise meaning, however, was never spelled out. Nor was it established that military maneuvers and other forms of military activity were proscribed in the area. Thus, the restrictions imposed on Heligoland were not strictly speaking "demilitarization", since a variety of military actions could presumably be conducted on the islands. In the final analysis, the terms were restricted to defortification.

The Germans, upon presentation of the draft treaty in May 1919, readily accepted the policy of razing the island fortifications. Their only protest stemmed from the impression given that all harbors were to be destroyed. Thus, the German Counterproposals of May 29 stated that: "The dismantling is conceded. Any measure necessary, however, in the interest of the insular population, as well as of peaceful navigation and fishing, must be maintained for the protection of the coast and of the fishing port."⁴³

The Allied reply of June 16 clarified the article by stating that the "only harbors it is proposed to destroy are the naval harbors within the positions given in Article 115; the fishing harbor is not within this area, and the naval harbors are not used by fishing vessels." This article, the reply concluded, had to be accepted "unconditionally."⁴⁴ And it was; following the Allied reply, no further protests were made over Heligoland by the Germans.

Baltic Routes and Coastal Forts

Provisions for the defortification of the maritime routes to the Baltic were included in the original draft of the naval clauses submitted to the Supreme Council on March 6. Clause 2 of Part II of the naval terms read:

In order to ensure free passage into the Baltic to all nations, Germany shall not erect any fortifications in /the designated area/..nor install any guns commanding the maritime routes between the North Sea and the Baltic. The fortifications now existing shall be demolished and the guns removed under the supervision of the Allied Commissioners.⁴⁵

The terms had been unanimously accepted by the Naval experts and provoked no dissensions among political leaders. There was no attempt to expand the terms to include further restraints on military activity in the area and thus ended up, as originally presented, as an arrangement for de-fortification rather than demilitarization.

Upon receipt of the draft treaty, the Germans accepted the provision without comment. There was, indeed, no reference to the provision in any of the German replies to the draft treaty. Therefore, the clause was accepted as originally presented by the Admirals, becoming Article 195 of the final treaty.

Unlike the article relating to the fortifications on the Baltic routes, the provision affecting coast fortifications was seriously challenged, extensively debated and ultimately modified. The original draft of the article, Clause 3 of Part II of the naval terms submitted on March 6, stated that "All fortified works and

fortifications within fifty kilometers of the German coast or on German islands off that coast shall be disarmed and dismantled. The construction of any new fortifications within the same limits is forbidden."⁴⁶

The article had been opposed by American and Japanese naval representatives during the drafting and was included in the original terms by a narrow 3 to 2 vote. When the article came up for discussion in the Supreme War Council on March 6, Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, sitting in for Wilson, vigorously opposed the imposition. As noted in the previous chapter, Lansing protested that since German naval armaments were being limited, he could see no reason why Germany should not be allowed to defend its coasts. The conference "was going beyond reason," he protested.⁴⁷ Balfour sought to assure Lansing that the fortifications were offensive rather than defensive, but in explaining raised doubts in his own mind. He concluded by stating that "if the fortifications in question were of value only for defensive purposes, he would at once accept the American view." Yet he was inclined to think that "under present conditions of Naval warfare, fortified bases merely become jumping-off places for offensive operations."

Lansing was not convinced. How could Germany launch offensive operations without a navy? For him, the problem was no longer that of securing other countries against German offensive action, but of securing Germany against other nations. Once the German navy had been reduced to the small number proposed in the treaty, he maintained that "Germany was entitled to keep any bases she might have for the protection of her Navy."

Lloyd George acknowledged that "there was a good deal of force in the contention of the American delegates." It would be unwise, he said, to give the impression that the Allies had displayed a spirit of revenge. Yet the fortifications should not be used to attack others. He therefore proposed that the clause be referred back to the Admirals to be so drafted "as to distinguish between fortifications maintained for offensive and those maintained for defensive purposes." And over the vociferous protest of Foch, it was agreed to accept Lloyd George's recommendation.⁴⁸

That evening the Admirals abandoned their previous stand by accepting the American position. Unable to make a distinction between offensive and defensive fortifications, they agreed to consider all the existing coastal

fortifications, except those on Heligoland and Dune, as defensive. Further, they agreed to recommend that Germany be permitted to retain the fortifications, subject only to the provision that no new ones be built. The revised article, submitted on March 7, therefore read:

All fortified works and fortifications now established within 50 kilometers of the German coast or on German islands off that coast, other than those mentioned in clause 1 and 3 of Part II, (i.e., Heligoland and Dune) shall be considered as of a defensive nature and may be retained as at present. No new fortifications shall be constructed within the same limits.⁴⁹

On March 17 the article was approved and appeared as Article 196 of the final treaty. The provision, like the article on the fortifications of the maritime routes to the Baltic, was accepted by the Germans without comment. No mention of the article was made in any of the German replies to the draft treaty.

Aside from the slight disagreement over what constituted defensive and offensive fortifications, the demilitarization provisions of the peace treaty were approved without great dissension among the Allies. Perhaps even more important, they were approved without extensive analysis or discussion. The recommendations of the military experts were, except in the case of coast fortifications and the harbors of Heligoland, accepted by the political leaders without challenge. What is noteworthy about the deliberations is not so much that so many different kinds of demilitarization schemes were included in the peace settlement, but that the policy was not more widely considered.

Chapter 3 -- Footnotes

¹ For historical development of this concept, see Major-General J.H. Marshall-Cornwall, Geographic Disarmament (1935).

² For the various proposals advanced in France during the war, see Jere C. King, Foch versus Clemenceau (1960), Ch.I.

³ For a review of the Franco-Russian understanding, see King, Foch versus Clemenceau, p. 12; Tardieu, The Truth About the Treaty (1921), p. 161; Guy de Traversay, "La premiere tentative de Republique rhénane," La Revue de Paris, (November 15, 1928), p. 409.

⁴ King, Foch versus Clemenceau, p. 12; Tardieu, The Truth About the Treaty, p. 161; Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (1939), I, 252.

⁵ In Lloyd George, Memoirs, I, 252.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ See, King, Foch versus Clemenceau, *passim*; Paul Birdsall, Versailles: Twenty Years After (1941), Ch. VIII; Seth P. Tillman, Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference (1961), Ch. 7; Ferdinand Czernin, Versailles, 1919 (1964), Ch. 7; David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, I, Ch. VIII; Andre Tardieu, The Truth About the Treaty, Ch. V; and Georges Clemenceau, The Grandeur and Misery of Victory (1930).

⁸ F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, IV, 216.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 299-300.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 307-08.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 300.

¹² Lloyd George, Memoirs, I, 254-55; Tardieu, Truth About the Treaty, pp. 145-47.

¹³ Lloyd George, Memoirs, I, 256.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 260.

15 The discussions in the ad hoc committee are reviewed in Tardieu, Truth About the Treaty, pp. 172-176; Lloyd George, Memoirs, pp. 261-263; King, Foch versus Clemenceau, pp. 44-45.

16 Lloyd George, Memoirs, I, 402-403; for a history of the Tripartite agreement, see Louis A. R. Yates, United States and French Security, 1917-1921 (1957).

17 Tardieu, Truth About the Treaty, pp. 178-82.

18 The discussion is in F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, IV, 363-64; Article 20, is on p. 390.

19 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, V, 113; the draft article is on pp. 116-17.

20 Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (1941), p. 322.

21 Ibid., p. 374.

22 Ray Stannard Baker, American Chronicle (1945), pp. 403-04.

23 The memorandum is in Tardieu, Truth About the Treaty, pp. 251-62.

24 Lloyd George, Memoirs, I, 264-65.

25 Ibid., p. 263.

26 Tardieu, Truth About the Treaty, pp. 256, 261.

27 Ibid., p. 262.

28 Quoted in Tardieu, Truth About the Treaty, p. 263; also see Paul Mantoux, Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatre (1955), I, 67.

29 Mantoux, Les Délibérations, I, 67-75.

30 Tardieu, Truth About the Treaty, pp. 267-68.

31 Ibid., pp. 266-69.

32 Mantoux, Les Délibérations, I, 89-91.

³³ See Tardieu, Truth About the Treaty, pp. 269-70.

³⁴ F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, V, 66-69.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 66-691

³⁶ F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, VIII, 177.

³⁷ F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, IV, 248.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 224.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 366.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 366.

⁴¹ Mantoux, Les Délibérations, I, 251-55.

⁴² F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, XIII, 271-72.

⁴³ Luchau, The German Delegation, p. 340.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 433.

⁴⁵ F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, IV, 249.

⁴⁶ The first draft of the article is in Ibid., p. 249.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 224.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 225.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 265-66.

Chapter 4

DISARMING THE VANQUISHED:

Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria

On September 10, 1919, three months after the completion of the German settlement, the Austrian peace treaty was signed at St. Germain-en-Laye. The terms were, in substantial measure, drawn from the German treaty; in turn, Allied leaders utilized the Austrian settlement as the basis for the Hungarian treaty, finally signed at Trianon on June 4, 1920, and the Bulgarian treaty, signed at Neuilly on November 27, 1919. All three agreements formally registered the Allies' determination to impose long-range, broadly-constituted disarmament provisions upon their vanquished opponents in Eastern Europe.

Like the German treaty, the military terms of the Austrian settlement reduced the size of the Austrian army and limited the number of its weapons. It also placed restrictions on the manufacture of armaments and abolished compulsory military service. The army and navy were prohibited from forming an air force and restrictions were placed on military training. The Naval terms of the Austrian treaty were, given the country's new frontiers, predictably more restrictive than the naval terms in the German treaty; not only were all submarines to be surrendered and those under construction destroyed, but all Austro-Hungarian warships were to be surrendered. The treaty permitted Austria to retain as its entire navy three river patrol boats for use on the Danube. Supervision of the treaty terms was to be carried out, as in the German treaty, under the direction of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control and the final article of the military section provided for long-term supervision under the League of Nations. Unlike the German treaty, however, there were no occupied areas or demilitarized zones.

The Austrian Peace Treaty

Negotiations on the Austrian peace treaty began relatively late at the peace conference. Indeed it was not until the German draft treaty had been delivered on May 7 that the Allies began to seriously consider the Austrian settlement. Assuming that the German terms could easily be adapted to the Austrian treaty, an erroneous assumption as it turned out, the Austrians were invited to St. Germain for presentation of the treaty on May 12. The Austrian delegation made hurried preparations and managed to arrive at St. Germain on May 14; but by then the Council of Four had become involved in the German counterproposals. For over a week the Austrian delegation was completely ignored, except for the brief ceremony of exchanging credentials. Finally, ten days after its arrival, the Austrian delegation implored the Allies to take some action and Clemenceau replied somewhat optimistically that the terms would be communicated on May 30. For a few days there was a frantic effort to put together the Austrian terms, but as the deadline approached whole sections of the treaty were still incomplete--including the section on military terms and the sections dealing with financial and reparation provisions. It was therefore decided to submit to the Austrians those sections of the treaty which had been completed, but to reserve the remaining portions for later presentation. After a slight adjournment, the first draft of the partially completed treaty was presented to the Austrian delegation on June 2.

During the remaining weeks of June, the Allies, preoccupied with the German treaty, were unable to devote attention to Austrian issues. Not until after the German treaty was signed on June 28, could the Allies concentrate on the remaining portions of the Austrian treaty. By then, however, most of the heads of government had returned home, so the Austrian treaty had to be completed by a new Supreme Council. This new Supreme Council--designated the Heads of Delegation and composed of George Clemenceau, Robert Lansing, Lord Balfour, Signor Tittoni and Baron Makino--began to squeeze final consideration of the Austrian treaty in between deliberations over the fighting in Hungary, the Polish advance against Lithuania, the Italian action in Fiume and the Greek war against Turkey. Not until mid-July did the Council complete a revised draft of the Austrian treaty--this time including the military, financial and reparations sections--which was submitted to the Austrian delegation on July 20. The Austrians drafted their counter-proposals which were reviewed by the Allies during the latter part of August.

After incorporating a few minor changes in the July 20 draft, the Allies resubmitted the treaty to the Austrians on September 2. On September 10 the treaty was signed at St. Germain-en Laye; it was ratified on July 16, 1920.¹

It is important to note that in the military conditions imposed on Austria what was left out of the final draft was perhaps more important than what was included. To appraise the importance of these conditions Marquées, analysis must focus on the process of negotiations. In this process several points warrant extended examination. First, the deliberations over the disarmament of Austria were far more protracted than were those with Germany. Not only were the military terms subjected to more separate readings but occupied more sessions of the Supreme Council than did the German terms. Second, in contrast to the German treaty, where Marshal Foch was the dominant force in the drafting of the military terms, a procedural change led to a shift in the military agency formulating the Austrian terms. The absence of Foch and the change in personnel encouraged an attempt to lessen the severity of the military terms to be imposed on Austria. Third, in determining the degree of Austrian disarmament, the differences that arose did not so much reflect a conflict between rival national positions as a conflict between political and military approaches. Thus, there was a high degree of consensus between Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando over the size of the Austrian army to be authorized; but they were seriously challenged by their own military advisers.

Fourth, while differences arose between the political and military leaders over the size of the Austrian army, the main issue was not the disarmament of Austria, but the disarmament of the new and reconstituted states of Central and Eastern Europe--Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece. In resolving this issue an incongruous realignment took place, with Wilson and Clemenceau leading the opposition to disarmament and Lloyd George and Orlando reluctant followers. Fifth, the Naval and Aerial clauses were easily resolved. Except for one minor difference--provoked by a misunderstanding on Wilson's part--the terms were approved without debate or dissension. Sixth, the supervision and control provisions in the Austrian treaty were patterned closely after the German terms. Indeed, there was a repetition of the strange fate of the article establishing long-term supervision under the League as befell the corresponding article in the German treaty. As in the German treaty, Wilson objected to the notion of external investigation and

proposed an amendment, giving the League the right of inquiry only. This amendment, as before, was formally accepted in the Supreme Council and duly incorporated in the revised draft of the terms. But in the final treaty the right of investigation unexplainably reappeared. Seventh, while the Austrians expressed shock at the severity of the military terms and submitted detailed protests, the protests were not so much opposition to disarmament as to the technical means and the time requirements for implementation of the terms.

Drafting the Military Terms. The drafting of the military terms of the Austrian treaty involved a procedural change: whereas the ad hoc Foch Committee had drawn up the original German military terms, the Austrian military terms were drafted by the Military Representatives to the Supreme War Council. This body composed of General Sackville-West of Great Britain, General Bliss of the United States, General Belin of France and General Cavallero of Italy, had been largely ignored during the deliberations over the German terms; but its use now encouraged a shift in the policy assumptions used in drafting of Austrian conditions.

According to H.W.V. Temperley, editor of the monumental History of the Paris Peace Conference and member of the British peace delegation, the British, in drafting the Austrian military terms, assumed that the Austrian terms would be less restrictive than those imposed on Germany. While the German terms were to serve as a guide, it was important the British felt, to show the Austrian people that they were regarded with no special disfavor. Moderation and clemency were all the more necessary, they assumed, in view of the chaos in Central Europe: Soviet rule had just ended in Bavaria but had been established in Hungary.²

While the British may have felt it desirable, even essential, to lighten the burden of Austria, their draft terms did not differ significantly from the military provisions which had been handed the Germans a few days earlier, on May 7. But four changes introduced in their draft led the British to feel that they were significantly moderating the Austrian military terms. The first was in the time permitted the Austrians to demobilize their armed forces. The corresponding article in the Versailles treaty stipulated that the German forces were to be demobilized within two months from the coming into force of the treaty. In the British draft, this time was extended to three months. A second modification was in the length of service required of officers and enlisted men in the new Austrian army. German terms provided

that officers remaining in the postwar army would serve until the age of forty-five, while new officers would serve for twenty-five years. In the British draft, the old officers would serve until the age of forty and new officers were to serve for twenty years. For enlisted men, the German articles stipulated twelve year enlistment periods while the British draft, though retaining the twelve year enlistment period, provided that half of this could be in the reserves. The third modification was that no occupation or demilitarized zones were to be imposed on Austria. The fourth, and perhaps most important change, related to the size of the Austrian army. The German draft treaty stipulated that Germany, with a population of 60 million, would be permitted an army of 100,000 or a ratio of less than two per thousand population. The British draft proposed that Austria, with a population of seven million, be allowed an army of 40,000, or more than five per thousand population.

These concessions, which in retrospect appear to be slight, gave rise to a variety of protests which varied with the examining body: the first two modifications were contested by the Military Representatives while the last one--relating to the size of the Austrian army--was challenged in the Council of Four. The only change which was accepted without debate was that exempting Austria from occupation and territorial demilitarization. When thereafter the Representatives met on May 11 to review the British draft for the first time, they reached easy agreement on most of the provisions but came to an impasse on two articles--those establishing the method of recruitment and the enlistment periods.³

While few differences arose over Article 1 of the British draft, giving the Austrian army three months to demobilize, the second article, abolishing compulsory military service, met determined French opposition and ultimately split Allied ranks. As before, the Italian representative supported the French demand for conscription while the American representative accepted the British recommendation for voluntary service. The French and Italians again argued that voluntary service was too costly and too uncertain. Unless the army was highly paid, they maintained, Austria would find it difficult to recruit even up to the size authorized. Either the army would impose a serious financial burden on Austria or it would be inadequately staffed. The French and Italian therefore recommended compulsory military service for most of the army, permitting a volunteer force of 8,000. American and British representatives argued that voluntary military service had been accepted in principle for Germany

and that if not included in the Austrian treaty it would be difficult to insist on so severe a penalty being imposed on Germany alone. As neither side would give in, a statement was reached over the article and it was decided to submit both draft proposals to the Supreme Council.

The articles in the next section, in contrast, were accepted without dissension. While Article 3 provided for an army of 40,000, which was larger, proportionally, than the German army, the article was accepted by the Military Representatives without dissent. The remaining articles--relating to the organization of the Austrian army--were also approved without amendment. At the suggestion of General Cavallero an article was added which prohibited any military force not specifically authorized in the treaty. This provision--not present in the German treaty--was designed to prohibit semi-official military forces like the Volkswehr. The proposal met with the approval of the other Military Representatives and was appended to the British draft.

The article establishing lengths of service for officers --to the age of forty for continuing officers and for twenty years for new officers--was adopted by the Military Representatives with only slight change. But the following article, dealing with the period of service for privates and non-commissioned officers, provoked the second major conflict over the military terms. The British-American draft called for voluntary enlistment for all privates and non-commissioned officers for a period of twelve years, six of which could be taken in the reserves. The French and Italians, however, countered with a rival draft which proposed that of the 40,000 authorized for the army only 8,000 be allowed to enlist on a voluntary basis, and that these 8,000 should serve the entire twelve year period of enlistment on active duty, with no reserve status provided. As an impasse also developed over this article, the two alternative proposals were included in the draft submitted to the Council of Four.

The fourth section, "Schools, Educational Establishments, Clubs and Societies," contained three articles which were patterned after the German provisions and were accepted with only minor stylistic changes. As in the German treaty, all educational institutions, societies of discharged soldiers and, generally speaking, associations of every description, were not to occupy themselves with military matters of any kind.

The fifth Chapter, on "Armaments, Munitions and Material, Fortifications," included six articles. The first two, adopted without amendment, stipulated that within three months of the coming into force of the treaty, weapons and stocks of armament were to be reduced to those figures listed in two appended tables. The first table enumerated the weapons permitted per division--12,000 rifles, 108 heavy machine guns, 162 light machine guns, 18 light trench mortars, 9 medium trench mortars, 24 field or mountain guns and 24 field or mountain Howitzers--which allowed no more to the Austrians than was permitted to the Germans. The second table listed the number of rounds of ammunition permitted per unit: the Austrians were permitted a few more rounds in some weapons and the Germans a few more in other weapons, with the advantages to either side neither obvious or significant. The remaining articles were patterned after corresponding German articles and provided for restrictions on the manufacture of armaments, the surrender of all non-authorized weapons and prohibitions on the importation and export of weapons. The final article prohibited, as in the German treaty, the use or manufacture in Austria of poisonous and asphyxiating gases, armoured cars, tanks and "all similar constructions suitable for use in war". The only difference between the German terms and the British draft was that Austria could manufacture armaments in only one factory while no numerical restriction was placed on the Germans.

Except for some changes in the time limits for certain terms and in the authorization of a proportionately larger army, the British draft was not substantially different from its German counterpart. Most clauses, in fact, were taken directly from the German draft and reworded to fit the Austrian conditions.

Civil-Military Differences. Having received the draft from the Military Representatives, the Supreme Council began consideration of the Austrian military terms on May 15. Immediately three issues arose, two of which were to prolong the discussions for over a month. Lloyd George raised the first issue when he challenged the French-Italian proposals to retain compulsory military service in Austria.⁴ The fundamental difference between the two draft articles, according to Lloyd George, was that the American-British proposal made for a small army, whereas the French-Italian proposal meant, in practice, the creation in a short time of a large army. It was a familiar argument not requiring lengthy elaboration. With the issue already settled in the German treaty, neither Clemenceau or Orlando desired to reopen the issue, although

Orlando was particularly grieved by the precedent. After abolition of compulsory military service in Austria, as in Germany, he said, it would be impossible for Italy to retain compulsory service if Italians saw that no other country adopted this method of recruitment. And Italy, he pointed out, "would be unable to raise an army by voluntary service." The whole tradition of the country was against it. But as they had prohibited compulsory service in Germany, he conceded that "no sufficient reason existed for reaching a different decision in the case of Austria." As long as Clemenceau accepted the British-American draft, he would too.

Next, the delegates turned their attention to the other two issues, which became increasingly interdependent as discussions continued. The first related to the size of the Austrian army and the second involved the determination of whether the smaller Central and Eastern European states were to be disarmed along with Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. Solution of first question, it became apparent, was dependent on the answer to the second. How could the size of the Austrian army be set until the size of the neighboring armies was determined? The first question provoked a conflict between the Council and their Military Representatives: the second question led to a split within the Council itself.

Clemenceau first challenged the recommendations of the Military Representatives on the size (40,000 men) of the Austrian army. Apprehensive over this figure's effect on the German treaty, he proposed that the size of the Austrian army be fixed "to bear the same ratio to the figures of population as had been agreed to in the case of Germany."⁵ General Sackville-West, was called upon to explain how the figure of 40,000 had been arrived at, but he merely succeeded in confusing the issue. In actuality, the size of the Austrian army was based rather closely on the ratio established in the German treaty, but as the periods of recruitment in the two countries were to be different--at least in the British-American draft--the figure of 40,000 was not comparable. However, Sackville-West did little to clear up the misunderstanding; indeed, he compounded it. He pointed out that "in reality" a force of 40,000 men constituted a small army, "because in that figure all the services were included." This statement made no sense if interpreted to mean--as it was by some--that it included personnel of the navy and air-force, for Austria was to be deprived of both. Nor did it make sense if interpreted to mean--as it was by others--that this referred to army service personnel. It made sense only if interpreted to mean--which he undoubtedly meant to convey --that under the British-American draft proposal half of the

12 year enlistment period could be taken in the reserves which meant in practice that only half of the 40,000 would be on active duty at any one time. And if the account were taken of those units required for auxiliary services, the Austrian army would have only 15,000 to 20,000 active fighting men on call.

Since the Supreme Council never grasped the differences between the German and Austrian drafts regarding enlistment periods, they got side-tracked into comparing a 40,000 man Austrian Army with a 100,000 German army. Given the population differences, the ration looked lop-sided in favor of Austria. As the military experts failed entirely to clarify the issue, Clemenceau was able to successfully challenge the figures. Thus, when the Premier intervened to say that on the basis of the discussion he was "radically opposed to the proposals of the military advisers," the other delegates agreed, although Wilson was bothered that the point Sackville-West was attempting to make escaped them. But Clemenceau refused to pursue the issue further and said that he would "never agree" to an Austrian army of 40,000. In his opinion, a force of 10,000 to 12,000 would be "sufficient for the maintenance of order within the territory of Austria and for the control of her frontiers."⁶

With pressure building to reduce the Austrian armed forces as a result of discrepancies in the German-Austrian ratios, Wilson tried another approach: instead of reducing the Austrian armed forces, why not increase the size of the German army? Perhaps, he said, Foch had been right in recommending an army of 200,000 men for Germany.⁷ But Clemenceau said that he "positively declined to reopen that question." Ultimately the Council of Four decided that the Military Representatives should prepare a report showing the forces to be allowed Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Poland, Bulgaria and Greece, "taking the German figures as a proportional standard." In the case of Poland, allowance was to be made "for the existing situation of the Eastern frontier."⁸

The Military Representatives did not accept the Supreme Council decision submissively. Though they formulated the figures for the armies on the basis of the ratio of the German army to population, they refused to approve them. Indeed, they rejected the arguments of the Council that the Austrian army be reduced to 15,000 to 20,000 and repeated their recommendation for a force of 40,000. In their report to the Council, they noted that they had to "persist" in

their opinion that to reduce these armies to the proportionate level of the German army would permit forces "insufficient to ensure the efficient carrying out of the tasks which these states may be called upon to perform."⁹ Thus they recommended armies which were substantially higher than those calculated on the basis of the German figures:

<u>States</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Total effectives calculated on basis given by S. C.</u>	<u>Recommendations of the Mil. Reps.</u>
Austria	7,000,000	15,000	40,000
Hungary	10,000,000	18,000	45,000
Bulgaria	5,000,000	10,000	20,000
Czechoslovakia	13,000,000	22,000	50,000
Yugoslavia	11,000,000	20,000	40,000
Rumania	16,000,000	28,000	60,000
Poland	22,000,000	44,000	80,000
Greece	6,000,000	12,000	20,000

In presenting these figures, the military advisors advanced four main arguments which they felt justified proportionately larger armies. The first argument was based on the ineffectiveness of internal communications within these states. Germany, they noted, had an "excellent" communication system which could, in case of urgency, transport its forces from one point to another to ensure internal order. This was not the case in the smaller states. Not having the same facilities for communication, it would be difficult for these states to quickly assemble their troops, scattered over the country, at any desired point.

The second argument was based on the requirements for maintaining order in large cities. Experience demonstrated, the Military Representatives pointed out, that maintenance of urban order necessitated forces at two or three per cent of the total population. These forces were required to suppress uprisings, as in Germany, or to prevent disturbances, as in several Allied countries. This consideration was particularly relevant, they noted, in Austria, which had within its borders a capital with a population of over two million. If it were necessary to suppress major disturbances, they concluded, there was "no doubt" that the Austrian government should have a force of 25,000 to 30,000.

The third argument was that it was "essential to take into account the nature of the frontiers and their value from the point of view of defense." It was "impossible", they said, to consider Germany, half of whose frontiers faced the sea,

or neutral states or neutral zones, from the same standpoint as states such as Hungary which were "surrounded by hostile neighbors with open frontiers." The fourth argument raised the threat of Bolshevism. Not only were Poland and Rumania "directly menaced" by Soviet Russia, they constituted "the barrier which defends Europe against Bolshevism." Therefore, these states should be "left in a condition to continue war against the Russian Maximalists with all possible means at their disposal."¹⁰

On May 23, the Supreme Council met to consider the report of the Military Representatives and during the discussions General Bliss advanced a new argument to support the recommendations of the professionals. He "felt very strongly" that by reducing the forces of the smaller states, as proposed, "those States would be converted into mere vassals of the two Continental Powers of the Entente." Should disorders occur within the smaller states, which the governments would be unable to control, this would require the intervention of either France or Italy. Without the means for preserving internal order themselves, these states would in effect lose their independence. Therefore, he recommended that the figures of the military advisers be accepted by the Council.

Bliss' appearance before the Council marked a turning point in the deliberations of the disarmament of the smaller states of Central and Eastern Europe. Although the delegates were not convinced that their original objectives were inappropriate, they were, as Orlando admitted, impressed by General Bliss' remarks. Wilson felt that the points raised by Bliss were "very serious and large" and required careful consideration; Clemenceau agreed.¹¹

That afternoon when the Council met again, the debate over the disarmament of Austria and the smaller states continued and a realignment of positions took shape. Heretofore the British and Americans had been closely allied, within the Military Representatives and the Council of Four, while the French and Italians often had common points of view on military policy. But during the evening of May 23, Wilson abandoned his support for the disarmament of the smaller states. When confronted with the operational consequences of the ideal--the danger of exposing the smaller states to the menace of Bolshevism--Wilson began to see disarmament as a threat to security. This was, of course, closer to the French than to the English point of view. As Wilson moved toward Clemenceau, Orlando, apprehensive over the rearmament of the smaller states, especially Yugoslavia, moved toward

Lloyd George. Wilson, for example, concluded that Bliss' remarks "seemed to him to carry considerable weight," while Lloyd George urged his colleagues not to allow the small states "to use them as cats' paws for their miserable ambitions."¹² Prussia, he pointed out, had begun as these states were beginning and with less population than Yugoslavia. Were they to disarm Austria and Germany and allow Czechoslovakia an army of one and a half million and Poland, which was at that very moment "embarking on imperialistic enterprises," an army of two million? This was, he concluded, "an outrage on decency, fair play and justice."

Orlando complained that the figures proposed by the military advisors did not produce disarmament at all. Indeed, they would allow these states "the same standard of military strength as Italy had before the war." Czechoslovakia, he noted, was to have 50,000 men; Italy's army before the war was 180,000, although Italy had three times the population of Czechoslovakia. Unless it could be claimed that Italy was disarmed before the war, the number of effectives proposed by the Military Representatives "did not amount to disarmament." It was a good point, but no one wished to get into a discussion of what constituted disarmament.

While Wilson raised doubts over the disarming of the smaller states, Clemenceau led the retreat. He acknowledged that "this was the most difficult question of all that had to be decided." And he conceded that he "saw the point of view of what Mr. Lloyd George said." But he "also saw the other side of the question." "One of the strongest guarantees against German aggression," he said, "was that behind Germany, in an excellent strategic position, lay these independent States--the Poles and the Czecho-Slovaks." This being the case, he noted, his military advisers opposed reducing the Polish army; to meet the danger of Soviet Russia, his advisers also opposed the disarmament of Rumania.¹³

Wilson commented that the figures proposed by the military experts "only amount to 350,000 men for the whole of Eastern Europe." To Lloyd George this was misleading for, except in the cases of Germany, Austria and Hungary, the other states would be able to recruit on an annual basis. This meant, he pointed out, taking Czechoslovakia as an example, that with the training of 50,000 a year "in 12 years she would have any army of half a million" Not to be dissuaded, Wilson replied that there was a plan to limit their military equipment. But Lloyd George scoffed at this saying that "it was very difficult to guarantee that these nations would not manage

to provide themselves somehow with equipment." With no plan for inspection or supervision to be imposed on the smaller "friendly" states, Lloyd George had a point.

The deliberations at this point reached an impasse. Lloyd George and Orlando continued to press for the disarmament of the smaller states, while Clemenceau was opposed and Wilson was becoming increasingly doubtful. Adjournment without having reached any decision, the Allies were unable to complete the military section of the peace treaty presented to the Austrians on June 2.

The disarmament of Austria and the smaller states was taken up again on June 4, with Clemenceau noting how difficult it would be to reduce the armies of the Eastern European states "other than the enemy States." To this Lloyd George added, rather sardonically, that he had "no doubt what the size of these forces would be if no action were taken."¹⁴ Wilson had in the interim evolved a scheme which he felt would permit them to further both the ideal of disarmament and keep up their defenses against Bolshevism. His proposal was that "a period should be fixed within which it might be anticipated that the ferment in Eastern Europe would subside, at the end of which the armies should be reduced to the figures now settled." As an example, he suggested that "it might be provided in the Treaty of Peace that after January 1st, 1921 the various States should agree to accept such and such limitation of forces, unless in the judgment of the Council of the League of Nations some extension was desirable." This plan would provide for the immediate security interests of the Eastern European states and also for future disarmament.¹⁵

Clemenceau liked the idea. He suggested, however, that the figures not be worked out at that time, as this might "irritate" the smaller states. Rather, it would be better to say that by January 1st, 1921 the League of Nations would fix the figures for the limitation of armaments.¹⁶

This was a clever move on the part of Clemenceau, but Wilson immediately grasped the significance of the amendment and opposed it. In Wilson's formula disarmament would go into effect automatically on a certain date, unless the League Council decided--unanimously--to the contrary. Under the League's unanimity rule, those opposed to the disarmament of the smaller states would have to mobilize support for a change; a single state on the Council could require the implementation of disarmament. With Clemenceau's formula the advantage

would lie with the opponents of disarmament--for it would be up to the advocates to mobilize support and reach unanimous agreement on the figures to be imposed before disarmament could be implemented. One power could block the decision and thereby permit the smaller states to remain uncontrolled. Besides the procedural differences in the two formulas, there was a tactical difference: would it be easier to reach agreement on the figures for the size of the armies then or at a later date. Wilson proposed that they decide then and there while Clemenceau counselled for postponement.

A new stalemate threatened, but Lloyd George suggested that they invite the smaller states to the next session of the Supreme Council devoted to the disarmament of Austria to hear their reactions. The proposal, given Lloyd George's policy objectives, was a tactical blunder. Although the representatives were to be asked only whether they preferred that the figures be decided then or at a later date, it could have been anticipated that the smaller states would challenge the decision itself. And if they challenged the decision, they had a powerful weapon at their disposal: their sovereign independence. As these states were not subject to peace terms, how could the Council impose disarmament on them if they opposed? Not only were they sovereign independent states, they were also "friendly" states and some had even been active allies of the Entente during the war.

These questions had not been raised in the Council, perhaps because they had not occurred to anyone, perhaps because it was assumed that once the Great Powers had agreed on a policy they would be able to have that agreement implemented. As the Allies were not in agreement, it could have been anticipated that the smaller states would play off the Great Powers against each other. By emphasizing the threat of Bolshevism to Wilson and the threat of Germany to Clemenceau they could aggravate the differences within the Council. Given the political implications of Lloyd George's compromise proposal, Clemenceau withdrew his amendment to Wilson's plan for delayed disarmament and the Wilson formula was accepted.

The only procedural question remaining was whether to present the smaller states with a set of proposed figures as basis for discussion. Wilson proposed this, suggesting that the figures of the Military Representatives be accepted, including 40,000 men for the Austrian army. Clemenceau was not to be taken in by this procedural gambit for had he accepted the figure of 40,000, even for discussion purposes, he would

have committed himself on the substantive issue. Therefore, he resisted Wilson's suggestion. Lloyd George again suggested a compromise: that the figure of 30,000 be accepted. Both Clemenceau and Wilson agreed, and the Austrian question was settled. As expected, the procedural decision became the substantive solution--not only was 30,000 the basis for discussion, it became the final figure.

Having decided on the size of the Austrian army, it was still an open question whether the Supreme Council would be able to agree on the disarmament of the small states, even if only for some future date. This question was settled the following day when the representatives met with the Supreme Council. Vesnitch of Yugoslavia, Venizelos of Greece, Bratiano of Rumania, Benes of Czechoslovakia and Paderewski of Poland effectively played on the fears of Bolshevism and Germany, while protesting that the Council was threatening their sovereign independence.¹⁷ The delegates--especially Clemenceau and Wilson--were predictably impressed with the remarks. Wilson noted that "after hearing these views he would have to think the whole matter over again." Lloyd George, while acknowledging that the arguments had been "powerful", was more inclined to consider them merely "clever."¹⁸ But clever or not, the arguments undermined the policy of disarming the smaller states for the issue was not raised again at the peace conference. When the military terms of the Austrian treaty were taken up for the final time on June 16, they were easily, though somewhat hastily and perhaps reluctantly, approved without further debate.¹⁹

In the deliberations over the disarmament of Austria, the two main issues--the determination of the size of the Austrian army and the decision on the disarmament of the smaller states--split the Council of Four three ways. Clemenceau opposed the disarmament of the smaller states, especially Poland and Rumania, but supported the drastic limitation of arms for Austria. Wilson, while favoring the future limitation of armaments for the smaller states, opposed their immediate disarmament; he also opposed a drastic limitation of armaments for Austria. Thus Wilson was the only one on the Supreme Council, somewhat ironically, who resisted the disarmament of both Austria and the smaller states. Lloyd George, on the other hand, actively pressed for the disarmament of both, while Orlando, although not pressing his views, associated himself rather closely with Lloyd George.

Naval and Aerial Clauses. The original draft of the naval clauses of the Austrian treaty was prepared by naval experts attached to the Supreme War Council. This group was composed of Admiral Benson of the United States, Rear Admiral Hope of Great Britain, Vice Admiral de Bon of France, and Admiral Thaon di Revel of Italy. Meeting on May 13, the naval experts proposed seven articles for the Austrian treaty, considerably fewer than the twenty clauses in the German treaty. For the most part the Austrian draft terms reflected the principles established in the German treaty.²⁰ The first article provided that all Austro-Hungarian warships were to be surrendered; this included submarines, monitors, torpedo boats and armed vessels of the Danube flotilla. This article differed somewhat from the German treaty -which required that Germany turn over those war-ships in excess of the six battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats it was permitted to retain. Since Austria would become a land-locked state, with only the Danube providing access to international waters, the complete prohibition of an Austrian navy was neither unexpected nor particularly onerous.

The second article of the Austrian draft provided for the disarmament of an enumerated list of "auxiliary cruisers and fleet auxiliaries," which could be retained as merchant ships. This provision was exactly the same as the corresponding clause in the German draft treaty. The third article required that all warships, including submarines, then under construction were to be broken up. This was to begin "as soon as possible" after the treaty was ratified. The condition was substantially the same as the German terms--although the time limits for the effectuation of the terms were initially different in the German treaty: in the revised drafts they corresponded exactly.

The fourth article stipulated that machinery and material "arising from the breaking-up of the ex-Austro-Hungarian warships" could not be used "except for purely industrial or commercial purposes," nor could they be sold or disposed of to a foreign country. This article was taken directly from the German draft treaty. The fifth article prohibited Austria from constructing or acquiring submarines, even for commercial purposes. This too corresponded exactly to the terms of the German treaty.

The sixth article stipulated that all arms, ammunition and other naval war material, including mines and torpedoes, which Austria-Hungary possessed at the Armistice, November 3, 1918, were to be surrendered to the Allies. Austria was in

the future to be forbidden to manufacture or export any of those articles listed. The corresponding provision in the German treaty was essentially the same, the only difference being that Austria, with no navy authorized, was required to turn over all articles, whereas Germany, with a small navy permitted, was required to turn over only those arms in excess of authorized amounts. The same restrictions on manufacture and export were provided in both treaties. The last provision in the Austrian draft imposed a series of three month restrictions on wireless telegraphy. The same restrictions were in the German draft, only the time limits were initially different.²¹

Although the naval section in the Austrian draft was much shorter than the German provisions, it is difficult to conclude that the Austrian terms were less severe. Most of the provisions not included in the Austrian draft were simply not applicable. The only opposition raised during the drafting of the terms by the naval experts came from Benson. He suggested two points--that the warships and material surrendered by Austria should be destroyed or broken up, a point left unresolved in the original draft, and second, that the naval terms should contain no prohibition against the manufacture of naval armaments on foreign order. Neither amendment was accepted by the other naval experts and Benson requested that they be appended to the draft to be submitted to the Council of Four.²²

When the Supreme Council took up the naval terms on May 15, Wilson supported Benson's two reservations.²³ Clemenceau pointed out that the German treaty contained the same prohibition against the manufacture of naval armaments for foreign order; he saw no reason why an exception should be made for Austria. Wilson persisted, arguing that Germany was differently situated: Germany had a seaboard whereas Austria did not. The English and French admirals were called on to explain the consequences of Wilson's proposed amendment. Admiral Hope noted that Austria could, under Wilson's proposal, manufacture mines and torpedoes and deliver them to the Germans. And Admiral de Bon explained that the article in question prevented Austria from supporting other nations who might enter into war if they had access to naval armaments from Austria. Wilson pointed out that under the treaty Austria could manufacture war material in only one factory, which would be under Allied supervision. He did not see the need to add this additional prohibition; what he wanted to do was to "make some distinction in favor of Austria, in order to wean her away from her old Ally." While the French and

Italians saw only danger in Wilson's proposed amendment, Lloyd George said that he did not think the question of "great importance." Before the delegates became to committed on the issue discussion was postponed to enable consultation with their naval experts.

When the Supreme Council met again to discuss the naval terms, on May 23, President Wilson admitted that he had been laboring under a misunderstanding. He had assumed that the point was "a very serious one." Since consulting with his naval experts, he now saw that "the question was one of only slight importance." Its insignificance, however, led him to doubt whether it was worth while including in the treaty and he repeated his suggestion that it be deleted. Lloyd George was "quite indifferent" to the whole matter, while Clemenceau apparently had second thoughts for he raised no objection. Without further discussion it was agreed to strike out that sentence prohibiting the manufacture of naval war material on foreign order.²⁴ With that one amendment, the naval clauses were approved by the Council on May 23.

The Aerial clauses of the Austrian treaty were taken directly from the German draft and provoked neither debate or dissension. Indeed, the air clauses were accepted at the first reading, on May 15, without discussion, subject only to a second reading. And on May 23, at the second reading, the articles were accepted without amendment.²⁵

Like the German treaty, the Austrian draft stipulated that the armed forces were not to include military or naval aircraft and that all air force personnel were to be demobilized. In this latter provision the only substantive difference between the two drafts appeared: where Germany was given one months to complete this demobilization, Austria was given two months. No change was made in the provision that Allied aircraft were to have freedom of transit over and landing in the country. The article forbidding Austria from manufacturing or importing aircraft for six months after the ratification of the treaty was the same as the German treaty. The last article of the Austrian draft, requiring Austria to deliver "all military and naval aeronautical material" to the Allies was the same as the corresponding German provision.

Supervision and Control Provisions. The supervision and control provisions in the Austrian treaty were patterned closely after the German terms. For short term supervision, three Inter-Allied Commissions of Control were established under the same conditions as in the German treaty, i.e., they

were to supervise the execution of military, naval and air clauses for which a time limit was prescribed. The control Commissions were to establish their headquarters in Vienna and were entitled to make on-the-spot investigations any place in the country "as often as they think desirable." The Austrian Government was required to furnish the Control Commissions--as in the German treaty--with "all personnel and material needed to ensure the execution of the terms."

Long term supervision in the Austrian treaty was provided in an article patterned after the corresponding article in the German treaty and, curiously, encountered the same strange fate as the German provision. The original draft article in the Austrian treaty read:

So long as the present Treaty shall remain in force the State of Austria undertakes to submit to any investigation the the League of Nations by a majority vote may consider necessary.²⁶

When the article came up for discussion in the Supreme Council on May 15, President Wilson protested, as he had in the discussion of the same article in the German treaty, that the words "to submit to any investiagtion" was "too harsh." In a substitute motion, he suggested that the wording be changed to read "to respond to any enquiry."²⁷ Without further discussion, the Council accepted Wilson's reformulation of the article. When the Council approved the final draft of the military sections on June 16, the relevant article, duly ammended, read:

So long as the present Treaty shall remain in force the State of Austria undertakes to respond to any enquiry that the League of Nations by a majority vote may consider necessary.²⁸

Yet in the final treaty, the original formula unexplainably reappeared, as in the German treaty. Instead of authorizing the right of inquiry, the treaty required Austria to submit to any external investigation that the League, by a majority vote, decided on. The reversal of the Supreme Council decision remains a mystery.

Austrian Response. The completed draft treaty was delivered on July 20, and on August 6 the Austrians returned their counterproposals dealing with the military, naval and air clauses. During the deliberations over the reply to the Austrians only one disagreement arose among the Allies. This

dealt with an article which stated that for six months following the ratification of the treaty the manufacture, importation and exportation of aircraft and aircraft parts was forbidden. The Austrians contended that this clause would disrupt the aircraft industry and cause serious unemployment. In reviewing this proposed modification, the British and Japanese agreed that it should be deleted from the treaty, but they were overruled by the Americans, French and Italians.

The reply to the remaining counterproposals was agreed upon without dissent by the Allies. They rejected most of the Austrian proposed modifications, which ranged from a request for more time for demobilization and the retention of conscription to a request to retain a larger number of gendarmes, custom officials and forest guards. The only revision granted--of the sixteen suggested amendments--was in the naval section: the Austrians requested authorization to keep three patrol boats on the Danube and the Allies granted the request provided the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control designate the vessels.²⁹

On September 2, the Allies handed the Austrian delegation its reply to the counterproposals with the stipulation that the treaty was to be accepted or rejected within five days. After a brief extension the treaty was signed at St. Germain on September 10, 1919.

The Hungarian Peace Treaty

Revolution and subsequent military intervention in Hungary delayed the completion of the peace treaty until early 1920. It was not until June 4, 1920 that the document was finally signed at Trianon, almost a year after the signing of the German settlement at Versailles. While the completion of the peace terms had been repeatedly delayed, the military, naval and air clauses of the treaty had been approved early. Indeed, they were among the first sections to be completed and their approval on August 20, 1919 gave them the distinction of being the first sections formally adopted by the Supreme Council. Not only were the disarmament provisions of the treaty settled early, they were approved by the Supreme Council without dissension and, in fact, without debate. Having resolved the main principles of the disarmament provisions in the German and Austrian treaties, the only outstanding issue confronting the Supreme Council was the future size of the Hungarian army. The remaining military, naval, and air terms were, it was generally agreed, to be taken directly from the Austrian treaty.

While the Allies had little difficulty in reaching agreement on the military, naval and air terms, pressures for modifying the conditions did arise. These pressures did not originate from within the Supreme Council but rather from Hungary's neighbors, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Toward the end of the discussions on the treaty, in December 1919, the Czech and Yugoslav delegations submitted an identical series of proposed amendments seeking to introduce further restrictions and controls in the military sections. Following the recommendation of the Military Representatives, however, the Council rejected all the proposed changes.

The military, naval and air terms of the Hungarian treaty were drafted by the military advisors on May 11, the same time they formulated the Austrian terms. The drafts were identical with only two exceptions. The first related to the size of the armies: for Austria the Military Representatives had recommended that the total number of effectives, including officers, be 40,000; for Hungary they recommended a permanent force of 45,000. The second difference, never explained in the sessions of the Council, was the deletion in the Hungarian draft of that article--Article 15 in the original Austrian draft--fixing the maximum stocks of ammunition for the fixed weapons located in the forest and other "fortified places" in Hungary.³⁰ This was not a mere oversight, for in the final draft, this article was again missing.³¹

When the two drafts came up for discussion in the Supreme Council on May 15, the delegates focused their attention on the Austrian terms and, as noted above, it was at this session that they rejected the Military representatives' recommendation on the size of the Austrian army, demanding instead that the number of effectives be based on the "German standard".³² When the Council met on May 23 to consider the report of the military experts, in which the military experts submitted two sets of figures, one based on the "German standard" and the other based on their estimates of military needs, the size of the Hungarian army was figured at 18,000 and 45,000 respectively.³³ During the discussion, debate centered on the feasibility of disarming the smaller non-enemy states and again the Hungary treaty was ignored.³⁴

Not until August 9, several weeks after completion of the Austrian treaty, did the military sections of the Hungarian treaty again come up for discussion. This time the military professionals requested the Council to come to a decision on the size of the Hungarian army. General Belin of France noted that they had recommended a figure of 45,000 while

18,000 was the number of effectives determined on the basis of the German army. What figure between these two extremes, he asked, was the Council going to decide upon?³⁵

Tittoni, the new Italian Foreign Minister and delegate to the Peace Conference, suggested that on the basis of the figure settled upon in the Austrian treaty, Hungary ought to have a permanent force of 35,000. But Clemenceau refused to commit himself, saying that he did not see any particular need for deciding at that time. While this ended the discussion at the August 8 session, the British drafted a revised set of military, naval and air clauses on August 12 which adopted the figure 35,000 for the size of the Hungarian army and made one slight modification in the naval clauses. Where the May 11 draft had provided for the abolition of the Hungarian navy, the revised August 12 draft stipulated that Hungary would be allowed to maintain an unspecified number of patrol launches for the Danube River Police Service. The only requirement was that the Inter-Allied Naval Control Commission would select these craft.³⁶

Aside from these changes the August 12 British draft was the same as the May 11 draft, which in turn was taken directly from the Austrian draft. The Hungarian army was to be demobilized to a force of 35,000 within three months and compulsory military service was to be abolished. The number of gendarmes, customs officials, forest guards, and local police were not to exceed the number employed in a similar capacity in 1913. Terms of military service were as in the Austrian treaty--officers continuing in the ranks would serve until the age of 40 while newly appointed officers would serve for 20 consecutive years. Enlisted men would serve for 12 years, half of which--as in the Austrian treaty, but unlike the German treaty--could be taken in the reserves. The restrictions placed on military training in educational institutions were essentially the same as in the German and Austrian treaties as were the provisions relating to the manufacture of weapons and armament. As in the Austrian treaty, only one factory, which was to be owned and controlled by the state, was to manufacture arms and war material. The same restrictions were placed on the importation and export of weapons and material as were included in the Austrian and German treaties and the use of flame throwers, asphyxiating and other gases was equally forbidden in the Hungarian as they were in other treaties. The other articles in the naval, air, control and general sections were the same as in the Austrian treaty.

The revised British draft came before the Supreme Council on August 20 and was approved, judging from the minutes of the meeting,³⁷ after a discussion of about five minutes. General Belin in introducing the military, naval and air clauses noted that the Military Representatives had agreed on a figure of 35,000 for the Hungarian army and Pichon, having temporarily taken Clemenceau's place, agreed to accept the draft subject only to reconsideration of the size of the army. While the terms were not formally resolved until December 8, when the French withdrew their reservation, for all intents the deliberations were closed.³⁸

Pressures for modification of the terms did arise, not from within the Supreme Council, but from the smaller states. On December 20 the Czech delegation sent a letter to the Council proposing amendments to the Hungarian military clauses and on December 27 the Yugoslav delegation forwarded an identical set of demands. These letters were turned over to the Military Representatives for review and the military advisers on January 7 recommended that all seven proposed changes be rejected.³⁹ Some proposed modifications, they pointed out, were already covered in the treaty and were therefore superfluous--like the proposal to forbid a General Staff for the Hungarian army, which was covered in the article stipulating that the highest military formation was the Infantry and Cavalry Division. The other suggested modifications they considered unnecessarily severe--like the proposal to demilitarize a zone 50 kilometers wide on the Hungarian side of the frontiers with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The military experts responded that "there seems no justifiable reason for prohibiting Hungary to organize the defense of her frontiers." Other proposed modifications dealt with limiting the military forces in Hungary to two infantry divisions and one cavalry division (rejected as it would constitute "a decrease in Hungary's military power") and restricting the Danube patrol boats from navigating in that part of the Danube which formed the frontiers between Hungary and Czechoslovakia (rejected as hindering Hungary in its legitimate efforts to maintain order).

With the report of the Military Representatives in hand, the Supreme Council on January 10 decided to turn down all the proposed modifications advanced by Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.⁴⁰ The draft treaty, with the military, naval and air terms unaltered, was presented to the Hungarian delegation on January 15, 1920. After the Hungarian counter-proposals had been received--dealing principally with frontiers--and the Allied replies drafted, the treaty was formally signed at Trianon on June 4, 1920.

The Bulgarian Peace Treaty

On November 27, 1919 the Bulgarian peace treaty was signed at Neuilly, containing as in the settlement with Germany, Austria and Hungary provisions for the permanent, if not complete, disarmament of the country. Like the other ex-enemy states, the size of the army was limited to that required for the maintenance of internal order, compulsory conscription was abolished, the number of weapons permitted the army was specifically enumerated, as were the stocks of ammunition permitted per weapon, restrictions were placed on the manufacture, importation and exportation of weapons and ammunition, military training in schools and universities was limited and the use of certain weapons--flame throwers, poisonous gases, tanks, etc.--were absolutely prohibited. The Bulgarian navy, like the navies of Austria and Hungary, was abolished and permission was granted to retain only a few patrol boats for police service on the Danube. The formation of a military or naval air force was prohibited, no dirigibles were to be kept in the country and the same six month injunction on the manufacture of aircraft and parts was imposed as in the Austrian and Hungarian treaties. The control features were the same as in the other treaties, including the right of the League Council to undertake any "investigation" which it deemed necessary by majority vote.

The drafting of these military, naval and air terms was not a major preoccupation of the Supreme Council, and the conditions were settled easily. Indeed, only a small part of one meeting of the Council was devoted to an examination of the Bulgarian disarmament provisions. Not only were the terms settled quickly, they were adopted without controversy.

While the military, naval and air provisions were adopted without incident, disagreement did arise in the drafting of the Allied reply to the Bulgarian counter-proposals. Not only did a split occur among the Military Representatives, but conflict broke out between the military advisors and the Council. In the formulation of the disarmament provisions to be imposed on Bulgaria only one issue required a substantive decision on the part of the Council--that was the determination of the size of the Bulgarian army. The remaining issues had been resolved in the deliberations over the German and Austrian treaties and the principles established in these treaties would, it was assumed, be adopted in the Bulgarian treaty. The Italian representative tried to revive the issue

of compulsory vs voluntary recruitment, but M. Tittoni accepted the principle as established and refused to pursue the subject.⁴¹

The decision on the size of the Bulgarian army is significant if for no other reason than to demonstrate how procedural decisions often took the place of substantive decisions at the peace conference. The figures for the Bulgarian army were first presented in the May 21 report of the Military Representatives which included the two sets of recommendations on the size of the armies for the Central and Eastern European states, the one based on the "German standard" and the other based on the estimated military requirements of the states as determined by the military advisers. For Bulgaria, the figures were 10,000 and 20,000 respectively.⁴²

An impasse having been reached between the Military Representatives and the Council over the level of disarmament to be imposed on the smaller states, the Council, it will be recalled, invited the representatives of the "friendly" states of Central and Eastern Europe to discuss the issue. It was decided to present the representatives with a set of figures on the armed forces contemplated for each of the states to be used as a basis for discussion. For Bulgaria, this figure was 20,000. While this figure was accepted by the Council provisionally, as a procedural device to facilitate discussion, the procedural decision in effect settled the issue. The subject was never raised again and the figure of 20,000 appeared in the text of the draft prepared later for the Supreme Council, although it had never been discussed nor had it been formally approved. In passing it may be noted that this was the only case where the original recommendations of the Military Representatives were accepted as presented and not reduced to conform more closely to the "German standard."

When the completed military, naval and air clauses were presented to the Supreme Council on July 25, they were approved without debate or amendment. In all, the discussion in the Supreme Council lasted no more than five minutes.⁴³ Aside from the difference in the size of the army permitted, the Bulgarian military provisions corresponded almost exactly to the other treaties. What modifications were introduced were insignificant. The number of gendarmes, customs officials and forest guards, for example, was to be based on the number employed in a similar capacity in 1911, instead of 1913 as in the other treaties. The enlistment period for privates and

non-commissioned officers was twelve consecutive years, with no provision for half of this being taken in the reserves, as had been permitted in the Austrian and Hungarian treaties. The stocks of ammunition permitted for the guns constituting the fixed normal armament of fortified places was slightly higher in the Bulgarian treaty than in the Austrian settlement, with 1,500 rounds per gun for those whose calibre was 105 mm or less, as opposed to 1,300 rounds in Austria. (This clause, as noted above, had been deleted from the Hungarian treaty.) Finally, the article enumerating those auxiliary ships of the ex-Austro-Hungarian fleet which, once disarmed, could be retained as merchant ships, was absent in the Bulgarian treaty. This meant that all armed ships in Bulgarian possession had to be surrendered to the Allies.

The completed draft of the treaty was presented to the Bulgarian delegation on September 19 and a little over a month later, on October 24, the Bulgarian counter-proposals were submitted to the Allies. Eight specific modifications in the military, naval and air terms were proposed by the Bulgarians, two of which were to divide the ranks of the military experts. The first concerned the Bulgarian request to retain compulsory military conscription. While the Military Representatives agreed that the provision could not at that time be altered, the French, Italian and American military advisers were willing to accept an amendment to the effect that the question could be reopened later, thus raising the possibility of re-introducing compulsory military service. In the deliberations of the military professionals, the British adviser objected to this concession, but was overruled by the majority.

The second source of disagreement among the Military Representatives was the Bulgarian request to form a corps of frontier guards consisting of 3,000 men. While the French, Italian and military experts were willing to accept this proposal, the British adviser was again opposed.⁴⁴ There were no differences over the other proposed modifications, most of which were opposed by the Military Representatives. The request to raise the proportion of officers in the army from one-twentieth to one-fifteenth was rejected, as was the request to establish a school for noncommissioned officers. Requests for modification in the provisions abolishing a military and naval air force were rejected, but the Military Representatives did support a change in the naval clauses. As in the cases of Austria and Hungary, the military advisors recommended that Bulgaria be permitted to retain a small number of "lightly-armed vessels" for police and patrol duties.

When the Allied reply to the Bulgarian counter-proposals came up for discussion in the Supreme Council on November 1, the political leaders took immediate issue with the military recommendation that the abolition of conscription be subject to later reevaluation, but accepted the other proposed recommendations. Thus, Bulgaria, in the final treaty, was permitted to maintain four torpedo boats and six motor-boats, all without torpedoes or torpedo apparatus, provided that they were selected by the Inter-Allied Naval Control Commission.⁴⁵ While the British agreed to withdraw their opposition to the 3,000 man corps of forest guards, provided that it was recruited exclusively on a volunteer basis, Sir Eyre Crowe, the British delegate to the Supreme Council, was adamant in his opposition to the recommendation that compulsory military service be subject to future reexamination. If a concession were made to Bulgaria on this point, he maintained, she would be granted an advantage which no other enemy had obtained. Moreover, the abolition of compulsory military service was, in his estimation, a useful step toward the goal of general disarmament to which they all aspired. The French delegate, M. Pichon, agreed with his British colleague. The principle of voluntary recruitment had been established with respect to the other enemy states and, he maintained, "there was no reason to make an exception here."⁴⁶

When General Desticker explained why the Military Representatives had recommended the concession, he noted that Bulgarians "had adduced concrete arguments which appeared to be of considerable weight." They pointed out that Bulgaria, being an agricultural country with a population of only 5,000,000 "could never recruit 20,000 men" under the voluntary system. Pichon pointed out that Austria could raise the same argument; nevertheless the army of Austria, with a population of 6,000,000 had been fixed at 30,000. "to violate a principle," he noted, "is more serious than to be illogical in a matter of proportion."⁴⁷ General Cavallero replied that they had not ignored the question of Austria, but felt the situations were quite different. Austria had a large urban population and the remnants of a large army. They would encounter difficulties in recruiting an army up to the level permitted but the difficulties would be mainly of a financial nature. Bulgaria, on the other hand, was an agrarian country whose population showed no taste for military service. Yet a 20,000 man army was needed to maintain internal order. Therefore, if voluntary recruitment proved inadequate, then compulsory service might have to be reintroduced.

The political leaders were not impressed. Indeed, Sir Eyre Crowe noted that the difficulties referred to in raising the armies of the Balkan states merely confirmed for him the correctness of their decision. These difficulties, he felt, would deter these Balkan states from adopting war-like policies.⁴⁸ With the concurrence of the other members of the Supreme Council, it was decided to reject the recommendation of the French, Italian and American military advisers and to uphold their earlier decision to permanently abolish compulsory military service in Bulgaria.

Having agreed upon their reply to the Bulgarian counter-proposals, the Allied arguments were redrafted and presented to the Bulgarians on November 3, with the demand that the terms be accepted or rejected in ten days. On November 13, the Bulgarians announced their acceptance and on November 27 the treaty was signed at Neuilly.

Chapter 4 -- Footnotes

¹ For a review of the negotiation leading up to the Treaty of St. Germain, see H. W. V. Temperley, (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (1920-1924), IV, 389-411. Also see F. S. Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919 (1941), XVI.

² See Temperley, History of the Peace Conference, IV, 143 for the British assumptions.

³ The May 11 session of the Military Representatives is reviewed in Ibid., IV, 142-54.

⁴ The May 15 deliberations are in F.R.: Peace Conference, 1919, V, 627-39.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 628-29.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 631-32.

⁷ Ibid., p. 632.

⁸ Ibid., p. 635.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 885-86.

¹⁰ Report of Military Representatives is in Ibid., pp. 885-87.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 880; Bliss' report is on pp. 878-80.

¹² Ibid., p. 904.

¹³ Ibid., p. 905.

¹⁴ F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, VI, 182.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ The testimony is in Ibid., pp. 203-06.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 206-07.

19 Ibid., pp. 487-98.

20 The draft naval clauses are in F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, V, 660-62.

21 The German draft provided that the restrictions would remain in force until the peace treaty was ratified, whereas in the Austrian treaty the restrictions were to run for three months after the coming into force of the treaty. As the German draft imposed a condition which was to take effect before ratification, it had to be re-written in the final draft. And in its final form, the article read like the original Austrian clause: the restrictions were to last three months after ratification of the treaty.

22 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, V, 648.

23 The discussion is in Ibid., pp. 635-38.

24 Ibid., pp. 880-82.

25 Ibid., pp. 638, 882

26 Ibid., p. 653.

27 Ibid., p. 638.

28 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, VI, 498.

29 The Allied reply to the Austrian counter-proposals is in F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, VII, 873-77.

30 For the original texts of the military, naval, air and control terms, see F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, V, 53-665.

31 The final draft of the military, naval, air and control clauses is in F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, VII, 747-60.

32 See F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, V, 627-38, for Supreme Council deliberations.

33 Ibid., p. 888.

34 Ibid., pp. 877-82.

35 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, VIII, 634.

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36 See Article 18, F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, VII, 754.

37 Ibid., pp. 736-37.

38 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, IX, 523.

39 Report of Military Representatives is in Ibid.,
pp. 961-64.

40 Ibid., pp. 955-56.

41 See F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, VII, 258.

42 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, V, 888.

43 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, VII, 258

44 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, VIII, 875.

45 Ibid., p. 887.

46 Ibid., p. 875.

47 Ibid., p. 876.

48 Ibid.

Chapter 5

THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND GENERAL DISARMAMENT

In addition to imposing arms limitations and demilitarization on the vanquished, the Allies at Versailles promised to carry out their own disarmament. This promise was contained in Article VIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the introduction to the military sections of the various treaties.

Of the two sources of obligation, Article VIII of the League Covenant was by far the most important, the most detailed and the most thoroughly examined. It was, like the Covenant as a whole, subjected to four separate readings in the League of Nations Commission at the peace conference; it was examined, with the entire Covenant, in a conference of neutrals called to make recommendations on the proposed League; and it was the subject of critical appraisal by groups and individuals not directly involved in the drafting of the peace settlement. The preamble to the military clauses of the peace treaties was proposed only after the German military terms had been completed and was conceived more as an expedient device to gain German approval of the military terms than as a reasoned policy. Its provision that German disarmament was included "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of armaments of all nations" was neither debated nor discussed by the Allied leaders either to its immediate obligations or to its long range implications.

The drafting of the general disarmament provisions included in Article VIII raised eight important questions which, while not always clearly articulated or precisely defined, can be separated for analytical purposes. In analyzing these points, it is important to note how these questions were resolved and worded in the final provisions. Indeed, the significance of Article VIII lies not only in what was included in the final terms, but in what was left

out. If Article VIII was unprecedented, it was also carefully delineated and narrowly circumscribed.

An initial implicit question raised during the deliberations involved the procedural point of timing: was general disarmament to be worked out at the peace conference or was it to be negotiated later? A second question, again procedural, involved determinating the agency for negotiating disarmament: was it to be a separate conference, the League Council, the League Assembly, or some other agency? A third question involved the procedure of decision-making: was disarmament to be implemented by majority decision or only after unanimous consent? A fourth question focused on the level of disarmament: were national armaments to be reduced consistent with "domestic safety" or "national safety"? Implied in "domestic safety" was the reduction of the armed forces to the level of a police force. "National safety" on the other hand implied a defensive army; an organization considerably larger than a domestic police force. A fifth question related to the extent of disarmament: were restrictions to be imposed on the method of recruiting as well as the size of the forces? Were restrictions to be placed on the production of armaments as well as on the level of armaments? A sixth question raised the issue of supervision and control: were the agreements to include external inspection provisions or was supervision to be carried out by military and naval attachés. A seventh point involved the duration of the agreements and method of revision: were the agreements to be revised at a given date or left open ended? Were they to be revised by unilateral action or unanimous consent? Finally, there was the question of security measures after disarmament had been achieved: was there to be an international army to replace national forces?

Before reviewing the negotiations over Article VIII, it might be useful to summarize the provisions as they appeared in the final draft.

All members acknowledged that actual plans for general disarmament could not be worked out at the peace conference. The most that could be achieved, it was agreed, was the formulation of certain principles, an agreement on the future drafting process and the acceptance of guidelines to serve future negotiations. Thus, Article VIII contained three types of agreements: first, agreement on basic assumptions, second, agreement on the procedural mechanics of future negotiations and third, agreement on certain specific conditions for inclusion in the future agreement.

While the procedural process and the specific guidelines will be noted below, it might be appropriate here to note the basic assumptions included in Article VIII. There were two: a) "that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments" and b) "that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections." Conspicuously absent was the assumption--implied in the imposed military terms--that conscription promoted militarism and a warlike spirit, an assumption which President Wilson wished to insert but one which neither the French nor the Italians would accept.

There was some confusion over defining the agency responsible for drafting general disarmament. Originally, it was provided that the League in general was to formulate the plan; later, the League Assembly was to have the responsibility. In the final draft, it was stipulated that "The Council /of the League/, taking into account the geographical situation and circumstances of each state, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments."

Under this clause, the first step in the procedural process was defined and the first guideline established. It would be the League Council which would initiate and formulate the specific details of general disarmament; and in this plan disarmament was not to be equally applied to all states. Instead of using a single index to define the level of forces, e.g., so many military forces per thousand population, the negotiators were to take into consideration, at French insistence, "the geographical situation and circumstances of each state." This meant that such factors as the defensibility or non-defensibility of frontiers must be considered as well as the rising or falling of the birth rate, etc. While the clause did not create the difficulties later encountered in working out a disarmament agreement, it anticipated them.

The procedure for decision-making was vague although certain principles were accepted. As the League Council would formulate the disarmament plan, the rule of unanimity would prevail in the drafting stage. But how many states would have to ratify the agreement before it would enter into effect remained unclear. The Article stated only that after the disarmament plan had been drafted by the Council it would be submitted "for the consideration and action of the several Governments." It was not clear that all governments represented on the Council or all states of the

assembly would have to ratify the plan before implementation. Thus, if unanimity was to govern the drafting state, there were no guidelines for ratification.

The formula establishing the level of disarmament underwent a fundamental change during the negotiations. Originally, it was proposed to reduce all military forces to the point consistent with "domestic safety." But the final draft was amended in two ways: it was agreed that the national forces had to be large enough to carry out the international obligations assumed under the League and it was agreed to permit a defensive army rather than mere police forces within each state. The final draft stated that "national armaments" would be reduced "to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations."

During the formulation of Article VIII, extensive restrictions were proposed for recruiting and armaments production. In the one case, the universal abolition of conscription was demanded and in the other a proposal was made for the elimination of the private manufacture of armaments. In the final draft, however, the restrictions to be placed on private manufacturing were transformed from a prescriptive mandate to merely a policy objective, while the restrictions on conscription were abandoned altogether. The fifth paragraph of Article VIII provided only that the League Council "shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon the private manufacture of armaments can be prevented..."

The wording of this clause was unique, both in comparison to earlier drafts and in comparison with other provisions of the article, for it did not give the Council decision-making jurisdiction. Instead of stating that the Council "shall formulate", as in the other articles, it merely stated that the Council "shall advise". It left to individual states, rather than to the League, the final decision to limit privately owned armament industries.

While the French persistently sought to include inspection and supervision in the terms, the Americans and the British with equal diligence refused. In the final draft, the only method of control included was that obligating each state to submit to the League pertinent information relating to armament production and military, naval and air programs. The states were also to provide information on "the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes."

In one respect, this clause was unique: it was the only provision in Article VIII which was to go into effect upon the signing of the peace treaty. In its final form the clause read: "The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes, and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes."

In the original drafts no provision was made for revision and reconsideration of the general disarmament agreement. In the final draft, however, the plans would be subject "to re-consideration and revision at least every ten years." More important than the provision for automatic review were the differences over the method of revision. The British Admiralty pressed for a plan permitting unilateral revision of the agreed upon armament levels, suggesting that the appropriate clause be worded: "These limits, when adopted by the Government, shall not be exceeded without notice to the League/ Executive Council."¹ This proposal was rejected and the final provision read that the limits agreed upon were not to be exceeded "without the concurrence" of the Council, stipulating unanimous consent for any revision.

To ensure security after disarmament, the French repeatedly sought provisions for an international military force. The proposal, submitted under various guises, was rejected each time by the Americans and British. The most that would be conceded was the provision to establish a permanent Commission in the League which would "advise" the Council on the means to carry out the terms of Article VIII and on military, naval and air questions in general. The concession, emasculated deliberately--becoming Article IX of the Covenant--was never considered adequate by the French. It was perhaps not unexpected that the permanent Commission, once formed, would be used by the French not to effectuate disarmament but to block it.²

Article VIII of the Covenant thus read:³

- 1) The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.
- 2) The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each state, shall formulate

plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

- 3) Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.
- 4) After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armament therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.
- 5) The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.
- 6) The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.

Article IX stated:

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Article 1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally.⁴

The negotiations leading up to the acceptance of Article VIII were long and involved. To appraise the policies of the different states and the roles played by the various participants in the negotiatory process, the deliberations must be followed in some detail. In this process several points stand out:

- 1) The objective of general disarmament was not included in the official policy proposals of the Allies until the final moments of the war and even then it was not universally accepted. Although the idea of general disarmament had been advanced by various groups and individuals during the war, neither the French or the Italians included a disarmament clause in their early drafts of a league; even the English had initially rejected the inclusion of disarmament provisions

in their first official proposals for a league. If the Americans first officially endorsed the objective of general disarmament, it was General Smuts of South Africa who was perhaps the catalyst.

2) Although late in arrival, once the objective of general disarmament had been advanced it was ultimately supported by all the Allies. It was not, however, the objective which caused so much dissension; rather it was the policy implications which gave rise to serious and persistent differences among the Allies. On most of the contentious issues, the Americans and British stood against the French. The Italians did not take an active part in drafting the article; but when they did intervene, it was usually on the side of the French and together their voices usually were sufficient to block projected proposal.

3) While Article VIII was not discussed as extensively as some of the other articles of the Covenant, it was considered of major importance by the delegates. And to symbolize its importance, the article was placed as the first substantive provision following the introductory procedural clauses of the Covenant.

4) The major forces influencing the formulation of Article VIII were political rather than military. Although military leaders were informed of the negotiations in process and at times even submitted memoranda for the consideration of the delegates, at no time, were they directly involved in the deliberations.

5) Although it was generally assumed that disarmament would lead to peace--rather than peace lead to disarmament--there was remarkably little analysis of the assumption throughout the deliberations.

6) The German reaction to the promise of general disarmament was, as anticipated favorable. Indeed, they persistently tied the acceptance of their own disarmament to the promise and expectation of general disarmament, a relationship which the Allies did not contest or challenge.

Preliminary Proposals

While various unofficial groups advanced proposals for a future reduction of armaments during the first years of the war,⁵ not until early 1917 was it officially endorsed.

On January 22, 1917, President Wilson demanded restrictions on armament as a basis for American participation in a post-war "League of Peace." He stated that "the question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future of nations and of mankind." In his second Inaugural Address, Wilson advanced a more specific proposal. "National armaments," he stated, "should be limited to the necessities of national order and domestic safety." The proposal ultimately became Point Four in Wilson's Fourteen Points enunciated on January 8, 1919. For all its acclamation, however, the demand remained a mere slogan. No plans were formulated, no agreements were reached, and no proposals were advanced either between the Allies or within any of the Allied Countries.⁶

Not until the Allied governments began drafting plans for a postwar league of nations did specific proposals for armament limitation appear. Even then neither the British nor the French drafts, which were the first official proposals circulated, contained provisions for disarmament. The English draft, known as the Phillimore Plan and submitted to the Cabinet on March 20, 1919, did not mention the desirability or the utility of disarmament.⁷ The French proposal, submitted on June 8, 1919, also failed to call for a reduction of armaments, but it did include a detailed proposal for an international military force.

Failure to include provisions for disarmament in the British draft was not merely an oversight. Lord Cecil, who was to become the British representative on the League of Nations Commission at the peace conference, had advanced a proposal for disarmament in late 1916, but it had been criticized so severely by Sir Eyre Crowe that he withdrew it. "It is an attractive proposition," Sir Eyre Crowe agreed, "that at any given moment the world would be as well off, and each nation as strong relatively to the rest, if all their existing armaments were, and remained, proportionally reduced, so that the balance of force, whatever it might be at the time, would be maintained. But so soon as any attempt is made to put this theory into practice, insuperable difficulties appear." He questioned the feasibility of disarmament on three specific counts. First, "who is to see and guarantee that the limitations are really applied with scrupulous honesty?" Second, "what should be the proportion of armed strength to be allotted to the several countries? By what test should the different

standards be measured and fixed: population, area, shipping, wealth, climate, geographical factors, or what?" And finally, are the nations ready to perpetuate indefinitely the postwar status quo, which "would mean not only that no State whose power has hitherto been weak relatively to others may hope to get stronger, but that a definite order or hierarchy must be recognized in which each State is fated to occupy a fixed place?" In view of these complexities, Sir Eyre urged "most strongly" that Britain "should refrain from bringing forward again the question of a limitation of armaments, which has landed us in such embarrassing difficulties before." These arguments appeared to Lord Cecil to be "very powerfully put;" he agreed; therefore, to abandon the scheme, noting that nothing could be done "at present."⁸

The French had never been fervent supporters of disarmament, perceiving postwar peace more in terms of control over the Rhineland, the creation of an international military force and a long-term reparations hold over Germany. Even the disarmament of Germany was initially resisted by many French leaders, including Marshal Foch, for fear that it would promote Allied disarmament and a resultant feeling of false security.

General disarmament was not included as a specific league objective until the American draft appeared on July 16, 1918.⁹ Although Wilson had included the proposal for a league in his Fourteen Points, little was done to implement the idea until the Phillimore Plan. On July 8, he asked Colonel House to rewrite the constituent sections of the Phillimore report, which House completed, with the aid of the group of experts attached to The Inquiry, on July 16.¹⁰ The House draft contained twenty-three articles and closely followed the Phillimore Plan, although it expanded several sections, amended others and added a number of new ideas. Among those ideas introduced was a clause advocating a limitation on armaments. The clause, Article 21, read:¹¹

The Contracting Powers recognized the principle that permanent peace will require that national armament shall be reduced to the lowest point consistent with safety, and the Delegates are directed to formulate at once a plan by which such a reduction may be brought about. The plan so formulated shall not be binding until and unless unanimously approved by the Governments signatory to the Covenant.

The Contracting Powers agree that munitions and implements of war shall not be manufactured by private enterprise and that publicity as to all national armaments is essential.

As noted, this first proposal included a more imperative time limit than the final draft, calling on the Delegates to formulate a plan "at once." If the time limit was precise, the drafting agency was vague, as it stated that the "delegates" would formulate the plan. In contrast with the final terms, where the drafting process was precise but ratification undefined, the House draft defined unequivocably the ratification process but left the drafting uncertain. The plan was not to go into effect "until and unless unanimously approved by the Governments signatory to this Covenant." But whether unanimity was to be employed by the "delegates" drafting the agreement was not stated. The formula for the level of disarmament was suggestive, but imprecise at this stage. With national armaments to be reduced to the lowest point consistent with "safety", it was not clear whether this meant domestic or national safety. If the level of disarmament was imprecise, the restrictions were clear: not only were armaments to be restricted, but the private manufacture of munitions and implements of war were to be prohibited, a broader restriction than appeared in the final draft. The control mechanism implied in the proposal was limited to publicity; no consideration was given to an international security force once national armaments had been limited.

During the summer of 1918, Wilson went over the House draft and made several changes, most of which were stylistic and organizational rather than substantive. He did clarify the formula establishing the level of disarmament, adding that national armaments should be reduced to the lowest point "consistent with domestic safety." He also added that the armaments should be reduced to the lowest point consistent with "the enforcement by common action of international obligations," a qualifying clause which would remain unchanged to the very end. Wilson added a further restriction --perhaps more politically inspired than logically necessary--to the clause prohibiting the private manufacture of armaments: munitions and implements of war should not be manufactured by private enterprise "or for private profit." The final clause on control through publicity was retained in essence, but reworded to read that "there shall be full and frank publicity as to all national armaments and military or naval programmes."¹²

At this stage in the deliberations the war ended. In the prearmistice agreement the Allies and Germany accepted Point Four and the obligation to reduce national armaments "to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." But in the prearmistice negotiations among the Allies, this formula was interpreted in the Cobb-Lippman commentary to include "not only internal policing, but the protection of the territory against invasion."¹³ Thus, before the peace conference convened, the definition of "domestic safety" had been reinterpreted to mean that the level of armaments permitted was to be that of a defensive army instead of a domestic police force. Although not entirely happy with the Cobb-Lippmann interpretation, Wilson accepted it on October 20, 1918, apparently more for expediency--to gain Allied acceptance of the Fourteen Points--than as an accurate reflection of his position.

If the Armistice marked a retreat in Wilson's original objectives relating to the level of future armaments, it also marked a change in his view on the extent of disarmament to be achieved. In both the House draft and the Wilson revision, disarmament was limited to restrictions on the size of military forces and the methods of manufacturing armaments. But as a result of General Smuts' proposals, circulated during the Armistice period, Wilson added restrictions on the method of recruitment, that is, on the formation of conscript armies.

The Smuts proposal, dated December 16, 1918, had, as David Hunter Miller later noted, "a profound influence on Wilson."¹⁴ But the impact was narrowly circumscribed for Wilson did not accept the argument of Smuts, only his recommendations. Even then he was selective for he ignored Smuts' most important point while accepting his minor, faut de mieux conclusion. What Smuts proposed was the antithesis of the Wilson plan; the South African advocated restrictions on conscription and controls over armament production as substitutes for disarmament. Wilson accepted both measures but used them to supplement disarmament.

The Smuts Proposal. Smuts noted that three proposals had been put forward for general disarmament during the war.¹⁵ They were:

- 1) the abolition of conscription and of conscript armies;
- 2) the limitation of armaments;
- 3) the nationalization of munitions production.

All three proposals, he acknowledged, "bristle with difficulties." But of the three, the first and third were the most practical, the most important and the most easily attainable; indeed, it was his feeling that as long as the Great Powers raised conscript armies without hindrance or limit, "it would be vain to expect the lasting preservation of world peace." If the instrument was ready for use, he stated, the occasion would arrive and men would use it. "I look upon conscription," he concluded, "as the taproot of militarism; unless it is cut, all our labors will eventually be in vain."

The nationalization of armament factories was necessary, he pointed out, because "as long as the production of munitions of war remains a private commercial undertaking, huge vested interests grow up around it which influence public opinion through the press and otherwise in the direction of war." The success of commercial armaments industries "depends on the stimulation of the war atmosphere among the people." Newspapers, influenced by large profits and advertising from armament firms, "whip up public opinion on every imaginable occasion." Therefore, he reasoned that the armaments industry should be nationalized; and he went further and recommended that nationalized industries be subjected to international supervision. ""In order to enable the council of the league to keep in touch with the production and movements of arms and munitions," he stated, "the council should have full rights of inspection of all such national factories."

When Smuts came to the concept of limitation of armaments, he had to "frankly" admit that "it presents very grave difficulties as a general principle." Disarmament, he pointed out, raised two important questions: first, "what are armaments" and second, "on what principle can one weapon of destruction be valued as against another of a different kind?" Both questions, he noted, were "at first sight unanswerable." Weapons were no longer limited in range and use. Indeed, the recent war was fought and ultimately won, not only with the usual military weapons, but with the economic, industrial and financial systems of the belligerent powers. Food, shipping, metals and raw materials, credit, transport, and industries played just as important a part as rifles, airplanes, tanks, and warships. What are, then, armaments in modern wars?

Even if some definition could be accepted, a second problem would remain: "how is one instrument to be valued

against another." How was, he asked, an airplane to be valued against a tank, etc? Unless a whole system of comparative values was settled "the armaments of one state may exceed in striking power those fixed for another state of equal military power." Given these difficulties, Smuts dispaired of finding a "general solution," and concluded that "the limitation of armaments in the general sense is impractical." The only practical possibilities, he felt, were in partial remedies, such as limiting the use of submarines or aerial bombing or prohibiting poison gases and "similar abominations." Such reforms, he acknowledged, would only humanize war, not end it. Though he did not advocate general disarmament, Smuts did urge limits on voluntary national militias and a "fair" scale of armament for such forces. A state with an authorized army of 100,000 would not be permitted to have weapons for an army of 500,000 and thus be in a position to expand rapidly. This was disarmament "in a narrower sense," he admitted, but it was probably all that could be achieved.

To guarantee that these limits of armaments would not be exceeded, Smuts proposed, in addition to the inspection of nationalized armaments industries, that the states inform the league of their export and import of weapons. He did not recommend the inspection of military forces as he had production facilities, and conceded that without this supervision the league would not be in possession of the full facts. But unless "inquisitorial powers" were given to the league--powers which he did not propose--it could not obtain complete information on national armaments. His plan for future peace did not rely so much on disarmament as on the elimination of conscript armies. As he pointed out, "Of the three proposals for disarmament, the abolition of conscription is by far the most important, and it is also the one behind which there will be the greatest volume of public opinion." On the basis of these arguments, then, Smuts proposed three articles for inclusion in the league charter:

That all the states represented at the peace conference shall agree to the abolition of the conscription or compulsory military service; and that their future defense forces shall consist of militia or volunteers, whose numbers and training shall, after expert inquiry, be fixed by the council of the league.

That while the limitation of armaments in the general sense is impracticable, the council of the league shall determine what direct military equipment and armament is fair and reasonable in respect of the scale of

forces laid down under paragraph 15, and that the limits fixed by the council shall not be exceeded without its permission.

That all factories for the manufacture of direct weapons of war shall be nationalized and their production shall be subject to the inspection of the officers of the council; and that the council shall be furnished periodically with returns of imports and exports of munitions of war into or from the territories of its members and as far as possible into or from other countries.

Wilson's Revised Draft. Before the peace conference convened, Wilson incorporated several of Smuts' ideas in the disarmament article. Drafted on January 10, 1919, this second version of the Covenant retained the original paragraphs calling on the Delegates to formulate "at once" plans for the reduction of armament and proposing the curtailment of the private manufacture of armaments. But it added two new clauses, which were taken from the Smuts' plan. The new clauses were:

As the basis for such a reduction of armaments all the Powers subscribing to the Treaty of Peace of which this Covenant constitutes a part hereby agree to abolish conscription and all other forms of compulsory military service, and also agree that their future forces of defense and of international action shall consist of militia or volunteers, whose number and methods of training shall be fixed, after expert inquiry, by the agreements with regard to the reduction of armaments referred to in the last preceding paragraph.

The Body of Delegates shall also determine for the consideration and action of the several governments what direct military equipment and armament is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces laid down in the programme of disarmament and these limits, when adopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of the Body of Delegates...¹⁶

As noted, Wilson's draft differed from the Smuts' plan on three points. Procedurally, the Smuts' plan left the determination of the size of the militia and their "fair and reasonable" armaments up to the Great Powers or the League Council. For Wilson, the drafting agency was to be the Body of Delegates, or the assembly. If Wilson's proposal was

more "democratic" it was also more open to veto as, presumably, the determination of the size of the militia for each state and its permissible equipment would require unanimous consent.

This led to a second important difference. Under the Smuts' plan the Council would decide on the size of the military and its equipment for each state. Once established, these "limits fixed by the council shall not be exceeded without its permission." Implied in this formula was the idea that the Council, once it had decided, would impose that decision on the smaller states. In essence, Smuts proposed that the Great Powers--represented in the Council--should legislate for the rest of the world, an idea which Wilson could not accept. Under Wilson's plan, the Body of Delegates would "determine for consideration and action of the several Governments" what military equipment would be fair and reasonable, meaning that the figures would be recommended and each government would decide whether to accept them.

Finally, the Smuts' proposal for inspection and control of the nationalized armaments industries was not accepted by Wilson. Nor was the demand for figures on the export and import of military equipment. Instead, Wilson repeated the provision calling for "full and frank publicity as to all national armaments and military or naval programmes."

Wilson's revised draft was criticized from two points of view within the American delegation at Paris. David Hunter Miller, the legal expert, criticized the new sections for not explicitly stating that the rule of unanimity would prevail in the determination of the levels of armaments.¹⁷ General Tasker H. Bliss, the military representative, criticized the article from the opposite point of view: the rule of unanimity might prevent disarmament, especially if the decision was left to the assembly. He wrote Wilson, on January 14, that he did not think so important a matter as the reduction of armaments "should be liable to a veto by the action of, possibly, one small Power." All hope of disarmament, he insisted, lay with the Great Powers. Indeed, the American military advisor articulated what Smuts had only alluded to stating that once the Great Powers had reached agreement, "they might well be permitted to exercise such pressure as they, in agreement, should think practicable in order to compel general disarmament."¹⁸

Upon receipt of these critiques, Wilson again revised his draft of the Covenant on January 20, 1919, two days after the opening plenary session of the peace conference. In this third draft, Wilson accepted General Bliss' advice to transfer the decision-making responsibility for determining the levels of armament from the Body of Delegates or assembly to the Council, thereby reducing the number of states having veto power in the drafting stage. But he refused to accept the suggestion that the Great Powers impose their decisions on the rest of the countries. Thus, the wording was changed merely to: "The Executive Council shall also determine for the consideration and action of the several governments . . .," leaving to each government the decision to accept or reject the plans of the Executive Council.

Preparatory Negotiations. Before the peace conference formally took up the drafting of the League Covenant, a series of consultations took place among the Allies to sound out positions and reconcile differences. What was singular about this corridor diplomacy was not so much the efforts to achieve a British-American consensus, which was perhaps expected given the preparations already made for a league in the two countries, but the complete isolation of the French. Meetings took place almost daily between the British and American delegates and a conference was held with the Italians; but no consultations were held with the French, nor were their views solicited on the prospective international organization prior to the peace conference.

The first efforts to resolve differences during the preparatory negotiations were made between the British and Americans. While Wilson had been redrafting his proposals, the British had been elaborating their own scheme for a league. Lord Cecil's first draft, taken from the earlier Phillimore Plan and the Smuts' proposals, was submitted to the Cabinet on December 17, 1918, and a revised draft was circulated on January 14, 1919. This last draft was incorporated into the official British Draft Convention on January 20. In none of these British drafts was a limitation of armaments proposed; the closest they came was in a clause regulating armaments trade. According to the fourth clause of Article I, the members would "entrust to the League the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest."¹⁹

Beginning on January 21, David Hunter Miller and Lord Cecil met to reconcile the various points of disagreement in

the respective drafts. After extensive deliberations, a Cecil-Miller draft emerged on February 27 which included the American proposal for a limitation of armaments taken from Wilson's third revision, thus marking the initial British acceptance of restricting postwar armaments.²⁰

Having resolved his differences with the British, Wilson met on January 30 with Premier Orlando and Foreign Minister Scialaja.²¹ The Italians raised only two objections to the Anglo-American draft of the Covenant, one of which was due to a misunderstanding, while the other was a more substantive criticism. The first related to territorial claims and was prompted by the fear that the draft might be interpreted to infer that Trentino and Trieste, both desired by the Italians, were to become League mandates. This may have been Wilson's intention, but at the meeting he gave his assurance that this was not the intent of the clause. With this explanation, the matter was dropped. The second objection related to the disarmament clause and revealed Italian opposition to the abolition of conscription. Orlando argued persuasively that the elimination of conscription would work a hardship upon the poorer powers. Rich countries, he maintained, could afford to pay their standing armies well but the voluntary system would not work in Italy. They were already having trouble with their paid carabinieri, who were demanding higher wages. He suggested, therefore, that a "minimum conscription" be allowed, which could be modeled after the Swiss system.

Although Wilson momentarily resisted giving way on the provision abolishing conscription, when he met the following day with Lord Cecil and General Smuts, they had to agree that the provision could not be pushed through without Italian support. Assuming French opposition to the idea, the only way of gaining its acceptance was through a British-American-Italian bloc. The opposition of the Italians ruled that possibility out and Wilson agreed on January 31 that the clause abolishing conscription would have to be modified "in accordance with the Italian view."²²

The following day the Anglo-American draft was revised, the text becoming known as the Hurst-Miller Draft. Taking the Italian objections into account, the formula on conscription was changed from an imperative mandate to a conditional objective. The text of the new Article VIII read as follows:

The High Contracting Parties recognize the principle that the maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national armaments to the point consistent with domestic safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations, and the Executive Council shall formulate plans for effectuating such reduction. It shall also enquire into the feasibility of abolishing compulsory military service, and the substitution therefore of forces enrolled upon a voluntary basis, and into the military and naval equipment which it is reasonable to maintain.

The High Contracting Parties further agree that there shall be full and frank publicity as to all national armaments and military or naval programmes.²³

Aside from the changes in the paragraph dealing with conscription, the Hurst-Miller draft of February 1 introduced several other modifications which had not been the subject of Allied differences. The Most important of these was the dropping of the clause stating that the members "agree that munitions and implements of war shall not be manufactured by private enterprise or for private profit." Miller had suggested eliminating this provision in Wilson's second draft, but Wilson had ignored the suggestion. In negotiations with Hurst, however, Miller apparently took it upon himself to delete the clause. It had not been opposed by the British during Wilson's conversations with Cecil and Smuts on January 31 and it had not been challenged by the Italians the day before.²⁴

Wilson was not very happy with the new draft. Indeed, he told Miller that he did not like it, for too many things had been taken out which he thought were important.²⁵ On February 2, the day before the League of Nations Commission was to meet, Wilson took his earlier draft and hurriedly made changes for the printer. Wilson wanted this fourth draft to serve as the basis of discussion in the League Commission and the printers worked through the night preparing it. For reasons which are still not clear, however, it was the Hurst-Miller document which was used as the preliminary draft once formal negotiations commenced.²⁶

Deliberations of the League Commission

On January 25, 1919, a plenary session of the peace

conference set up a special League of Nations Commission to draft the Covenant. Originally composed of fifteen representatives--two each from the Big Five and one from Belgium, Brazil, China, Portugal, and Serbia--the number was expanded to nineteen when delegates from Greece, Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia were added. Under the chairmanship of Wilson, the League Commission convened on February 3 and held eleven meetings in the next ten days during which time they completed the first draft of the Covenant. On February 14 the draft was presented to the peace conference, more to elicit comment than to gain final approval. Wilson's trip to the United States from February 14 to March 14 interrupted consideration of the Covenant, but during the interval the draft was subjected to public review. Before the League Commission reconvened a conference was held with the neutral powers to obtain their reactions. To consider the public and neutral responses, the Commission held three more meetings from March 22 to March 26, and two on April 10 and 11. The final draft was submitted to the April 28 plenary session of the peace conference and it was there approved for inclusion in the final Peace Treaty.

Article VIII was taken up by the League Commission for the first time at its fourth session, on February 6. The French delegate, M. Bourgeois immediately objected to even inquiring into the "feasibility" of abolishing conscription. Not only did Bourgeois oppose the possibility of abolishing conscription, he defended that method of recruitment on the grounds of democratic equality. In France, he pointed out, conscription was a corollary of universal suffrage and "a fundamental issue of democracy." With Orlando and the other French delegate, M. Larnaude, supporting Bourgeois' opposition, Wilson agreed to strike out all reference to the abolition of conscription.²⁷

The second set of amendments, proposed by Wilson, reintroduced two of the paragraphs deleted from his draft by the Hurst-Miller revision. The first concerned restrictions on the private manufacture of armaments and the second dealt with the Council's responsibility for determining the "fair and reasonable" level of national armaments. Both amendments were accepted, returning the following clauses to the draft:

The Executive Council shall also determine for the consideration and action of the several governments what direct military equipment and armament is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces laid down in the programme of disarmament; and these limits, when adopted,

shall not be exceeded without the permission of the Body of Delegates.

The High Contracting Parties further agree that munitions and implements of war should not be manufactured by private enterprise and direct the Executive Council to advise how this practice can be dispensed with, and further agree that there shall be full and frank publicity as to all national armaments and military or naval programmes.²⁸

The final amendment was proposed by the Japanese delegate, Baron Makino. He urged that "national safety" be substituted for the formula "domestic safety." Though this amendment was, as Miller has noted, "of some significance," there was no debate or discussion. This may have been because the Cobb-Lippmann commentary had already conceded this meaning to the provision. Whatever the reasons, neither Wilson nor any of the other delegates objected to the change, and the amendment was adopted.²⁹

The French had not apparently given much thought to Article VIII prior to the February 6 session, aside from the opposition to the provision on conscription. But following this session, they reconsidered the problem and submitted several amendments which were taken up by the Commission on February 11. In presenting his amendments, Bourgeois noted that the substitution of the words "national safety" for the words "domestic safety" necessitated "certain modifications" to carry out the words of the American President. In an earlier discussion, Wilson had proposed that: "A force must be created, a force so superior to that of all nations or to that of all alliances, that no nation or combination of nations can challenge or resist it." Although Wilson's use of the word "force" carried a moral, spiritual or even political connotation, the French chose to interpret it--somewhat presumptuously--as a call for a superior military force. To realize Mr. Wilson's ambition, M. Bourgeois noted that two amendments would be required: first, the creation of an international military force and second, the institution of international control over national armaments. He proposed that after the phrase "The Executive Council shall formulate plans for affecting such reductions," the following clauses be inserted:

It shall institute an international control of military forces and armaments of the High Contracting Parties, which agree to submit thereto in all good faith.

It shall determine the conditions which are necessary for assuring the permanent existence and the organization of an international force.³⁰

Bourgeois' third amendment was designed to prevent the restrictions on armaments being applied equally to all countries. Preoccupied with their lack of natural frontiers, the French were determined that the formula fixing the troops and armaments of each nation be based on two factors: the country's military power and the risk which each state faced "due to its geographical situation and the nature of its frontiers." To formalize this, he asked that the article be amended to include the provision that the Executive Council would give "due regard, in determining the number of troops, not only to the relative strength of the different States, but also to the risks to which they are exposed by their geographical situation and the nature of their frontiers."³¹

Wilson acknowledged that France might have to maintain a proportionately larger force, but he vigorously opposed the international military force and international control. Wilson's principal argument against both proposals was legal: the United States Constitution forbade it. "The Constitution of the United States," he pointed out, "forbids the President to send beyond its frontiers the national forces." While this was not precisely true, or at best an oversimplification, Wilson did not attempt to explain the nuances of American constitutional law. Instead, he repeated the argument several times as if it were a simple and clear cut prohibition. "No nation will consent to control," he stated. "As for us Americans, we cannot consent to control because of our Constitution." While unity of command had been advantageous during the war, this control was possible only because of the imminent danger which threatened civilization. "To propose to realize unity of command in time of peace," he said, "would be to put forward a proposal that no nation would accept."³²

While his arguments against international control were essentially legal, he had another reason for opposing an international military force. If they organized an international army, he said, "it would appear that we were substituting international militarism for national militarism."³³ This second argument, although not elaborated, was perhaps more indicative of Wilson's apprehensions than the somewhat specious legal argument. Contrary to the British, who were inclined to see peace in terms of a reconstituted balance of

power, and the French, who saw peace in terms of overwhelming power aligned against Germany, Wilson had a new vision--one in which power was institutionalized and militarism was abolished.³⁴

To Bourgeois there appeared to be a misunderstanding over the word "control." Wilson referred to the difficulties which would be encountered in setting up a united command in time of peace, but that was not, he maintained, the intent of the French amendment. Rather, what they considered more important was "some means of verifying the quantities of armaments produced by each nation." They used control, he said, only in the sense of surveillance and verification.

The international army, Bourgeois explained, was not to be a permanent force, but an organization of national contingents which could be rapidly coordinated against an aggressive state. If one could not do that, he said, "the League would become nothing but a dangerous facade." France could never feel secure unless, in case of attack, she could count on prompt help from League members. Unless this could be achieved, France would think the League "was nothing but a trap." It was necessary to create "some organization for the international forces which would be ready to come into operation whenever affairs took a critical turn." He said that he "did not hold in any way to his wording of the amendment, but simply to the double idea of verification of armaments and a certain organization to provide for cases in which the utilization of national contingents might be required."³⁵

Confronted with the demand for international supervision of national armaments, Wilson replied with a defense of the traditional forms of gathering intelligence. Before the war, he noted, the Allies knew of German military preparations: "We knew the number of their soldiers, their plan of attack and the extent of their armaments." No serious preparation for war could be made in secret. Once German disarmament has been carried out, "we shall enjoy on that side a period of safety, for it will be impossible for Germany to accumulate anew reserves of munitions and of the machinery of war."³⁶

In his reply, Wilson did not respond to the French arguments. The French were demanding verification to ensure that no state exceeded the armament levels established by the League. Wilson's response that verification was not needed because Germany would be disarmed and because no nation could prepare for war in secret, while perhaps valid, was not

entirely relevant. The problem for the French was how to assure that no state violated agreements on the limitation of armaments. When, after further exchanges, the French succeeded in getting Wilson to confront the problem, his response--hardly assuring to the French--was that the "only method" of achieving this "lies in our having confidence in the good faith of the nations who belong to the League."³⁷

The British position was lucidly set forth by Lord Cecil, who summarized the discussion and clearly indicated the limits of accommodations which his government could accept. He observed that the French proposals introduced three principal points. First, national security must be considered in relation to the geographical position of States. This, he indicated, was not an unreasonable position and could be met by adding to the article words like: "Having special regard to the situation and circumstances of certain States." Secondly, the French amendment relating to control had for its object the achievement of two goals: (a) that no State should have an army greater than a permitted maximum and (b) that every State should have a force equal to the minimum imposed by the League. It was the second of these goals that was, he said, "extremely delicate." He noted that the British people would object to a control system which insisted on a minimum number of British soldiers being under arms. Therefore, he felt that the proposal to establish international control could not be accepted. And thirdly, the French demand for some form of international military organization, while departing from the original conception of the League, he said, might be met in part through "a less strict arrangement." Instead of a permanent army, he proposed that a commission be established in the League to make military preparations for cases of emergency. This could be achieved, he said, by adding a provision such as "A permanent Commission shall be established to advise the League of Nations on naval and military questions."³⁸

This latter concession was not what the French had in mind. M. Larnaudé repeated the demand that they create an international force in being: "We must have", he stated, "national contingents always ready to reassure the States within the League."³⁹ Wilson sought to assure the French delegates that no members of the League would remain isolated if attacked. "We are ready to fly to the assistance of those who are attacked," he stated. He promised that the United States would "maintain its military forces in such a condition

that the world will feel itself in safety." When danger came, he maintained, "we will come, and we will help you, but you must trust us. We must all depend on our mutual good faith."⁴⁰

While the French may have had reservations about the good faith of other countries, this was not their immediate concern. They were concerned less with whether there would be aid than when that aid would arrive. What they wanted to avoid was a repetition of 1914, when the French had to absorb the brunt of the fighting for months before assistance arrived. For this purpose they proposed an international army which would be immediately available to besieged countries.

Unable to resolve their differences, the delegates adjourned, leaving to the Drafting Committee the reconciliation of these points. The Committee, composed of Cecil, Larnaude, Venezelos of Greece, and Vesnitch of Serbia, met on February 12, and again took up the arguments over an international army and international control. While Larnaude argued the French case at length, Cecil refused to go beyond the concessions already offered and warned the French not to demand more than could be given. "America had nothing to gain from the League of Nations," he pointed out. The offer made by Wilson for support "was practically a present to France." To a lesser extent, this was also the position of Great Britain: while vitally interested in continental affairs, the British too could stand apart. Accordingly, he pointed out to the French "very frankly" that they were saying to America and Great Britain that, because more was not offered, they would not take the gift at hand.

As Larnaude did not insist, Cecil's substitute proposal, that a permanent commission be established to advise the League on naval and military questions, became Article IX of the February draft. The Drafting Committee went on to accept the French proposal that risk and the nature of frontiers be considered in determining the level of armaments for each state, although the delegates adopted the broader wording of Cecil's amendment.

The revised Covenant was reviewed by the League Commission in two long sessions on February 13. During this second reading, the French again sought approval for their amendments on international control and an international army. The debate, however, added nothing new to the arguments already presented. Cecil, chairing the session in Wilson's absence, agreed to one slight change in the wording of Article IX. This amendment would give the permanent Commission broad jurisdiction without mentioning the word "control" directly. As revised, the article would read:

A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the League of the execution of the provisions of Article VIII and on military and naval questions generally.⁴¹

Bourgeois was still not satisfied. The proposed amendment, he said, gave no more power to the Commission than the original text. Therefore, he insisted that the French amendment be put to a vote, which was rejected by a vote of 12 to 3.⁴²

Defeated on the matter of control, the French turned to the question of an international military force, where they presented an amendment to replace Article IX as follows:

A permanent body shall be created in order to plan and prepare the military and naval programme, by which obligations imposed upon the High Contracting Parties by the present Covenant shall be enforced, and in order to give immediate effect to it in any urgent situation that may arise.⁴³

Cecil feared that the French proposal would create an international General Staff with powers to intervene in the military and naval policies of each State. This, he said, no country would accept. Though Bourgeois sought to assuage these fears, he only confirmed them. Explaining that the French did not intend to create an international army stationed at, or operating from, any given point, he proposed setting aside a certain number of national forces which could be called into action by the permanent body envisaged in the amendment. This was, indeed, precisely what Cecil referred to in calling the permanent body an international General Staff.

While several of the delegates could see little contrast between what the French were demanding and what Article IX authorized, there was in fact a profound difference in policy implications. The French wanted the permanent body to be able to impose on the members of the League the plans and programs worked out. Article IX merely authorized the Commission to advise the League on the execution of Article VIII and on military and naval questions generally.

Unable to gain approval for his amendment, Bourgeois insisted on a vote by the whole Commission: again the French were defeated. The Commission did, however, accept the French amendment calling on the Executive Council to take

into account the country's geographical situation and special circumstances when fixing the limits of armament. They also accepted a French proposal to change the wording in the clause calling for "full and frank publicity" to "full and frank interchange of information." Finally, it was decided to adopt Cecil's revision of Article IX. As approved on February 13 and reported to the plenary session the following day, Articles VIII and IX read:⁴⁴

Article VIII

The High Contracting Parties recognize the principle that the maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations, having special regard to the geographical situation and circumstances of each State; and the Executive Council shall formulate plans for effecting such reduction. The Executive Council shall also determine for the consideration and action of the several Governments what military equipment and armament is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces laid down in the programme of disarmament; and these limits, when adopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of the Executive Council.

The High Contracting Parties agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war lends itself to grave objections, and direct the Executive Council to advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those countries which are not able to manufacture for themselves the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

The High Contracting Parties undertake in no way to conceal from each other the condition of such of their industries as are capable of being adapted to warlike purposes or the scale of their armaments, and agree that there shall be full and frank interchange of information as to their military and naval programmes.

Article IX

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the League on the execution of the provisions of Article VIII and on military and naval questions generally.

Though the French accepted this draft, they did not abandon their amendments. During the ceremonious presentation of the Covenant to the peace conference on February 14, they introduced them once again. Their presentation, Bourgeois noted in a long, gracious speech, did not mean that they did not accept the draft as a whole. Rather, he mentioned them, he said, in the hope that they would contribute to the public discussion which would follow.⁴⁵

Comments and Criticism

During President Wilson's absence from the peace conference, from February 14 to March 14, the Covenant was subjected to wide public debate and criticism. Most of the serious and important suggestions came from the United States, where apprehension arose over the fate of the Monroe Doctrine and the possibility that the League might weaken the right of exclusive jurisdiction over domestic matters. A number of suggestions were forwarded to the American delegation, but judging from available evidence there was little criticism of Article VIII and IX.⁴⁶ However, the British Admiralty protested several provisions of Article VIII, sending to the British delegation in Paris a long memorandum. They wrote that Article VIII involved consequences of "so grave a nature and so prejudicial to the interests of this and other countries" that they felt compelled to demand "in the strongest possible manner" that the proposals be given fuller consideration.

Aside from apprehension over the possibility of being left out of disarmament negotiations, the Admiralty made one substantive criticism of Article VIII: they opposed restrictions being placed on the private manufacture of armaments. "While fully appreciating the force of the desire...that private enterprise in armament production should cease", the Admiralty memorandum read, "it is observed that the effects of this proposal would operate to the advantage of an aggressive power, and would seriously compromise the security of fully established countries...It is further maintained that the proposal would tend to provoke rather than prevent war."

This was a new and unique position which the Admiralty advanced and their arguments raised several points which had not been considered.⁴⁷ As their initial premise, the Admiralty noted that few nations were self-supporting in armaments and equipment. Their second premise was that democratic

nations were "most reluctant to spend money in accumulating in peace time the resources which they would require in event of war." The conclusion was obvious: democratic states which were attacked were dependent on the import of arms and munitions to tide them over until domestic resources could be converted to wartime needs. This was the experience of the last war, the memorandum noted. "If it had not been for the factories of the United States, the position of the Allies would have been excessively difficult, if not impossible, before the entry of America into the war." If the American armament firms had been under government control, the export of their products would have been prohibited by international law for neutral governments were prohibited from supplying weapons to belligerents. Had this been the case, the effect on the Allies "might well have been disastrous." The Admiralty therefore recommended that "the prohibition of the manufacture of munitions and implements of war by private enterprise should be excluded from the main Covenant of the League of Nations and should be reserved for further consideration and examination."

As a result of the various modifications of the clause dealing with the private manufacture of armaments, this proposal had already been in large measure satisfied. In the February draft of the Covenant, Article VIII had been reworded to provide that the Executive Council would "advise" how the evil effects of the private production of weapons could be prevented. Though the clause had not been excluded from the draft, it did provide that the restrictions would be subject to further consideration before any action were taken.

In addition to its memorandum, the Admiralty submitted a list of proposed amendments, the most important of which dealt with Article VIII. This amendment would have eliminated the binding character of the disarmament agreements by permitting unilateral renunciation at any time. In the clause which stated that "These limits, when adopted by the Governments, shall not be exceeded without the permission of the Executive Council," the Admiralty wished to substitute "notice to" for "permission of." This would permit any country to exceed fixed limits at will.

On March 18, Wilson met with Cecil to go over the various amendments which had been proposed in the United States and Britain. When they came to the Admiralty amendment, permitting unilateral renunciation of the terms, Wilson balked. He did not see how it could be accepted and Cecil, who had agreed

merely to submit it on behalf of the Admiralty, approved. He wanted it understood for the record, however, that he had submitted the proposal and had pressed it "very seriously." This was agreed to and the matter dropped.⁴⁸

Final Negotiations

The League of Nations Commission convened again on March 22 for the first of five meetings needed before the Covenant was approved. The most contentious issue during this last phase revolved around American efforts to gain an amendment providing that nothing in the Covenant would jeopardize the Monroe Doctrine. Few amendments were proposed for Article VIII, although the French again introduced their proposals for supervision and inspection. When Article VIII came up for its third reading at the end of the March 22 session--the eleventh meeting of the League Commission--the Japanese proposed a procedural amendment, which was immediately accepted, and the rest of the time was devoted to the French proposal. The Japanese proposed that the disarmament plans adopted be "subject to reconsideration and revision every ten years," and Wilson interjected to add "at least every ten years." This was approved and became paragraph three of the final draft.

The French amendment on supervision, although slightly revised, was again opposed by Wilson, who argued that the powers demanded by the French would be appropriate for "a Union of States with a common legislature," that is, a super-state, but not for the type of organization contemplated in the Covenant. As neither Cecil nor the other delegates changed their position, the amendment was again rejected. Bourgeois still did not give up, reserving the right to present the amendment again before the Commission and before the Conference.⁴⁹

At the next session, on March 24, the delegates got involved in a long debate over the French demand for an international General Staff. The amendment had been reworded to accommodate American and British fears: the Commission proposed would not have decision-making power; only the executive Council of the League would be able to give instructions and orders whenever peace was threatened. The Commission would concern itself, according to Bourgeois, only with "preparing the plan of military and naval action." This plan

would be submitted to each government, where the constitutional organs and legislative bodies would pass upon it. Instead of causing any anxiety to constitutional authorities, Bourgeois noted, the French proposal was calculated to give them "all necessary guarantees concerning the extent of the effort which each country might be called upon to make."

Neither Wilson nor Cecil was convinced, although both expressed sympathy with the concerns of the French. Having read the French proposal with a great deal of care, Wilson still felt that the existing draft of Article IX gave the French sufficient guarantees. Inasmuch as France would have a member on the League Council, it would, he noted, be able, in case of need, "to give the danger signal and insist upon the drafting of a plan of action, or of co-operation, which appeared indispensable to her." The French amendment, he said, did not add to the existing draft.

While the French were comforted by Wilson's interpretation, they nevertheless insisted that their amendment was more precise and should be adopted. They were unable to convince the other delegates, who accepted instead a Czechoslovak proposal to give the Executive Council more clearly defined powers. Bourgeois still reserved the right to raise the issue again before the plenary session of the Conference.⁵⁰

The fourth and final reading of the draft was carried out by the League Commission on April 10 and April 11. On the first day, the first ten articles of the Covenant, including the articles on disarmament, were approved without change.⁵¹ The completed draft of the Covenant was presented to the plenary session of the Peace Conference on April 28, with much pomp and ceremony. While the speeches extolled the Covenant in majestic fashion, M. Bourgeois re-introduced his two amendments for consideration.⁵² The French delegation, however, was not united on this, for following Mr. Bourgeois' penetrating speech, the French Foreign Minister, Pichon, announced that the Government accepted the draft as submitted by the League Commission and reserved the right to amend the terms later.⁵³ Thus, no vote was taken on the French amendments, and the draft as presented by the League Commission was approved.

German reaction to the provisions for general disarmament was accommodating. The German delegation did try to obtain two concessions from the Allies--that Germany be immediately admitted to the League and that the Allies honor their disarmament promise within two years--neither of which was

accepted.⁵⁴ The Allies did promise to "open negotiations immediately" for general disarmament and implicitly accepted the moral, if not legal connection, binding German disarmament to general disarmament. The Allied reply to the German Counterproposals read:

The Allied and Associated Powers have already pointed out to the German Delegation that the Covenant of the League of Nations provides for 'the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.' They recognize that the acceptance by Germany of the terms laid down for her own disarmament will facilitate and hasten the accomplishment of a general reduction of armaments; and they intend to open negotiations immediately with a view to the eventual adoption of a scheme of such general reduction. It goes without saying that the realization of this program will depend in large part on the satisfactory carrying out by Germany of her own engagements.⁵⁵

Although it is doubtful that the failure of the Allies to carry out their promise of general disarmament in the postwar period had a legal effect on the peace terms, it gave the Germans a cogent moral argument that in the absence of a general limitation of armaments their unilateral disarmament was unjust, if not actually null and void. Indeed, the argument did much to prepare people--especially in Britain and America--for Germany's eventual renunciation of the military terms. Thus, Article VIII and the Allied reply tying German disarmament to general disarmament did much to promote that sense of moral outrage and injustice which later served as a rationalization for German rearmament.

Chapter 5 -- Footnotes

¹ David Hunter Miller, Drafting of the Covenant (1928), I, 286.

² Lord Cecil, A Great Experiment (1941), pp. 78-79.

³ F.R.: Peace Conf. 1919, XIII, 82-83.

⁴ The reference to Article I in the clause relates to the admission requirements set forth in paragraph 2. This section states that any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named as original members may be admitted if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly and provided that it shall accept "such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military and naval forces and armaments."

⁵ See Greda Richards Corsby, The Politics of the Disarmament Question in England, 1914-1919 (1957), Ch. 2.

⁶ See Chapter I, above.

⁷ For the Phillimore Plan, see Miller, Drafting the Covenant, II, 3-6.

⁸ The Cecil memorandum appears in his A Great Experiment, pp. 353-357. We are indebted to Professor Martin D. Dubin of Northern Illinois University for a copy of Sir Eyre's "confidential" memorandum, printed for the War Cabinet, May 1917.

⁹ For the first American draft, see Miller, Drafting the Covenant, II, 21-26.

¹⁰ Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (1928), IV, 21-26.

¹¹ Miller, Drafting the Covenant, II, 10.

¹² Ibid., p. 13.

¹³ Seymour, Papers of House, IV, 194.

¹⁴ Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, I, 34.

- ¹⁵ Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, II, 48-52.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., p. 72.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., p. 73.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., p. 95
- ¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 106-07.
- ²⁰ Ibid., pp. 134-35.
- ²¹ Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, I, 67.
- ²² Ibid., p. 65.
- ²³ Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, II, 233.
- ²⁴ Miller does not explain why or how the clause was dropped from the Huist-Miller draft in his detailed analysis on The Drafting of the Covenant.
- ²⁵ Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, I, 72.
- ²⁶ Ibid., pp. 72-75.
- ²⁷ Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, II, 264-65.
- ²⁸ See Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, I, 171-72.
- ²⁹ Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, II, 265.
- ³⁰ Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, I, 207.
- ³¹ Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, II, 292.
- ³² Ibid., p. 294.
- ³³ Ibid., p. 294.
- ³⁴ Roland Stromberg sees this as part of "the paradox which Wilson confronted, and seemingly accepted, at Paris: the League must have teeth in it, it must be virile, it must exact 'binding stipulations,' it must do far more than the old Hague Court. Yet it could not be given its own overpowering armed force, or indeed any armed force at all, it should have no power to bring the United States into war, it

must not infringe upon national sovereignty." "The Riddle of Collective Security, 1916-1920," in G. L. Anderson, ed., Issues and Conflict: Studies in Twentieth Century American Diplomacy (1959), p. 158.

35 Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, II, 294-95.

36 Ibid., pp. 295-96.

37 Ibid., p. 297.

38 Ibid., p. 296.

39 Ibid., p. 296.

40 Ibid., p. 297.

41 Ibid., p. 320.

42 Ibid., p. 319.

43 Ibid., p. 320.

44 Ibid., p. 329.

45 F.R.: Peace Conf. 1919, III, 219-24.

46 See Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, I, 276-302.

47 Ibid., pp. 288-89.

48 Ibid., p. 286.

49 Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, II, 342-43.

50 Discussion is reviewed in Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, I, 324-25.

51 Ibid., p. 439.

52 F.R.: Peace Conf. 1919, III, 294.

53 Ibid., p. 313.

54 Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (1941), p. 322.

55 Ibid., p. 424.

Chapter 6

GERMAN DISARMAMENT AND
ALLIED MILITARY CONTROL, 1920-1927

The military terms of the Versailles Treaty entered into force on January 10, 1920 and remained in effect until their repudiation by Hitler in 1935 and 1936. During this span of sixteen years, Germany was repeatedly charged, both officially and unofficially, with the willful violation of obligations. Evidences of covert evasion and overt obstruction were persistently advanced and the possibility of secret rearmament became the frequent subject not only of journalistic speculation but of diplomatic concern.

In attempting to assess the degree of German compliance and noncompliance with the treaty terms, it is important--though perhaps superfluous--to note that the data available on the subject is fragmentary and often unreliable. While there may be inferential evidence on some points and even official German documentation on others, no precise data exists on many of the more controversial areas of concern, including the extent of illegal military training and the levels of illegal weapons testing and manufacture. Whatever conclusions reached, therefore, must be considered as tentative and conjectural.

To facilitate analysis--and to help clarify the sequence of events--it might be useful to isolate four stages of treaty execution during the period 1920 to 1936. The first stage, which was the period of implementation, extended from January 1920 to the end of 1922. During this period Inter-Allied Control Commissions were set up in Germany, whose immediate task was to see that German military strength was reduced to treaty levels and to do so within established time limits. Although it was originally anticipated that all of the disarmament terms would be carried out by no later than March 31, 1921, the delay in the

ratifications of the treaty and the continuing domestic disorders in Germany forced the Allies to grant several extensions. But even these revised dates were not met; unexpected delays took place as implementation turned out to be much slower and more difficult than anticipated, the assessment of which caused profound differences among the Allies. Not only did the Allies reach fundamentally different conclusions over the degree of German compliance with the military terms, but they differed over the extent--and even necessity--of enforcement action. By May 1922 however the aerial terms had been fulfilled and the Aeronautical Control Commission was replaced by a more limited Committee of Guarantee. During the latter part of 1922 most of the naval and military terms were met; negotiations of their withdrawal, however, were interrupted by the Ruhr crisis of 1923 and it was not until September 1924 that the Naval Control Commission was withdrawn and January 1927 that the Military Commission was dissolved.

The second stage, which was the period of Allied supervision, lasted from January 1923 until early 1927. During this period, the main objectives of the Allies were to guarantee the continued fulfillment of those terms already implemented and to achieve compliance with those provisions as yet unfulfilled. These objectives, however, were not easily attained. The Ruhr crisis of 1923 led to a complete suspension of Allied control in Germany for nearly two years and provoked a bitter conflict not only between the Allies and Germany but among the Allies themselves. It was not until late 1924 and early 1925 that the negotiations over the Dawes plan and the Locarno Pact permitted agreement to be reached on most of the outstanding points relating to arms control. Consequently, the Allies evacuated the northern zone of the Rhineland in January 1926 and dissolved the last of the Control Commissions in January 1927.

The third stage, extending from early 1927 to 1933, was characterized by the absence of Allied control machinery and hence can be referred to as a period of self-regulation. While control was in theory to be continued under the auspices of the League of Nations, in practice it became the obligation of the Germans themselves to supervise the faithful execution of their own disarmament. No League inspection was ever undertaken in Germany and none was demanded.

The fourth stage, lasting from 1933 to 1936, was a period of repudiation and rearmament. Although plans and preparations for military expansion had been agreed upon

during the final years of the Weimar Republic--and carried out to some extent--it was not until Hitler came to power that Germany launched a determined campaign to rearm. Chaffing increasingly under the restraints of the Versailles Treaty, Hitler on March 9, 1935 announced that Germany would no longer be bound by the air clauses of the treaty. A week later, on March 16, he indicated that military conscription had been reintroduced and that the German army would be more than tripled in size. Having unilaterally repudiated the most important provisions of the military and aerial terms, Hitler was able to negotiate the end of the naval clauses. On June 18, 1935 Germany signed an agreement with Great Britain which in effect nullified Articles 181-197 of the Versailles Treaty.

The present chapter will examine the policies of Allied military control during the first two periods, 1920-1927. The following chapter will review the status of German disarmament following the withdrawal of external control and under a system of self-regulation.

Period of Implementation: 1920-1922

The task of verifying compliance with the disarmament and demilitarization terms of the Versailles Treaty fell to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control. Implicit in the terms of the treaty was the expectation that these Control Commissions would remain in Germany for a few months--until March 31, 1920 at the latest--and then withdraw, leaving the permanent supervision of German disarmament to the League of Nations. The wording of Article 202 was clear--up to a point: "All the military, naval and air clauses contained in the present Treaty, for the execution of which a time-limit is prescribed, shall be executed by Germany under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers."¹

This article established two important conditions affecting the operations of the Control Commissions: first, the Commissions were to supervise the execution of only those clauses for which a time-limit was prescribed and, second, the terms were actually to be carried out by the German government, not the Commissions. The Commissions were to supervise the actions of the German government, but it was the obligation of the Germans to actually execute the terms of the treaty. While the provision limiting the competence of the Commissions to only those clauses

for which a time-limit was prescribed appeared clear and precise, in practice the delineation was often troublesome. According to official sources, the Versailles Treaty contained twenty-three time-limits relating to the military terms.² But these represented only about half of the conditions set forth in Part V. The question naturally arose: if the Control Commissions were to supervise only those clauses for which time-limits were prescribed, who was to supervise those provisions which did not include time-limits?

Organization of Control Machinery. The organizational structure of the Allied control and supervisory machinery functioned on three different levels. And while in theory jurisdictional competence was clearly established, in practice precise lines of authority were often difficult to identify.

The Supreme Council, which was made up of the heads of the Allied governments, sat at the top of the organizational hierarchy. According to implicit, if not explicit, administrative arrangement, it and only it had the authority to make major policy decisions. Below the Council came the Conference of Ambassadors, an organization composed on the Allied ambassadors assigned to the French capital. Meeting in weekly sessions, the Conference of Ambassadors was designed to oversee the practical implementation of the treaty terms. It had among its advisory bodies an Inter-Allied Military Committee, which was headed by Marshal Foch. Referred to as the Versailles Committee--and sometimes as the Foch Committee--this body increasingly reflected the views of its chairman who in turn consistently reflected the views of the French authorities. As a result, the Versailles Committee was often at odds with the military experts--or at least some of the military experts--in the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, the third and lowest level in the organizational structure. And though the authority of the Control Commissions was theoretically limited to that of supervising the implementation of the military terms in the field, they frequently competed with the Versailles Committee as the advisory body not only to the Conference of Ambassadors, but to the Supreme Council as well.

The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control were divided into three separate commissions. There was a Military Commission headed by General Nollet of France, a Naval Commission with Admiral Charlton of Britain as President,

and an Aeronautical Commission presided over by General Masterman of the R.A.F. Each of these Commissions had its headquarters--and a small staff--in Berlin.

The Military Control Commission was in turn divided into three subcommissions: 1) Effectives, which was to supervise the reduction in personnel of the German army to the treaty limits; 2) Armaments, which was assigned the task of supervising the surrender and destruction of the weapons and arms that the German government was to turn over to the Allies; 3) Fortifications, which was authorized to supervise the disarmament and dismantling of those fortifications specified in the treaty.

According to the terms of the treaty, the three Commissions were empowered, as agents of the Allied Powers, to deal with German authorities "in all matters" relative to the execution of the military clauses. Yet a close examination of the enabling clauses of each Commission points up the fact that these bodies were to carry out essentially verification and inventory duties rather than control functions. Thus, the Military Commission was, according to Article 208, to receive from the German government "the notifications relating to the location of the stocks and depots of munitions, the armament of the fortified works, fortresses and forts which Germany is allowed to retain, and the location of the works or factories for the production of arms, munitions and war material and their operations." It was to "take delivery of the arms, munitions, and war material", "select the points where such delivery was to be effected," and "supervise the works of destruction, demolition and of rendering things useless." German officials were also required to furnish the Military Commission with "all such information and documents"--particularly from legislative and administrative organs--that the Commission "may deem necessary" to ensure total adherence to the military restrictions. The Naval and Aeronautical Commissions were similarly restricted, according to Articles 209 and 210, to essentially verification functions.

Problems of Verification and Control. The Treaty of Versailles did not enter into force until nearly seven months after its signature by Germany and the Allied powers. The delay, occasioned principally by the uncertainty of American intentions, led to several unexpected complications in the execution of the military terms.

Aside from the fact that several target dates were rendered obsolete--necessitating treaty revision at the very outset of its implementation--the delay meant that there was no verification and control machinery in Germany during a crucial period of military activity. Unable to supervise the initial stages of the demobilization of the German army, the Allies were in no position to prevent hundreds of thousands of weapons from falling into the hands of civilians or to verify the destruction of war material which the Germans claimed to have carried out before the treaty went into effect. Figures on both points were to be sources of continuing disagreement not only between the Allies and the Germans, but between the Allies themselves.

In addition, the delay in ratification meant that the Allies were unable to intercede in the formation of those many paramilitary groups which sprang up in 1919. Although these groups were to be prohibited under the terms of the peace treaty, their organization was not restricted under the terms of the armistice. Thus, the delay in ratification permitted these organizations to legally recruit and arm themselves, an opportunity which they engaged in with spirit and energy. While the intercession of Allied control machinery at an earlier date might not have effectively prevented the formation of these paramilitary organizations, the ratification of the treaty would at least have made their activities illegal and thus subject to sanction.

Additionally, the Control Commissions were confronted with several important problems relating to differences in treaty interpretation, unclear jurisdiction, German obstruction, inadequate staffing and lack of enforcement authority. The Conference of Ambassadors left to the Commissions the knotty problem of interpreting what the Versailles Treaty meant when it referred to the surrender of "war materials." Interpreting this phrase in the abstract introduced all sorts of problems; interpreting it in practice proved almost impossible. As General Morgan, British representative on the Effectives Sub-Commission, complained: "Is a field kitchen war material? Or a field ambulance? Or a motor lorry?...How are you to distinguish between war explosives and commercial explosives?...Is an ingot of gun steel forged but not yet bored, turned and

rifled on the gun-lathe invested with a belligerent character or not?"³ An even greater dilemma arose regarding factories and manufacturing processes. For example, nitrogen compounds could be used both as fertilizer and as gunpowder. How would the Military Commission distinguish between a sporting rifle and a military rifle? General Bingham, President of the Armaments Sub-Commission, reported that "we gave our ruling, but, as a hard matter of fact, the machinery for manufacturing the two is practically the same."⁴

Somewhat less pressing but no less important was the problem of jurisdiction. This stemmed from the fact that numerous clauses in Part V of the Versailles Treaty were considered to be of a more permanent nature and hence did not have time-limits inserted. For example, Article 170 set a permanent restriction on Germany's right to import or export arms, munitions and war material and Article 171 forbade Germany from manufacturing or importing all kinds of poisonous gases, armored cars, tanks and similar equipment. The restrictions on military training in educational institutions, set forth in Article 177, was likewise a permanent feature of German disarmament, as were the prohibitions in Article 178, on all measures of mobilization and in Article 179, denying Germany the right to send abroad any military, naval or air mission. In theory, these clauses--without a time-limit--were to be supervised by an agency other than the Control Commissions, presumably by the Conference of Ambassadors or by the Supreme Council initially and ultimately by the League of Nations. But this was not entirely clear.

While a jurisdictional problem existed at the administrative level, it was less important than that which existed at the legal level. In particular, the absence of target dates in three articles gave rise to conflicts which weakened the position of the Allies in certain of their charges of treaty violation. The first article, over which there was more apprehension than consequence--related to the abolition of compulsory military service in Germany. Article 173 merely stated that "Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in Germany." The choice of a grammatical future construction--"shall be abolished"--without a time-limit, naturally raised the question of legal obligation. At what point was German action--or lack of action--illegal? Though the Allies would complain bitterly over the failure of the German government to abolish compulsory military service during the first months of 1920, their position was not--legally at least--very strong.

A second problem--more serious as it turned out--revolved around the interpretation of Article 172. According to this article the number of employees and officials of the German states "shall not exceed that of the employees or officials functioning in these capacities in 1913." The number of police could be increased, however, "to an extent corresponding to the increase of population since 1913." Although the long-range implications of the article were obvious, it was not clear when this level of force, especially for the police, was to be achieved. And as the Germans claimed that a number of the paramilitary organizations which arose in 1919 and 1920 were temporary police auxiliaries, it was open to question whether the treaty specifically prohibited these groups and, if so, when they became illegal. This point was to come before the Supreme Council in the Conferences of Boulogne and Spa in mid-1920.

Article 177, which appeared to resolve the issue of these paramilitary groups introduced further difficulties. According to this article, all "societies of discharged soldiers, shooting or touring clubs and, generally speaking, associations of every description...must not occupy themselves with any military matters." In particular, they "will be forbidden to instruct or exercise their members, or to allow them to be instructed or exercised, in the profession or use of arms." While fairly clear as to future intent, this article raised three immediate problems: first, in denying these associations the right to occupy themselves in "military matters," it was not clear whether the treaty also prevented them from engaging in "police matters"; second, the clause did not prohibit the formation of "societies of discharged soldiers" but stipulated only that they must "not occupy themselves with any military matters"; and third, there was no time-limit on when the restrictions should go into effect. Implied, however, was the future effectuation of the restrictions, for the second paragraph again employed the grammatical future: these associations "will be forbidden to instruct ...in the profession or use of arms." This problem also had to be taken up by the Supreme Council at the Conferences of Boulogne and Spa in 1920.

While organized harassment of the Control Commissions was limited, the staff were confronted on occasion with a lack of cooperation from the German authorities which bordered on outright obstruction. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this was the action of the German Peace Commissions. Although designed ostensibly to act as a

Liaison between the Control Commissions and the German facilities to be inspected, in practice these Peace Commissions were often times more of a hindrance than a help. The officers on the Peace Commissions would frequently beg-off certain questions by professing the need for higher authority. They would sometimes delay the inspection of barracks or factories, contending that the Allied control officers would be molested. Then, at times, the German liaison officer assigned to a certain control officer would not show up or would suddenly disappear, thereby providing the excuse needed by the German officer in charge of the facility being inspected to refuse entry of the Allied control officials. In its January 10-May 10, 1920 Report, for example, the Naval Control Commission complained that the inspection of factories was proceeding with great difficulty. "Here the obstruction of the Liaison Officers has been most marked--these officers create obstacles and unpleasantness at every turn and are undoubtedly parties to the concealment of war material." And while the June 10, 1920 Report noted that "the attitude of the Liaison Officers appears to have improved," the January 10, 1921 Report complained that obstruction was again taking place and was, in fact, increasing. "The work of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control has been subject to continuous and increasing obstruction, especially on the part of certain Liaison Officers, who are actively supported by the German Naval Peace Commission." As a result of these obstructions, the Report continued, "the work of destruction of war material is once more almost at a standstill."⁵

There were some incidents of a more serious nature, in which physical harassment was encountered. General Bingham reported in 1923 that several episodes had taken place the year before. At Ingolstadt on October 24, 1922 and at Passau on November 22, 1922 threatening crowds stoned Allied vehicles, for which the Germans paid a fine of \$50,000. In recounting these incidents, however, he stressed their abnormal nature: "Apart from these incidents, the work as a whole proceeded smoothly--a great credit to the Entente officers, and also to the Germans."⁶

One of the more difficult problems facing the Commissions was the fact that the staff assigned to carry out the veridication and supervisory functions was quite limited in size. While precise figures are not available, the data that exists suggest that the size of the staff was not adequate for the tasks assigned. General Nollet, President of the Military Control Commission, noted that the total

personnel assigned to his Control Commissions was 337 officers and about 700 enlisted men. The Aeronautical Commission started out with 258 officers, but by August 1921 only 70 remained. The Naval Commission still had 236 offices in Germany at the same time, August, 1921. It was the contention of General Morgan, British representative on the Effectives Sub-Commission, that the size of the Commissions was far too small to be effective in its verification and supervisory tasks.⁷ And given the duties and responsibilities of the Control Commissions, this appraisal seems warranted.

Not only did the Control Commissions lack sufficient personnel, they lacked adequate enforcement authority. Indeed, the Commissions of Control were something of a misnomer, for their powers were less than of "control" than that of "verification." In this sense, the Commissions corresponded more closely to the French interpretation of the word "contrôle", which implies inspection, verification and auditing, than to the Anglo-American interpretation, which suggests the exercise of authority over and the directing, commanding or regulating of power. As the Commissions actually functioned, they were largely inspection and auditing agencies, lacking in effective enforcement powers. When confronted with a treaty violation or infraction or obstruction, the Control Commissions had to petition to higher Allied agencies for the application of diplomatic pressure or sanctions.

During the first phase of control in 1920, special difficulties were encountered due to the internal political and economic situation in Germany. The Naval Commission, for example, reported that numerous strikes had interrupted the breakup of ships and the fortifications on Heligoland, while the lack of coal delayed the delivery and surrender of ships. Machinery capable of breaking up the larger weapons was also difficult to locate in Germany, necessitating considerable delay in the execution of certain treaty provisions.⁸

In reviewing the implementation of the military terms of the treaty during this first phase of military control several tentative observations may be made. First, during the period 1920-1922, most of the charges of treaty infraction were based on Germany's failure to meet the time limits established in the treaty rather than overt or covert violation. Aside from resistance to and obstruction of the Control Commissions, few incidents of outright

violations were uncovered. Of these, some were based on rather strained interpretations of the treaty and others were based on rumors and speculation. Important as some of these were, the Allies remained throughout this first period preoccupied with the delays in the execution of the treaty above all else.

Second, differences in assessing the progress of disarmament--and the significance of the infractions--arose from the very beginning among the Allies. Not only did these differences arise among the diplomatic representatives, but they found expression among the military as well. In general, the British tended to assume that adequate progress was being made on disarmament and that the nonfulfillment of the terms stemmed more from the inability than the unwillingness of the German government to carry out its obligations. The French, on the other hand, tended to emphasize the significance of the delays in fulfillment and to assume that this was due to a calculated policy of evasion and deceit on the part of the German government. And while the Italians tended to support the British, the Belgians were inclined to agree with the French interpretation.

Third, not only did differences arise among the Allies over the assessment of treaty implementation, but differences arose over the type--and need--for enforcement action. Thus, while the British were inclined to rely on diplomatic pressure--and direct negotiations with the Germans--the French favored the application of more tangible and material sanctions, mainly in the form of additional occupation of German territory. Less impressed with the possibilities of diplomatic pressure--and fearful of the possibilities of treaty revision--the French tended to resist the idea of direct negotiations with the Germans. Thus, though the British had proposed meeting with the Germans in early 1920, the conference was delayed under various pretexts for about six months. It was not until the Spa conference met in July 1920, therefore, that the Allies held their first post-war conference with the Germans.

Fourth, although the Allied Control Commissions did not discover all the violations which took place in Germany during this period, they were able to uncover, according to more recent research on captured German documents, all the significant infractions. Whether this indicates that the Commissions were very successful or that those who violate treaties do not write documents for historians to find is still difficult to say.

Infractions: the Charges and the Record. Throughout this period, reports on the progress of German disarmament were made by both the Foch Committee at Versailles and by the Inter-Allied Commissions in the field. During 1920, these reports documented the fact that there were delays in the reduction of military personnel down to the prescribed maximum levels, delays in the delivery and destruction of war material and delays in the curtailment of military production. Legislation outlawing compulsory military service and the import or export of war material had not been passed and there were delays in the abolition of military schools. Of equal concern to the Allies during the early 1920's was the delay in the disbanding of those paramilitary and semi-police organizations which continued to operate. In addition, charges of obstruction were repeatedly made.⁹

By the end of 1920, in spite of additional extensions given the Germans at the Spa Conference in July 1920, most of these defaults had still not been wholly or satisfactorily met, at least in the opinion of the Versailles Committee. In its Report of December 30, 1920, the Versailles Committee noted that, while several of the conditions had been fulfilled, a great many of the clauses remain unexecuted.¹⁰ Among those clauses which had not been carried out were: Article 172 calling for the delivery of information regarding the manufacture of explosives; Article 176 requiring the suppression of military schools and Article 180 on the disarmament of fortifications within the Rhineland neutral zone. Also the German army had been reduced to 100,000, the navy to 15,000 and the air force had been completely demobilized. The German government had passed legislation--on August 21, 1920--abolishing considered it inadequate. The surrender and destruction of material was proceeding "normally" but was "not yet completed." And the disarming of the civilian population had not yet been carried out, although the German government had, on August 7, 1920, passed legislation calling on civilians to surrender their weapons or face heavy fines. The disarming of the Einwohnerwehen (civil guards) and other paramilitary organizations was meeting resistance, particularly in East Prussia and Bavaria, and thus continued to present a problem. The disarming of the Sicherheitspolizei (security police), on the other hand, was "relatively well advanced" with about two-thirds of their arms having been surrendered.

General Masterman, reported that the delivery of certain aeronautical equipment had still not been completed. The dismantling of hangars and the demolition of hydrogen factories was proceeding normally, but had not been fully carried out. And though about 5,000 airplane machine guns had been delivered, this figure was still "insufficient." Apart from these delays, two direct violations were reported. The Aeronautical Control Commission found that in four factories a total of 57 civilian aircraft had been or were being built without authorization and that there had been illegal flights over the Rhineland neutral zone.

The naval report noted many of the same types of infractions: delays in the delivery and destruction of designated weapons, in the inspection of production facilities, and in the reduction of personnel to the prescribed limits. The Naval report listed six outright violations but they appeared to be of little consequence. For example, it was discovered that a certain firm was engaged in the manufacture of conning towers for submarines, allegedly for a Dutch concern. Not only did the Germans refuse to let the control Commission examine the drawings, but they refused to order the cessation of the work, which the Committee felt to be a clear violation of Article 191 forbidding Germany to construct or acquire "any submarine, even for commercial purposes." Given the wording of the clause, however, the charge that the construction of conning towers for export was a violation of Article 191 was somewhat tenuous at best. Other violations were that the German Disposal Board had "on many occasions, removed and disposed of War Material without the permission of the N.I.A.C.C. /Naval Inter-Allied Control Commission/" and that the German government had refused to destroy large numbers of couplings for submarine main propelling shafts at Dessau. More serious was the charge that naval material was being "secretly distributed and concealed throughout Germany, palpably with the consent and active participation of the Naval Representatives of the German Government."

By the spring of 1921 many of these infractions had still not been resolved. And with the defaults over reparations increasing the Allies issued an ultimatum on May 5--referred to in the diplomatic correspondence as the London Ultimatum--threatening the occupation of the Ruhr if their demands were not immediately accepted.¹¹ The Germans agreed and by the fall of 1921 most of the treaty terms--but not all of them--had been carried out. In their report to the Supreme Council on August 13, 1921, the Versailles

Committee noted that the army had been reduced to 100,000 men, that the destruction of designated arms had been completed, and that the stocks of ammunition and armament had been reduced to treaty levels. Information on the manufacture of explosives and chemicals had been disclosed and conscription had been abolished. Military schools had been closed or transformed and the destruction of fortified works in the Rhineland neutral zone had been completed.¹²

Still to be completed were the disbanding of the Selbstschutz and the Orgesch. These organizations permitted Germany, according to the report, to retain "a really strong reserve...which are composed of a large number of volunteers." The effectives of the police had not been reduced to the stipulated number and the police organizations had too much "of a military-mobile character." The transformation of factories to commercial uses had been delayed "under various pretexts," and thus the possibility of continued production of war material remained a "danger". The inventorying of war material surrendered by Germany and resting in hundreds of depots throughout the country was not finished nor had the Control Commission yet obtained all the lists showing armaments at the time of the Armistice. Finally, the delivery and destruction of certain materials, like "wagons, bridging materials, field bakeries, etc.", remained "obviously incomplete."

The naval clauses were in a satisfactory stage of completion. Thus, it was reported that the demilitarization of Heligoland was "very well advanced" and would be completed before the end of the year. The German fleet had been reduced to its prescribed limits and naval personnel had been brought down to the treaty figure of 15,000. Minesweeping was finished in the North Sea and was nearly completed in the Baltic. The destruction of surface ships under construction had been carried out "satisfactorily" as had the work of transforming warships into commercial vessels. The destruction of war material was, with few exceptions, being carried out "at a normal rate." The only important problem remaining for the Naval Control Commission was that of completing the verification of authorized stocks of munitions.

The functions of the Aeronautical Control Commission had likewise been nearly completed by the fall of 1921. According to its report, "No questions of principle are at present outstanding with the German Government, and the work of delivery and destruction is proceeding normally under the

supervision of the Control officers." It was assumed that most of its tasks would be completed within a month, with the exception of aeronautical armament, the final disposal of which would probably take a little longer.

In February 1922 the German government was informed that these final provisions had been satisfactorily fulfilled and that the Aeronautical Control Commission was to be dissolved. But as Germany was permanently forbidden to create a military or naval air force, the Allies decided--and the German ultimately agreed--to continue supervision under a new agency, the Committee of Guarantee. This Committee was to have a much smaller staff than the Aeronautical Commission and much less autonomous authority. Indeed, it had to obtain official German authorization for most of its control and inspection activities. The Committee of Guarantee went into operation on May 5, 1922 and remained in operation until August 9, 1926.

Although most of the remaining provisions had been met by the summer of 1922 the Allies were reluctant to abandon their control entirely. Therefore, they decided to replace the Military and Naval Commissions with Commissions of Guarantee, as had been done for the aerial provisions. But for the Allies to concede even this, Germany would have to carry out those terms which had not yet been satisfactorily executed. In a joint Note delivered on September 29, 1922--a Note which was to figure in the negotiations over the next three years--the Allied identified five continuing infractions: first, the police had not yet been brought into conformity with Article 162 of the treaty; second, certain factories had not been converted to peace-time production; third, the surrender of excess war material had not been fully carried out; fourth, statistics on the war material possessed by Germany at the time of the armistice had not been delivered; and fifth, legislation prohibiting the export and import of war material and forbidding compulsory military service had still not been satisfactorily implemented.¹³

While the Allies considered their Note of September 29 something of a concession, the Germans were not overly receptive to the offer. If the conditions of the treaty had been fulfilled for the most part, the Germans argued, then any continuing supervision should be carried out by the League under Article 213. Committees of Guarantee for the naval and military terms were not only unnecessary they were an unwarranted infringement of German sovereignty.¹⁴

While negotiations continued over the withdrawal of the Control Commissions, the French and Belgians occupied the Ruhr in January 1923 as a sanction for the nonfulfillment of reparations deliveries. And with this, the first period came to a close. The German responded with their policy of passive resistance and non-cooperation, a policy which suspended completely the operation of Allied military control for nearly two years.

The data in these military reports and diplomatic notes for 1920-1922 suggest that most of the charges of treaty violations were based on failure to meet target dates rather than the outright circumvention of the treaty. Charges of direct violation, of course, were made. And some of these charges were clear violations of the treaty, e.g., the continued manufacture of weapons at the Krupp works in Essen and the entry of unauthorized military forces in the neutral zone to quell the Ruhr insurrection. Other charges of treaty violation, however, were less clear-cut and involved a somewhat strained interpretation of the terms, e.g., the charge that the construction of conning towers was a violation of Article 191. Even the charge that the activities--and existence--of the paramilitary organizations constituted a treaty violation was so perhaps more in spirit than in law--at least for some of the organizations. So unclear, in fact, was the legal basis for the charge of treaty violation that the Allies had to pass supplementary regulations at the Conference of Boulogne in June 1920 and reach a new agreement with the Germans at the Conference of Spa, held in July 1920. Thus most of the charges of violation involving these organizations that were made--especially after June and July 1920--were charges that the Germans were violating not the treaty so much as the Boulogne and Spa protocols.

Other charges of violation were even less clear-cut. Some of these were based on rumor and speculation, which though possible and even probable, remained unsubstantiated. This was the basis, for example, of the charge that naval war material was being secretly distributed and concealed throughout Germany and that this was being done "palpably with the consent and active participation of the Naval Representatives of the German Government." However substantial and substantiated these charges of direct circumvention, the main concern of the Allies throughout this period was over the delay in treaty fulfillment. And though they agreed that these delays were violations of the

terms, they disagreed over the significance of these infractions.

Assessment: Debate Over Treaty Violations. There was no disputing the fact that infractions in the treaty had taken place. The crucial question for the Allies was whether these infractions were the result of Germany's unwillingness or inability to carry them out. And it was over this question the Allies split.

The first assessment of German disarmament by the Allied heads of government took place at the Conference of San Remo on April 18-26, 1920.¹⁵ The Allies took up the German problem at the insistence of Lloyd George, who wished to find some way of restraining French action in Germany. Just prior to the conference an insurrection had taken place in the Ruhr, to which the Germans responded by sending in a military force -in violation of Article 43 of the Versailles Treaty. The French countered, on April 6, by occupying Frankfort, Darmstadt, Hanau, Homburg and Dieburg. Although supported by the Belgians, the British and Italians disassociated themselves from the action, compounding the split among the Allies that was developing over reparations policy.

To resolve the difficulty, Lloyd George proposed at San Remo that the Allies meet with the German leaders "to find out what could be done."¹⁶ But for the French, it was not a question of what could be done, but rather one of what should be done. Once the Allies began to make policy on the basis of what was possible, Premier Etienne Millerand complained, then the entire treaty would be opened up for revision. This analysis reflected the profound differences between the British and Italians approach to the treaty and that of the French and Belgians. While agreeing that the Germans were not fulfilling the disarmament and reparation terms, they differed fundamentally in their assessment of both the significance and the causes of the infractions.

Italy's Francisco Nitti summed up the problem succinctly: "We could either charge the German Government with bad faith, or we could recognize that it was confronted with very real difficulties." While he was willing to concede that there was bad faith in certain quarters in Germany, he was inclined to believe that "infractions in the treaty were due more to the inability of the Government to carry out the terms rather than their unwillingness." Lloyd George

agreed. He declared that he "did not doubt the good faith of the present German Government...He believed, on the whole, that the German Government sincerely desired to fulfill the treaty."¹⁷

Millerand accepted the distinction that Nitti made but came to the opposite conclusion. He noted at one point in the discussion that "there was a fundamental difference between Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Nitti on the one hand, and himself on the other, a difference which every point in the discussion tended to emphasize, and that difference was that fundamentally Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Nitti believed in the good faith of Germany, and he did not." Therefore, he could see no advantage to direct negotiations with the Germans. He maintained that both before and after the war the Germans "had constantly told lies and cheated and haggled without ever carrying out their promises. One conversation more would lead to nothing."¹⁸ Though it was ultimately agreed that the Allies would meet with the Germans, after the French had achieved approval of various preconditions, the discussion revealed fundamental disagreement over German intentions.

Were the Germans acting in bad faith or not? Implicit in the answer were three important implications. If the answer was that the Germans were acting in good faith, i.e., that they were attempting to carry out the terms but were unable because of conditions, then it would follow that 1) the infractions need not be considered as significant, but only temporary delays; 2) the Allies could grant extensions or the time limits to permit the Germans to gain control of the situation; and 3) severe sanctions need not be applied, for the Germans were doing the best they could. If, however, it was assumed that the Germans were acting in bad faith, then it would follow that 1) the infractions were significant for they revealed that the Germans were attempting to preserve their military power at all costs; 2) the Allies need not grant extensions on the execution but demand their immediate fulfillment for they were in a position to carry them out if they wanted; and 3) if the Germans refused to comply then severe sanctions would have to be imposed. Both positions were logically consistent and both stemmed from basic assessments of German motivation.

German disarmament was next taken up at the Conference of Boulogne on June 21-22, 1920.¹⁹ The Supreme Council was faced with two important questions concerning the

effectuation of the military terms. The first related to the German request, made on April 20, for a permanent army of 200,000; and the second involved those aspects not adequately covered in the original treaty, especially the paramilitary and police organization. While agreement was easily reached on these points, the Allies continued to disagree in their assessment of the delays in treaty implementation. Agreement was reached on six points:

- 1) that the military force of Germany would "be maintained at the figure of 100,000 men, as fixed by the treaty";
- 2) that "the Sicherheitspolizei must be completely disbanded within a period of three months";
- 3) that the strength of the German police forces could be "raised to 150,000 men, i.e., an increase of 70,000 on the figure of 1913";
- 4) that the German government had to pass "without delay" the legislation required by Article 211;
- 5) that the government was required to pass "the necessary laws to forbid the export of war material to foreign countries";
- 6) that the government was "to disband effectively the formations of the Einwohnerwehren", although no time limit was given.²⁰

While little discussion took place on any of these points, dissension arose over that portion of the protocol which sought to assign blame for the continued delay in German disarmament. This statement--originally drafted by Foch's Versailles Committee--stated *inter alia* that: "The Allied Governments have noted with the greatest regret the slowness and the bad faith shown by the German Government in the execution of the military, naval and air clauses of the Peace Treaty." Lloyd George sought to pin Foch down: were the Germans really showing bad faith in not carrying out the terms or were they simply finding it impossible to do so because of the conditions that prevailed? Foch replied bluntly that in his opinion, "the Germans were deliberately evading the terms."²¹

But Foch's opinion, though perhaps shared by the other military advisors on the Versailles Committee, was not

wholly supported by the Allied military staff in the field, i.e. by the heads of the Commissions. In the latter's report for the Conference, three different views were put forward by the Presidents of the three Subcommissions, ranging from assumption that the Germans were engaging in calculated evasion to the view that the Germans were sincerely attempting to implement the terms. General Bingham, President of the Armaments Subcommission, was the most optimistic. He stated that "I cannot put my finger on any definite violation of the Treaty, as regards the disarmament clauses, with the exception of the small incidents alluded to under Article 168, viz., the manufacture of 77mm. guns at Essen." Generally speaking the disarmament clauses were "being carried out." It was his opinion, however, that "a state of internal chaos is preventing the disarmament from being carried out as fully and as quickly as it would be if law and order prevailed in the country." As for whether the Germans were showing bad faith or not, his view was that both the German government and the German people were "anxious to carry out the disarmament clauses quickly." But this was not the view of some of the military, who "undoubtedly snatch at any interpretation of a clause which appears to favour their point of view, and which will allow them to increase the armament over and above that authorized."

The summary conclusion of the Fortifications Subcommission implied, however, precisely the opposite. "The general attitude of the German authorities," the report stated, "seems to be well calculated to delay the execution of the Articles concerned. It appears one of passive obstruction, yielding gradually under pressure and consuming time." The President of the Effectives Subcommission, while not as optimistic as General Bingham, did reject the notion of calculated obstruction. He reported that "the German Government has made an effort to carry out the reduction of its armed forces."²² With the military experts in disagreement, Lloyd George refused to accept Foch's assessment of the problem. He proposed that for the words "bad faith" the words "lack of goodwill" should be substituted. This was accepted without challenge and the protocol was passed with only a few additional changes.

To find out why the treaty was not being satisfactorily carried out, the Germans were invited to attend a conference, held from July 5-16, 1920 in the small Belgian

resort town of Spa.²³ Meeting nearly six months after the signing of the peace treaty, the Allies had to decide whether to authorize additional extensions for implementation and if so under what conditions. And to make that decision, they had to assess once again whether the causes of the delay lay in German unwillingness or inability.

The German delegation, headed by Chancellor Fehrenback and Foreign Minister Simons, made an eloquent plea for patience. Fehrenback maintained that the German government and people were animated by "a firm desire to loyally execute the treaty," but that they had met "with almost insurmountable difficulties in the execution of their task."²⁴ This theme, repeated throughout the conference, produced only impatience among the Allies. What they had come to hear was not excuses for nonfulfillment, but specifically how and when Germany would meet its obligations. While the Allies pressed for dates, times and quotas, the Germans held that since it was impossible to predict future contingencies, it was impossible to predict how successful they would be in executing the terms at any given moment.

When finally pressed into offering a specific plan for implementing the terms, General von Seeckt, the chief of the German Army Command, proposed that the reduction of the army be carried out gradually over the next fifteen months, beginning with a reduction to 190,000 by October 10, 1920 and continuing by small quarterly decreases until October 10, 1921 when there would be only 100,000 effectives. Foch's Versailles Committee did not take the German hardship claims very seriously. Instead, it urged that the German army be reduced to 150,000 in about two weeks (by August 1, 1920) and to 100,000 within another month (by September 1, 1920). The Germans, according to this plan, were also to be given until September 1 to complete the disarmament of the country. If any of these deadlines were not met, the Allies reserved the right to occupy the Ruhr or some other agreed upon area.²⁵

When Foch's recommendations were taken up, Lloyd George stated that he "could not agree with the report presented by Marshal Foch and the military experts." It would be a great mistake, he declared, to ask Germany to accomplish what was impossible. In such an event, public opinion would not support the Allied government if "strong steps" had to be taken. He was "convinced" that it was not possible for the German army to be reduced by August 1 to an effective strength of 150,000 or by September 1 to a strength

of 100,000 men, and at the same time to obtain the surrender of some 200,000 rifles from among the population, as well as 1,000,000 rifles from the Sicherheitspolizei and Einwohnerwehr.²⁶

As a counter-measure, Lloyd George proposed--and the other delegates ultimately agreed--that if Germany met or showed progress in meeting certain preliminary conditions then longer time extensions might be offered. The five conditions that he proposed were: 1) that the Sicherheitspolizei and Einwohnerwehr be immediately disarmed (in the Boulogne protocol these organizations were to be disbanded, the former within three months and the latter at some unspecified time; in the meantime they presumably could retain their arms); 2) that the German government issue a proclamation demanding the immediate surrender of all arms in the hands of the civilian population, with effective penalties for non-compliance; 3) that the government pass legislation abolishing ~~compulsory military service~~ and short term enlistment periods; 4) that arms in excess of limits be surrendered and destroyed; and 5) that the naval and aerial clauses which were still unfulfilled be enforced. On condition that these were carried out, the Allies would agree, according to the Lloyd George proposal, to 1) extend the time for reduction of the army to the following: by October 1, there would be 150,000 men in the army and by January 1, 1921 there were to be 100,000; 2) allow Germany to retain additional troops in the neutral zone and 3) to take every necessary step to prevent the smuggling of arms from the Allied occupied zones into other parts of Germany.²⁷

By the January 1, 1921 deadline, however, many of the treaty provisions had still not been fully executed. Therefore, on January 24-29, 1921, the Allies met in Paris to decide on future military policy. While differences in the assessment of German disarmament continued to divide the Allies, the main problem at Paris was to decide on what enforcement action--if any--should be applied.

Enforcement: the Debate Over Sanctions. Differences among the Allies over enforcement action began with France's April 1920 decision to occupy several German cities as reprisal for the German entry into the neutral zone--in violation of Article 43--to put down an insurrection. At the San Remo Conference, Lloyd George objected both to the

method of the decision, whereby one of the Allies acted unilaterally, and to the content of the decision, whereby further German territory was occupied. He did not think, he told Millerand prior to the conference, "that the occupation of the Ruhr would be of much use." Indeed, as a means to promote the execution of the treaty, "he thought the occupation of the Ruhr was the worst way to deal with this question." Instead, what the Allies should do was to meet with the Germans directly and obtain from them definite commitments. While Millerand accepted the possibility of less direct enforcement action than the occupation of the Ruhr, in practice he could see no better alternative. Certainly diplomatic pressure through direct negotiations with the Germans "would come to nothing." The occupation of the Ruhr would at any rate, Millerand stated, have the result of producing coal and was the most direct way of securing the execution of this part of the treaty.²⁸

Although Lloyd George ultimately agreed to the possibility of a future Ruhr occupation in event of German noncompliance, the Italians objected even to this concession. Nitti reported that he could agree to nearly everything proposed by his French and English colleagues, "but there were certain things which he could not accept. One of these was the threat of collective military occupation of further German territory." If used as a reprisal for failure to fulfill economic clauses, annexation would be "an extension of the treaty" and he "would not be able to take any part in such action."²⁹ Though agreement was finally reached, the San Remo Conference revealed a fundamental split in the ranks of the Allies over the appropriate method or methods to obtain German compliance. While the Belgians supported the French in the demand for direct and tangible enforcement action, both the English and the Italians pressed instead for the application of diplomatic pressure.

The issue of enforcement was next taken up at the Paris Conference which met from January 24 to 29, 1921.³⁰ The meeting turned out to be a trying experience for the Allies as the British and French reached the brink of an open conflict over disarmament. Profound differences arose not only over the extent and significance of the treaty terms yet to be fulfilled, but also--perhaps more important--over what should (and could) be done to obtain future German compliance. In general, the British tended to

emphasize that German disarmament had been fundamentally successful, assuming at the same time that the unfulfilled clauses were relatively insignificant. The French, on the other hand, emphasized the continuing failure of German disarmament, concluding that the unfulfilled terms posed a serious danger to the security of their country. Thus, while the British were impressed with what had already been achieved, the French were just as impressed--and more concerned--with what had not been achieved.

Although Lloyd George failed to get French or even Italian approval for another meeting with the Germans at the Paris Conference, he did win support for granting the Germans extensions on the time limits for those treaty provisions as yet unfulfilled. Perhaps more important, he prevented inclusion in the Note to be delivered to the Germans any direct reference to a threat of a Ruhr occupation in event these new dates were not met. It was ultimately decided that the threat of a Ruhr occupation would be leaked to the press instead of officially presented. In this way, the delegates reasoned, the Germans would learn of Allied intentions, but not officially or directly. For the British it did not smack of "sabre-rattling"; for the French it provided the basis for future action.

While Lloyd George succeeded in January 1921 in muting the threat of a Ruhr invasion, on March 2, 1921 he agreed to support Foch's plan for the occupation of Duisburg, Ruhart and Dusseldorf for default of reparation payments (the occupation was carried out on March 8) and in May 1921 he gave his approval to the London Ultimatum which explicitly threatened the occupation of the Ruhr if Allied demands were not met.³¹ By giving way gradually and reluctantly to French demands, by mid-1921 the British had officially accepted the occupation of the Ruhr as a possible sanction for noncompliance with the treaty terms.

Secret rearmament: 1920-1922. While the Allies were mainly concerned with the delays in the execution of the treaty provisions during this first period, there were on occasion charges of clandestine evasion. Confirmed in part at the time, the final verdict has had to await postwar examination of captured German documents. Though the evidence is not yet complete, the verdict is unanimous: the German army persistently sought to secretly circumvent the arms control restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. If there has been agreement on the charge and even some

agreement on the evidence, important differences have arisen over the significance of the illegal actions.

Postwar research on the German army agree that the army became during the 1920's a veritable "state within a state," immune to political interference and insulated from external control. Under the leadership of General Hans von Seeckt, who served as Chef der Heeresleitung (Chief of the Army Command) from 1920 to 1926, the Reichswehr, though formally restricted in size to 100,000 men, was forged into a tightly-knit, highly disciplined cadre force, designed not only to resist foreign attack but to provide the basis for later expansion. While controversy abounds over Seeckt's personal ambition, there is widespread agreement that he displayed great ingenuity, if not brilliance, in circumscribing the disarmament clauses of the treaty. John Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power writes that "Hans von Seeckt's clandestine brilliance circumvented the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles" with "staggering success."³²

Implacably opposed to the Versailles Treaty, the army was equally distrustful of the civil authorities in Germany. Therefore, most of the army's attempts at circumventing the treaty were kept secret--with varying degrees of success--not only from the Control Commissions but from the German government. In a memo written in September 1922, during the negotiations between the German army and the Soviet Union, Seeckt wrote: "In all these activities...the participation and even the official knowledge of the German government must be entirely excluded. The details of the negotiations must remain in the hands of the military authorities." A recent study warns, however, that it would be wrong to assume from this emphasis on secrecy that the violations "were carried on exclusively by the army and behind the back or against the protest of Germany's civilian authorities." The leading members of each cabinet during the 1920's "had at least a general knowledge of, and in some cases even lent active support to, the Reichswehr's clandestine operations."³³

Evidence of clandestine operations not uncovered at the time by the Control Commissions has been noted in four fields: German-Russian military collaboration, army support to illegal formations, illegal economic preparations and preservation of the General Staff.

German-Soviet military collaboration has been the subject of much research in recent years, the recapitulation of which is beyond the scope of the present study.³⁴ Suffice it to note that contacts were made between Soviet representatives and the German army during 1921 (and perhaps as early as 1920). After lengthy negotiations a preliminary contract was signed on March 15, 1922 between the Army (through its Sondergruppe R) and Junkers, according to which Junkers was to begin construction of aircraft in the Soviet Union.³⁵ Negotiations were also carried on for the construction of an air base and flight training, the production of shells and grenades, experiments in and manufacture of poison gas. Later negotiations dealt with the production of tanks. During the period 1920-1922, however, collaboration was confined mainly to administration and organizational arrangements, which remained unknown to the Allies. It was only in 1926 that these activities were revealed publicly.

That illegal paramilitary organizations existed during 1920-1922 was well known to the Allied Control Commissions. What was less known at the time was the support given to these organizations by the army. German military leaders were placed in an ambivalent position with regard to these illegal groups. Unable to provide the forces or the legal rationale to carry on a "defense of the frontiers" along the undefined border with Poland, the Army relied heavily upon the support of these irregular associations and yet was apprehensive over their influence and activities. General Seeckt wanted to dissolve most of these groups as they threatened the army's monopoly. But in 1921 heavy fighting broke out in Upper Silesia between Polish insurgents and German free corps units, and though the army was not permitted to participate directly in the fighting, for fear of provoking the Allies, Seeckt nevertheless ordered officers in mufti to be available and weapons and ammunitions to be supplied.³⁶

While evidence of army support of illegal formations exists in the Silesian crisis of 1921, it has not yet been established whether this was a general pattern or an isolated episode. Given the attitude of Seeckt and other military leaders, however, it would appear that the army did not provide much secret assistance to these forces during 1920-1922, except during emergencies. The evidence on this, however, necessitates sustained judgment.³⁷

Data on the army's support of illegal weapons production and research is slight for the period 1920-1922. However, there was apparently some activity in this area. Gordon Craig quotes a Krupp memorandum discovered after World War II which indicates that a formal agreement had been reached on January 22, 1922 between the Reichswehrministerium and Krupp "jointly to circumvent...the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles." Unfortunately no documentary evidence is given for the agreement. Carsten notes that sometime in 1922 the Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw (I.V.S.) was formed in the Hague and subsidized by the German navy. Its primary purpose was to maintain technical standards and to stay abreast of the newest developments in the field of submarine construction. Wheeler-Bennett and Telford Taylor have discovered a great deal of this type of operation for the later periods, whereby German continued weapons production and research abroad; and presumably some of these activities were launched during the period 1920-1922.³⁸ Yet a question remains whether this was a violation of the Versailles Treaty. It would appear that the production of forbidden weapons abroad by private firms--even if subsidized by the military--was a "legal" way to circumvent the restrictions.

The efforts of von Seeckt to preserve the German General Staff in spite of treaty provisions was little appreciated by the Allies during 1920-1922. This was in part due to the fact that the functions of the old General Staff were spread over various sections of the army command and the Reichswehr Ministry and thus defied immediate detection.³⁹ In part it was also due to the general disorganization of the army command during the initial postwar years: centralization of functions developed only in time. In 1923-24, however, the Control Commissions uncovered the operation of the revived General Staff and the issue served as a continuing source of friction until 1927.

Arms Control: 1923-1927

The year 1923 marked a decisive turning point in the Allies' military control of Germany. In January of that year the French and Belgians occupied the Ruhr as a reprisal for Germany's failure to meet its reparations payments, and the Germans countered with a policy of passive resistance which included, among other things, a refusal to take part in any inspection or control function which included French

or Belgian officers. As a result the Control Commissions remained inactive throughout the year. When official contact was resumed between the Allies and Germany following Stresemann's abandonment of passive resistance in late 1923, negotiations over arms control proceeded in almost precise annual sequences. During 1924 negotiations focused on the Allied demand for a resumption of control and for a "general inspection." Although the Germans resisted the continuation of supervision under the Commissions, arguing that control should be vested in the League under Article 213, agreement was ultimately reached for a general inspection, which took place between September 8 and January 25.

With the results of the general inspection confirming that Germany had not yet fulfilled all its treaty obligations, the Allies decided that the evacuation of the northern zone of the Rhineland, scheduled in the peace treaty to take place on January 10, 1925, would not be allowed. Throughout 1925, arms control negotiations centered on establishing the terms and conditions for the withdrawal of the Allies from the Cologne zone. With agreement ultimately reached, the northern zone was evacuated in late 1925 and early 1926. On January 31, 1926 the last of the Allied forces departed. Negotiations for the ending of Allied military control became the subject of major pre-occupation between Germany and the Allies during 1926. Although the era of good feeling, following the signing of the Locarno pact in December 1925, promoted a general mood of accommodation, the negotiations over the dissolution of the Control Commission proved unexpectedly difficult. The Germans had still not executed many of the terms of the treaty, according to the Allies; though the Germans were ready to acknowledge this, they argued that the defaults were not serious enough to warrant continued foreign supervision. With the British impatient to end military control, it was finally agreed to accept the German thesis and withdrawal was announced in spite of continued noncompliance. On January 31, 1927, exactly a year from the evacuation of the northern zone of the Rhineland, the last of the Control Commissions was dissolved and supervision was entrusted to the League.

The sequence of these 1923-1927 negotiations over arms control has been examined with scholarly care elsewhere and need not be recapitulated in detail here.⁴⁰ But several points relevant to this analysis stand out and

warrant further examination. First, while the Allies were mainly concerned over the delay in the implementation of the military terms during the first period, following the occupation of the Ruhr they began to see the defaults more as calculated obstructions and wilfull evasions. Second, though the Allies did not differ greatly over the nature and extent of the German defaults, they continued to disagree over appropriate counter-measures. This was particularly true during the Ruhr occupation, which Britain disassociated itself from completely. But it was also true--to a lesser extent--during the negotiations over the evacuation of the northern zone of the Rhineland. In general, the British felt that the evacuation need not be dependent on the complete fulfillment of every treaty provision; the French were more inclined to demand absolute and total satisfaction as a condition for Allied withdrawal. Third, while clandestine efforts at rearmament were stepped up during this period, most of these activites were discovered by the Commissions. Evidence from recent investigations of German documents has indicated that, while many of the operations remained unknown to the Control Commission in their detailed activities, no important or significant evasion of the terms passed undetected.

1924: Negotiations for a "General Inspection." As a result of the Ruhr occupation, Allied military control ceased for almost two years. During 1923 only three visits took place and these were conducted without French or Belgian officers present. When the British agreed not to conduct any further activities without their French and Belgian colleagues, supervision stopped altogether for the rest of the year.⁴¹

Under pressure by the Allies to authorize a resumption of military control, the German government ultimately agreed on January 9, 1924 to permit visits to take place on January 10 and January 12, 1924.⁴² But they authorized this on the assumption that these were to terminate the activities of the Commissions. And while the visits took place on the two designated days, accompanied by "some violence", the Allies refused to accept the position that these were to be the final visits of the Allied Commissions.⁴³ With the German government refusing to sanction any further inspection and the Allies insisting on their right to continue the operation of the Control Commissions, a stalemate ensued.

Throughout the first nine months of 1924 notes were exchanged between the Conference of Ambassadors and the German government. While the Germans were initially willing to agree that investigations of the five points in the Allied Note of September 29, 1922 would be acceptable, they refused to agree to any additional inspection. In addition, they demanded that this final inspection be carried out by a new organization with limited authority and composed of "non-controversial" members. The government did not deny that there might be continuing defaults, but it argued that Germany was for all intents disarmed and any continuing problems could be handled by the League. The Allies had never insisted nor had Germany ever agreed, it was argued, that the dissolution of the Control Commissions depended on the absolute fulfillment of each and every treaty provision.⁴⁴

While the Allies argued that the five items listed in the Note of September 29 did not comprise all of the breaches of the treaty, they did agree to limit future investigations to these five categories. But they rejected the notion that the next inspection would be the last--the right of the Allied governments to continue military control remained "entire and absolutely intact"--and they refused to constitute a new supervisory body.⁴⁵

With no agreement in sight by the spring of 1924, the Conference of Ambassadors issued an ultimatum on May 28 stating that unless the German government accepted the Allied demands within thirty days, the Allies would "demand the strict application of the treaty." But before the Allies could carry through on their threat, Poincaré was defeated in the May elections and was replaced by Herriot on June 14. One of the first acts of the new French Premier was to go to England to consult with Prime Minister MacDonald over German policy. On June 24, they released a rather conciliatory statement and promised that as soon as the five conditions of the September 29 Note had been met, the Control Commissions would be withdrawn and matters turned over to the League.⁴⁶

With a change in French leadership and agreement over the Dawes plan imminent, the Germans accepted the Allied demands--with qualifications--on the final day, June 30. They agreed to a general inspection but with the expectation that at its conclusion the Commissions would be withdrawn and all supervisory authority turned over to the League. This expectation, however, the Allies refused to encourage; withdrawal they insisted would be dependent on the

results of the general inspection.⁴⁷

On the basis of this explicit agreement-implicit disagreement, the long delayed general inspection was arranged. As it turned out, it was to be the last important function of the Control Commissions. The Naval Commission was dissolved on September 30, less than two weeks after the inspection began. Though the Military Control Commission would remain legally in existence for another two years, in practice its powers became more clerical than supervisory and its presence more psychological than operational.

The general inspection began on September 8, 1924 and over the next six weeks the Control Commission made almost 800 visits. Few serious "incidents" took place, but there was passive opposition, especially in the Reichswehr Ministry and among the patriotic associations. As the inspection progressed, the verdict became clear: most of the infractions listed in the September 29, 1922 Note had not been rectified and many new violations were discovered.⁴⁸

1925: Negotiations over the Rhineland. During 1924 it was widely assumed in Germany that with the approval of the Dawes plan and agreement on a general inspection, the Allies would evacuate the northern zone of the Rhineland on schedule.⁴⁹ According to Articles 428-432 of the peace treaty, the Rhineland was to be evacuated over five year intervals with the northern zone scheduled for January 10, 1925. But as the inspection dragged on it became clear that not only would the final report not be ready by January 10, 1925 but that sufficient defaults had been uncovered to justify, if desired, a prolongation of the occupation. And this was precisely what the French desired.

On January 5, 1925 the Allies released a preliminary report which listed six continuing infractions. After almost five years these could no longer be considered merely delays in the implementation of the treaty. The inspection had found that: 1) the General Staff had been reconstituted under another name; 2) the recruiting and training of short-term recruits was being carried out; 3) numerous factories had not yet been transformed; 4) surplus war material had not yet been completely surrendered; 5) the police had not been reorganized to deprive them of their military character; 6) the administrative and legislative

measures demanded in the September 22, 1922 Note had still not been carried out.⁵⁰ The first two infractions had not appeared in the September 29 Note while the complaint that Germany had not delivered the statistics on war material existing at the time of the armistice was not repeated in the 1924 Note. The other four infractions had appeared in the 1922 Note.

The German government responded the next day with a tone of injured innocence, and with a certain justification. The January 5 Report had not listed any specific violations--these were promised for later--and confined itself to broad categories of continuing defaults. But this attempt to prolong military control on the basis of unsubstantiated charges, the Germans argued, was quite unjust. How could they satisfy or even respond to complaints if they were not specified? It was a fair argument, but the Allied response of January 25 merely promised to hand Germany a list of the defaults at the earliest date; in the meantime the occupation of the Rhineland would have to continue until Germany had satisfactorily met these unspecified infractions.⁵¹

The delay in presenting Germany with a detailed list of defaults reflected not only the difficulty in compiling the data, but the growing differences that were emerging among the Allies over the appropriate response to be made to the evidence. This was particularly acute over the question of the Rhineland evacuation. For the British, the evacuation could be undertaken when sufficient progress had been made on satisfying those remaining defaults over disarmament. The French, on the other hand, argued that their security was dependent on the retention of control over the Rhine area and that evacuation could not take place until Germany had fulfilled the treaty terms, as one commentator put it, "in their widest metaphysical sense."⁵² This meant that Germany not only had to satisfy the letter of the treaty but its spirit as well and demonstrate that it was both unable and unwilling to attack France.

Throughout March and the first part of April, 1925 the Foch Committee at Versailles worked on the evidence presented by the Control Commissions and endeavored, at the request of the Conference of Ambassadors, to determine the gravity of the defaults and indicate what measures Germany still had to carry out in order to qualify for the evacuation of the northern zone. Though the Foch report was

presented to the Conference of Ambassadors on April 10, the diplomatic representatives could not agree on a reply for another month and a half. The final Allied Report was not submitted to the Germans until June 5, 1925.⁵³

While the Report reflected French concern, it also accepted the British position. It stated that the Control Commissions had established "numerous defaults" which in their aggregate would permit Germany "to reconstitute an army modelled on the principle of a nation in arms." And so long as these "important defaults" remained unrectified, it would be impossible for the Allies to consider Germany's military obligations as fulfilled. But having resisted the indictment it then proceeded to an offer of clemency: as soon as these defaults had been rectified, the Allies would evacuate the first zone in the Rhineland. In addition, if these conditions were met there would be nothing to prevent the withdrawal of the Commission.

The Report listed thirteen violations which included several dozen specific charges. These violations dealt with the police, factory transformation, surrender of war material, army command, short-term enlistment, the import and export of war material, legislation regarding the possession and manufacture of illegal war material, forbidden zones, legislation on war requisitions, fortifications at Konigsberg coast fortifications, documents on weapons stocks, and documents on production.⁵⁴

The deliberations over the Locarno Pact, which were reaching fruition at this time, intervened to change the whole atmosphere of the arms control negotiations.⁵⁵ The French decided to evacuate the Ruhr, which had been held since January 1923, in early July 1925 and all French troops were withdrawn without incident by the end of August. The German government appointed General von Pawelsz to form a special commission to collaborate with the Control Commission in July. On October 20, Krupps began at long last to demolish its great gunmaking plants. Finally, on October 23, 1925 the Germans delivered their long awaited reply to the Allied charges.

The Note summarized the execution of the treaty terms in four lists: 1) demands which had been fulfilled; 2) demands which would be fulfilled by November 15; 3) demands, the execution of which could be assured by November 15; and 4) demands involving "special difficulties".⁵⁶ In the negotiations which followed, the Allies accepted the German

claims in the first three lists. Indeed, the Foch Committee reported in November that the Germans had made "genuine efforts" to disarm and that differences remained on only three points: the General Staff; strength of the security police and secret military associations.⁵⁷ Satisfied that progress was being made, the Conference of Ambassadors decided on November 14-16 that the northern zone would be evacuated even if these points had not been completely resolved. And though this proved to be the case, the Allies stood by their decision. On November 30 the first detachment of British troops left Cologne and on January 30, 1926 the last of the Belgian and French troops pulled out. The evacuation of the zone was officially declared completed at midnight, January 31, 1926.⁵⁸

1926: Withdrawal of Military Control. Although there were few differences remaining in early 1926, negotiations for the ending of military control proved unexpectedly contentious and difficult. The Germans made little progress on the defaults still unfulfilled and the Allies found new violations which led to the imposition of additional conditions. Thus, complaints over the General Staff, police and illegal formations were repeated throughout the year. And to these was added the newly discovered evidence that the fortifications along the eastern border at Konigsberg, Glogau, Lotzen and Kustrin were being modernized, which was, it was claimed, a clear violation of Article 180. By October 1926 complaints of short-term enlistments and the export of war material had returned to the list of Allied charges.⁵⁹ Thus, in spite of the German entry into the League in September, 1926 and the famous déjeuner à deux between Briand and Stresemann, little progress was made on resolving the impasse over disarmament.

Upon the urging of the British--who put forward a "minimum program" on November 10, 1926--the bases for an accommodation began to emerge.⁶⁰ But the French introduced new difficulties with their interpretation of Article 213 establishing League control. During the discussion in the League over the implementation of this article, which began in 1924, the French delegates pressed for the establishment of a permanent control arrangement for the Rhineland which would remain in effect after the final evacuation. Though the idea met with opposition, it was never abandoned by the French. With no decision having been reached the French returned to their demand during the final negotiations in late 1926, which provoked vigorous German opposition and protests from the British. With a new stalemate imminent,

Briand gave in and abandoned the French claim.⁶¹ With that, a settlement was in sight.

On December 9, the Conference of Ambassadors indicated that agreement had been reached with the Germans on the police, short-term enlistments and illegal formations. The only questions outstanding were those relating to the fortifications on the eastern border and legislation to regulate the export of war material. With promises by the Germans that these would be quickly settled, the government leaders announced at Geneva on December 11 that the Control Commissions would be withdrawn on January 31, 1927.⁶² Again the Allies stuck to their part of the agreement. Although the question of exports was resolved by the deadline, no agreement was reached on fortifications. But in spite of this, on January 31, 1927 the Military Control Commission was dissolved: Allied military control of Germany had come to an end.

Chapter 6 -- Footnotes

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4 General Sir Francis R. Bingham, "Work with the Allied Commissions of Control in Germany, 1919-1924," Journal of the Royal Service Institution (Nov. 1924), p. 758.

5 Reports of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control for May 10, 1920, June 10, 1920, October 10, 1920 and January 10, 1921 found in the National Archives: U.S., Navy Dept., Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Record Group 38 (1886-1922), docs. #C-9-e, 15101, 15101A, 15101B, 15101C, 15101D.

6 Bingham, "Allied Commissions of Control," p. 750.

7 General Charles N. Nollet, Une experience de désarmement, cinq ans de contrôle militaire en Allemagne (1922), p. 11; D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, XV, 666, 749; Morgan, Assize of Arms, p. 45.

8 Report of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control for January 10, 1921, National Archives, doc. #C-9-e, 15101D.

9 D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, X, 32-42, 86-104, 134-37, 146-52, 154-72.

10 Ibid., pp. 481-94.

11 D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, XV, 48ff; Gehard P. Pink, The Conference of Ambassadors (1942), p. 139.

12 Ibid., pp. 729-32, 754-58.

13 S.I.A., 1920-1923, p. 112.

14 Ibid., pp. 112-13.

15 D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, VIII, 1-252.

16 Ibid., p. 7.

- 17 Ibid., pp. 12, 17.
- 18 Ibid., pp. 8, 17.
- 19 Ibid., pp. 334-79.
- 20 Ibid., pp. 357-58.
- 21 Ibid., pp. 356-58.
- 22 D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, X. 154-72.
- 23 D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, VIII, 422-648.
- 24 Ibid., pp. 423, 438.
- 25 Ibid., pp. 460, 469-70.
- 26 Ibid., p. 471.
- 27 Ibid., p. 472.
- 28 Ibid., pp. 7-9.
- 29 Ibid., p. 200.
- 30 D.B.F.P., Ser. 1, XV, 1-124.
- 31 Ibid., pp. 257, 335-43, 580.
- 32 John Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power (1954)
p. xiii.
- 33 Francis L. Carstens, The Reichswehr and Politics (1964), p. 141; Hans W. Gatzke, Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany (1954), pp. 3-4.
- 34 For the latest sources, see H.L. Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926-1933 (1966).
- 35 Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, p. 138; Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army (1955), 408-15.
- 36 Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, pp. 149-50.
- 37 For an analysis of the Free Corps, see Robert E.L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism (1952).

38 Craig, Politics of Prussian Army, p. 406; Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, p. 242; Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of Power, pp. 142-47; Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika (1952), pp. 42-45.

39 Craig, Politics of Prussian Army, pp. 398-99.

40 S.I.A., 1925, pp. 172-92; S.I.A., 1927, pp. 88-114; and Gatzke, Stresemann and German Rearmament.

41 S.I.A., 1925, p. 174.

42 Text of January 9 note is in the National Archives, U.S. Army Intelligence (Attache Reports), Record Group 165, doc. #2657-B-591/15.

43 S.I.A., 1925, p. 174.

44 Ibid., 173; Gatzke, Stresemann and German Rearmament, pp. 19-23.

45 Gatzke, Stresemann and German Rearmament, p. 21.

46 Ibid., pp. 23-24; S.I.A., 1925, pp. 176-177.

47 S.I.A., 1925, p. 178

48 Ibid., pp. 181-182; U.S. Army Intelligence (Attache Reports), Record Group 165, docs. #2657-B-591/46 & 49.

49 S.I.A., 1925, p. 180.

50 Ibid., p. 182; Gatzke, Stresemann and German Rearmament, pp. 28-29.

51 Ibid., pp. 182-83; Gatzke, Stresemann and German Rearmament, pp. 30-31, 36-37.

52 Ibid., p. 184.

53 Ibid., pp. 186-87; Gatzke, Stresemann and German Rearmament, pp. 32-36; U.S. Army Intelligence (Attache Reports), Record Group 165, docs #2657-B-591/52 & 53.

54 Ibid., pp. 186-87.

55 D.B.F.P., Ser. IA, I, passim.

56 U.S. Army Intelligence (Attache Reports), Record Group 165, doc. #2657-B-591/60 contains German note of Oct. 23, 1925.

57 Ibid.

58 S.I.A., 1925, p. 193.

59 S.I.A., 1927, pp. 92-93.

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61 Gatzke, Stresemann and German Rearmament, pp. 69-70.

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Chapter 7

GERMAN DISARMAMENT, 1927-1936:Compliance and Evasions

With the withdrawal of the Inter-Allied Control Commission on January 31, 1927, Germany entered a period of self-regulation. Although the League, under Article 213, was to legally assume the responsibility for guaranteeing the faithful execution of the treaty terms, it was widely agreed that future compliance would be dependent on internal rather than external control. As Le Temps noted the day after the dissolution of the Commission, the "task of controlling German militarism must now be performed by the forces of German democracy."¹

Two problems had remained unresolved during the final negotiations leading up to the withdrawal of military control: fortifications and the export of war material. The Germans did not volunteer information on their construction of fortifications along the eastern border; but--once discovered--they justified the program as defensive and argued that it fell within the scope of Article 180. According to this article Germany was permitted to maintain its fortifications along the southern and eastern frontiers "in their existing state." This meant, the Germans reasoned, that these fortifications could be maintained in their existing state of effectiveness and defensive capacity. Given new techniques in offensive weapons and the ravages of time, this "relative effectiveness" formula permitted them to modernize the facilities. While the Allies initially refused to accept this argument, demanding the destruction of all new construction, they ultimately agreed to permit some modernization. Disagreement then shifted to another level: the Allies demanded that 88 projects be demolished while the Germans were willing to destroy only 20.²

Differences over exports had centered on the interpretation of the "war material" mentioned as being prohibited under Article 170. The Allies claimed that this should include such material as "boilers for war vessels, optical instruments, fire arms; material prepared and articles partly fabricated intended for use in making war material." The Germans, of course, rejected such a broad interpretation of the provision.³

On February 1, the day following the dissolution of the Military Control Commission, agreement was reached on the question of fortifications; the Allies accepted a compromise whereby 28 projects were to be destroyed.⁴ But while this appeared to resolve the issue it merely succeeded in introducing a new problem--that of verification. How were the Allies to be assured that the destruction of the fortifications agreed upon had actually taken place? To meet this problem, the Allies proposed that inspection teams be permitted; but the Germans opposed, seeing in this a reintroduction of Allied supervisory machinery. Ultimately an agreement was reached where the Germans accepted visits by individual technical experts of the Allied powers. These visits were carried out during early 1927 and by mid-year they had confirmed that the dismantling and destruction of the 28 projects agreed upon had been carried out satisfactorily.

In March 1927 a bill forbidding "illegal" exports was introduced in the German legislature and on May 26, 1927 it was passed. According to the American military attache in Berlin, by this act "Germany thus fulfills all the allies' demands arising out of the Treaty of Versailles and conforms with the Geneva understanding on which the withdrawal of Allied military control in Germany was based."⁵

Treaty Compliance: 1927-1932

With the dissolution of the Control Commission the assessment of Germany's compliance with disarmament fell to those traditional agencies of information gathering--military attaches and intelligence operations. Of interest to our analysis of arms control is the question of comparative reliability: were these traditional agencies as effective in uncovering German violations as externally imposed control commissions? In attempting to analyze this question, Germany provides a unique case; not only was there experience with both types of verification procedures, but there is documentary evidence to appraise the

effectiveness of each. The elimination of military control raises a second question bearing upon arms control: did the Germans "take advantage" of the dissolution of the Control Commission to step up their illegal rearmament activities: The German case is again instructive, for it has been the one country which has been subjected to both types of arms control--external supervision and self-regulation. A third question for analysis at this point is: how significant were the evasions and violations carried out by Germany up to the advent of Hitler in 1933? Did these illegal activities appreciably increase Germany's military strength?

Current research based on German documents, admittedly still incomplete at this stage, offers several tentative observations:

- 1) The traditional agencies of intelligence appear as effective and reliable as formally constituted control commissions.
- 2) Both types of assessment were remarkably effective in uncovering evasions and illegal activity in Germany during 1920-1932.
- 3) The Germans did not step up their illegal activities with the withdrawal of the Control Commissions.
- 4) The evasions and clandestine activities carried out during 1920-1932 did not significantly increase Germany's military capacity. The increase in German military strength which took place during the period was due far more to the effective use made of sources of military strength legally available--selectivity in recruitment, effectiveness of command, promotion of discipline and development of an esprit de corps, etc.

Violations: Charges by Foch Committee. Aside from the questions relating to fortifications and exports, few complaints were registered during 1927 by the Foch Committee and no charge was made of an acceleration of rearmament. In 1928, a series of incidents were brought to the attention of the Conference of Ambassadors by Foch, but these indicated minor infractions. The first of these complaints was sent to the Ambassadors Conference on April 6, 1928. In this memorandum Foch reported that "at various times detachments of the Reichsheer have penetrated in the demilitarized zone not now occupied for purposes of taking part in patriotic ceremonies or in celebrations gotten up by societies of former combatants." As examples of these penetrations, he noted that at a recent ski championship in

the Black Forest, the commanding general of the 5th Infantry Division and two officers from the Minister of War were present. Although unarmed, "their presence in the demilitarized zone constitutes at least a technical violation of Article 43." Foch also complained that military bands had taken part in parades in the demilitarized zone, also in violation of Article 43, and he demanded that the Conference of Ambassadors take action to prevent further unarmed intrusions. The British representative responded, as he would throughout the next three years, that the Conference of Ambassadors no longer had jurisdiction in this area since the League of Nations had taken over responsibility for the supervision of German disarmament. Therefore, he would not take part in any formal protest over the issue.⁶

Toward the end of 1928, the Foch Committee summarized the state of German disarmament. Submitted to the Conference of Ambassadors on December 3, the report listed five matters which had not been resolved to the satisfaction of the Versailles Committee. Most of these matters, however, appeared relatively insignificant and did not reveal any serious breach in the treaty. The first noted that the Germans had not yet authorized Allied inspection of the reconstruction planned for the coastal fortifications at Wilhelmshaven. The second protested that instructions for General Staff officers had not been published in the Official Gazette which would permit comparison with the instructions approved by the Allies. The third item, "of the greatest importance," referred to the failure of three States to submit proposed police laws and indicated that in other States the police laws were still "incomplete and unsatisfactory." The German authorities had also not yet satisfactorily carried out the December 4, 1926 agreement to dispose of about 1600 police establishments, which included barracks, camps and maneuvering grounds, target ranges, etc. The fourth item complained that the Germans had not yet published, by ministerial decree, an agreement on regulations for troop transport by rail and the fifth point charged that evidence had come to the attention of the Committee that several of the paramilitary organizations were still active, especially in East Prussia. The more important of these were the Grenschutz (frontier guards) and the Stalhelm.⁷

Revealing how small press items become the basis for official complaints, the American Military Attaché in Paris noted how the Foch Committee, in combing through the German press, noticed an article which indicated that hydroplanes had taken part in the German naval maneuvers of September

6-7, 1928. Foch forwarded this item to the Conference of Ambassadors with a covering note stating that 1) if the hydroplanes belonged to the navy, this was a violation of Article 198; 2) if these planes were civilian aircraft which cooperated in naval maneuvers, this was a violation of the Aviation Agreement of May 22, 1926, which prohibited German aircraft from engaging in any training of a military character. Although Foch demanded appropriate action, the British again refused to sign a protest on the grounds that the Conference of Ambassadors was no longer competent to deal with the matter.⁸

A Foch Committee complaint delivered to the Conference of Ambassadors in January 1929 indicated another source of information used by the military authorities in keeping track of German developments: catalogues of industrial establishments. In going through these catalogues, the Committee found that a firm, Rohrback, openly advertised the sale of military aircraft. Though these were to be constructed in the Copenhagen branch of the firm, Foch felt this to be a violation, as this was a German firm operating under German law.⁹ On February 20, 1929 the Foch Committee submitted a new complaint: German officers were serving abroad in violation of Article 179. Based on the most detailed and time-consuming investigation, the Foch Committee had put together a dossier listing the names and rank of dozens of officers serving in South American armies. Though many of these officers had become citizens of the countries they were serving in or had become naturalized citizens of Danzig, Foch still considered their service abroad as a violation of the treaty.

In his letter to the War Department, the American Military Attaché in Paris noted that these violations were "of a rather minor character" but they showed "how the violations of the Versailles Treaty by Germany are accumulating and how reluctant the German Government always is to take any steps to correct such violations even when its attention is called to them."¹⁰

In 1930, Foch's complaints to the Conference of Ambassadors dropped precipitously. Indeed, only one report has been found for the year and that dealt with the continued difficulties encountered in getting the German government to dispose of the 1600 police establishments. In reporting this complaint, the American Military Attaché in Paris noted, somewhat philosophically, that "It is natural that an enforced treaty of peace should be painful to a

defeated nation but the honor of the defeated nation is shown in no way better than by the good faith with which its treaty terms are kept." The German experience, he noted, revealed "the evasion, temporizing and deceit of the Germans." The hidden fortifications on their frontiers, the delays in the destruction and conversion of war installations required by the treaty, the efforts and concealment of poison gas manufacture, diversion of appropriations to forbidden military undertakings "have left a strong conviction in the French mind that German good faith is lacking," a conviction which he too shared. Indeed, it was his opinion that "the Germans have no intention of executing these agreements unless they are forced to do so and possibly by something more than protests from the Conference of Ambassadors."¹¹

The drop in complaints submitted to the Conference of Ambassadors was due less to the lack of evidence of violations than to the fact that the Conference was badly split. The British representative assumed that, with the settlement of the two outstanding issues in 1927, Germany had legally met her obligations and that the Conference of Ambassadors no longer had any jurisdiction. All complaints of treaty violation should, the British reasoned, be submitted to the League Council for appropriate action under Article 213. With its competence under question, the Conference of Ambassadors was dissolved in 1931.

Violations: Military Staff Reports. Although few military staff reports have been released which cover the period under review, those which have reveal the state of knowledge of German violations and provide a contemporary military assessment of their significance. Two military reports have been released: a memorandum by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Milne, on "The Military Situation in Germany, January 1930" and a report by Colonel Marshall-Cornwall, British Military Attaché in Berlin, on the "Military Activities in Germany during 1931."¹²

Milne's staff report on the military situation in Germany during 1929 is an excellent survey of a complex subject; it is balanced, clear and forthright. It carefully examines Germany's evasions and illegal activities, often in great detail. Where evidence was slight, this is acknowledged. Eight types of infractions were identified: reconstitution of the Great General Staff, illegal recruiting and reserve systems, continued existence of

unauthorized patriotic associations, training and experimentation in forbidden weapons, illegal manufacture of war material, unauthorized mechanization, chemical warfare and industrial mobilization.

By the Treaty of Versailles, the General Staff was to be abolished and was not to be recreated in any form. Milne notes, however, that the Reichswehr Ministry telephone directory was found to contain a section called "Generalstab" which consisted of four sections under a "Chef des Generalstabes." This section had not been mentioned in the General Army List, which identified all other sections of the Ministry. "While none of this information is in itself absolutely conclusive", Milne noted, "there would appear to be little doubt that at least the nucleus of the Great General Staff has been reformed."

Milne noted that after the war German military authorities, in violation of the treaty, had allowed a certain number of men, known as Zeitfreiwillige, to serve in the regular army for periods of from six months to a year, with the object of building up a reserve. Although this practice was prohibited by the Control Commission in 1925, the idea was, according to information received by the British, being revived in various forms. First, men were enlisted for twelve years, but were then discharged on various grounds after about three years service. Second, a category of men was being enlisted specifically for only three years. Third, men from the patriotic associations were being attached to regular units for short periods of training. On the basis of these activities, the British Military Attaché in Berlin estimated that about 7000 men were given training in 1929 in excess of the legal limits.

Various patriotic associations, Milne reported, were "undoubtedly carrying on active military training". From evidence obtained from those traveling through Germany, there was little attempt at secrecy. More difficult to trace, however, was the relationship between these organizations and the army. But he noted that there was evidence to show "that a certain amount of assistance in training is given to the patriotic associations by the regular army." And in the event of emergency, the military value of this training would be "considerable." Recent secret sources confirmed, he noted, that the nationalist and republic associations would be able to provide some 2,000,000 partially trained men.

While one of the chief handicaps of the German army was the prohibition placed in the treaty on certain weapons, in particular heavy and medium artillery, infantry close support guns and armored fighting vehicles, Milne reported that there was evidence to show that "experiments have been carried out both technically and tactically in these /forbidden/ weapons." Training in medium artillery was believed to have been carried out at Juterbog, while that in infantry close support guns and armored fight vehicles was carried out in maneuvers and exercises by means of dummies. Exercises were also being held with tractors used as light tanks and it appeared that German military authorities were "taking an active interest in the tractor industry in Germany with a view to providing a stop-gap tank in event of an emergency." Little trustworthy information, however, had been received as to the actual manufacture of tanks in Germany, but it was known that a Swedish firm was constructing 3-man armored fighting vehicles for the German army. And photographs had been taken of an armored motorcycle combination fitted with a machine gun which was being manufactured in Germany. Milne also noted that a great deal of "useful experimental and development work as regards armament design" had undoubtedly been carried out during 1929, particularly in infantry close support and antitank guns and in heavy machine guns.

"The utilization of foreign firms to evade the War Material Law," Milne reported, "can be taken as accepted policy, though it is mainly employed for experiments in design." Information had been received on German military manufacturing in Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Finland. As for illegal domestic manufacturing, Milne conceded that not much was known. But in spite of the secrecy, information had been obtained on the illegal manufactures of eight different plants and it was "safe to assume that others /were/ engaged in the same work."

The peace treaty specifically restricted the degree of mechanization permitted infantry and cavalry divisions. With the new innovations in transportation, these restrictions, Milne conceded, severely limited the mobility of the German army. To overcome this handicap, the Reichswehr Ministry had either purchased outright, or had working agreements with, a number of civilian motor-transport firms throughout Germany. The General Staff also found evidence that secret experiments with light armored fighting vehicles

had been made. But in general, the Reichswehr's policy on mechanization was "to watch the progress of development in other countries while fostering the home industry by means of secret subventions."

While the treaty prohibited the "use" of poisonous gases, it did not prevent Germany from studying the question of chemical warfare. And there was, Milne reported, "ample evidence to show that the German army was being/ trained in the use both of defensive and offensive gas." The Germans had, moreover, made "elaborate calculations", for example, as to the number and type of gas shell required for various kinds of gas bombardments. Perhaps more significant than experiments and calculations, however, was the progress in the German chemical industry, the largest in Europe, which could be rapidly converted to war production in case of emergency.

Milne acknowledged that owing to the secrecy which surrounded all schemes for industrial mobilization, it was difficult to get definite information. But they had found that the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie was collating information as to the maximum output from factories of certain types of war material, armor plate, for example, and the possibilities for expansion in event of war. A close study of the budget, in addition, revealed that "important subsidies were being paid to armament manufacturing firms."

Assessment of violations. These evasions and illegal activities, while numerous, did not according to the British General Staff significantly increase the strength of the German army. Milne reported that "I am still of opinion that the present Reichsheer is not a menace to the peace of Europe." He felt that the military leaders of Germany recognized the impotence of the Reichswehr with its restricted organization and equipment and, while they were undoubtedly doing their best to make it as efficient a weapon as possible for defensive use in a sudden emergency, it was in the future rather than in the present that their main interest was directed. Outwardly they were observing "to a large extent the dictate of the Treaty of Versailles," but at the same time they were "endeavoring by secret means to evade the restrictions imposed by that Treaty, with a view to laying the foundations for a large expansion at some future date, when the political situation may permit it." Their immediate problem, therefore, was "not to prepare the present German Army for war, but to organize the nation as

a whole, and industry in particular, so that it may be ready once more to convert itself into a war machine, should the necessity arise, and in the meantime to prevent the military spirit from dying out in Germany."

Two years later the British Military Attaché in Berlin, Colonel Marshall-Cornwall, reported that many of these earlier violations were still being pursued and that some new evasions had been uncovered. Based to a large extent on personal observations, conversations and visits, Marshall-Cornwall revealed in his report a remarkable knowledge not only of military activities but of domestic politics as well. Indeed, the report appears a model of military analysis, displaying insight and forthright judgment on the one hand and a careful regard for evidence on the other.

"It has been said," Marshall-Cornwall wrote, "that a coach and horses can be driven through most treaties; it is certain that the Germans have driven something more formidable in the way of mechanical transport through the Treaty of Versailles." Illegal weapons had been developed; mechanization had proceeded beyond that authorized in the treaty; fortifications had been erected; war material had been manufactured abroad and patriotic associations had provided military training.

While many of these evasions had been known before, Marshall-Cornwall attempted to put them in perspective. On weapons development, he noted that "experimental work is continuing in many directions, but very little new equipment has been issued to the troops." Cavalry regiments had been rearmed with a new carbine, but this represented only minor modifications on the 1898 model. An experimental Dreyse air-cooled automatic was being issued to some cavalry units, but apparently had not been perfected. An antitank gun, forbidden by the treaty was being introduced; and to get around the restrictions they were issued in the guise of a wooden dummy, but a surprisingly complete dummy. The gun-barrel and shanks were of wood, but the rest of the carriage, shield, sights and laying gear were of steel. Assuming that gun-barrels could be manufactured secretly and stored in regimental magazines, the attaché noted that it would require only a few hours work to equip every unit of the Reichswehr with effective antitank weapons. "This ingenious form of trickery," he concluded, "merely illustrates the futility of many of the treaty restrictions."

On the basis of his observations at German maneuvers,

the attaché found that "considerable progress" had been achieved in the mechanization of the Reichswehr. While some of this was legal, other modifications were not provided for in the treaty. Reconstruction of fortifications along the eastern frontier was still going on, Marshall-Cornwall noted, some of which was probably in violation of Article 180. German-Soviet military collaboration was also continuing, though he thought that relations were less cordial than before. There had been a recrudescence of "Wehrgeist" during the past year, he reported, which, though normally a movement for self-defense, "becomes easily transmuted in the German mind into a desire to kick over the traces." And though the Stalhelm was part of this recrudescence, he was less concerned about this organization than the newer groups like the Nazi SA's. Indeed, the Stalhelm, as a patriotic organization, he wrote, had much to commend it. He felt that "most Britons, were they Germans today, would be Stalhelmers." Originally developed out of a defensive league of property owners against the radical left, the movement formulated "a sane patriotism with the idea of consolidating the orderly elements of society against Bolshevik ideas." During 1931 the Stalhelm had been careful to avoid illegal military activities, but it did sponsor a "somewhat provocative gathering" at Breslau on May 31. One curious incident, he noted, took place following this rally. Though Government spokesmen always insisted that the Stalhelm had no military significance, a Polish journalist was arrested six months after the Breslau rally, tried, convicted and imprisoned for having spied on the proceedings, being condemned on the charge of having betrayed the national interest. "The logic of such a verdict," Marshall-Cornwall concluded, "is scarcely intelligible to any but a German mind."

Looked at dispassionately, he wrote, all these associations reflected "the innate German urge to be marshalled in mass and to march to the sound of a drum." So long as these associations continued to be divided and even competitive, he did not think they need be considered "as a danger to Germany's neighbours or to the world's peace." Their mutual rivalries, indeed, afforded a certain measure of safety.

Marshall-Cornwall acknowledged that with the revival of militarist sentiment in Germany there had developed "a tendency to ignore the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty." Official documents disclosed frequent violations

of the military clauses, with scarcely an attempt at concealment. But it would be unfair, he wrote, "to exaggerate the menace of the infractions hitherto committed." The Germans had so far done "nothing more serious than modernise to a slight degree their equipment and organization so as to keep abreast of the times, especially as regards their transport and communication services." What they had attempted "may be justifiably regarded as designed purely for self-defense." Petty restrictions, he noted, engender petty evasions, and it was short sighted to insist on the maintenance in perpetuity "of galling limitations which may have seemed desirable in a previous generation."

Whatever their present value, Marshall-Cornwall felt that the military clauses had been successful in denying to Germany "the possibility of menacing her neighbors." But the danger of sitting too long on a boiler unprovided with a safety valve must also, he warned, be considered. New weapons were being tested and their manufacture organized; reserve stocks of ammunition were being accumulated and new methods of transport and communication developed. "The danger is not imminent," he concluded, "but it is throwing its shadow ahead." With infractions of the treaty restrictions becoming more frequent and less concealed "one wonders whether this does not denote the thin end of the wedge which will split the whole fabric of the treaty." Writing in early 1932, he noted that the next few months would witness the rise of a new and more active political orientation in Germany and that the movement for liberation once launched would be difficult to arrest. It seemed advisable, he concluded in a prophetic note, "to reflect whether we can continue to suppress Germany's potential military power by methods which ultimately rest on the deployment of superior strength."

On the basis of later evidence, the verdict appears sound. In 1931-1932 the danger was still imminent. Although German evasions and infractions had been numerous, the Allies had achieved their basic aim--the disarmament of Germany.

In a recent study, Carsten has noted that by 1931 German rearmament had not progressed very far. Some "forbidden weapons" were available, but not in great quantities. Six medium and four light tanks were in operation and a smaller tank was under construction. Some units were being supplied with a 3.7 cm. anti-tank gun, but it was envisaged that it would take another seven years to equip each regiment with six of these weapons. Even less progress had been

made in the development of gas, in spite of the Army's collaboration with Russia. As for aircraft, the Army had in 1931 only 29 reconnaissance planes, 15 fighter planes and 26 night bombers. As late as March 1933 the Army command reported that it had ammunition for only fourteen days of fighting in a war with Poland.¹³

In attempting to determine whether German rearmament was accelerated following the withdrawal of the Control Commissions, Berenice Carroll has undertaken an analysis of mobilization plans and feasibility reports of the Ordnance Office of the German Army. She has come to the conclusion that the general level of rearmament was not increased significantly following the termination of external control.

If German violations were not stepped up following the withdrawal of the Control Commissions, then this suggests that other deterrents to treaty violation were present besides external control. Carroll identifies six deterrents operating in Germany up to 1933: 1) the military restrictions had become part of German domestic law and were an international treaty obligation; 2) the governments during the Weimar period were reluctant to endanger the success of their foreign policies by too flagrant abuse of the treaty terms; 3) the policy of disarmament was approved by many Germans on moral and political grounds; 4) normal channels of observation and intelligence were available to all governments and therefore infractions still ran the risk of detection; 5) the risks involved in carrying out illegal activities were such as to dissuade many otherwise sympathetic individuals and industrialists from cooperating with the Army's clandestine efforts; 6) there was the continued danger of sanctions being imposed through League enforcement if violations were pushed too far.¹⁴ To this might be added the cost factor and the problem of priorities. Extensive rearmament would have required a large investment of resources which, especially after the depression of 1929, were being demanded for other things. In its competition for increasingly scarce resources, the Army had to fight the battle of priorities, and it was not always too successful. Had Germany not suffered an economic setback the rate of rearmament might have been somewhat different.

German rearmament: 1933-1936

On March 9, 1935 Hitler announced that he would no

longer be bound by the air restrictions of the Versailles Treaty and that a German air force had already been formed. And a week later, on March 16 he officially repudiated the military clauses of the treaty, announcing that conscription had been introduced and that the army would be increased five-fold over its authorized limit to 36 divisions. Having unilaterally abrogated the aerial and military terms of the treaty, he negotiated the end of the naval clauses. On June 18, 1935 Germany and Great Britain signed a naval agreement which in effect terminated the naval section of the treaty. In the spring of 1936 Hitler eliminated the last remaining arms control restriction by sending troops into the demilitarized zone in direct violation not only of the Versailles Treaty but of the 1925 Locarno Pact as well.

The advent of Hitler's rise to power and the subsequent rejection of the treaty restrictions in 1935-36, raise three questions relating to arms control: First, to what extent did Hitler step up the rate of rearmament prior to the open repudiation of the treaty in March 1935? Second, how aware were the British and French of the violations and infractions carried out in Germany during 1933-1936 and how reliable was their information? Third, how were German evasions of the Treaty assessed by the British and French prior to its final repudiation?

Violations: the Problem of Compliance. A recent study on the relations between the Nazi party and the German army notes that "On coming to office, they /the Nazis/ lost no time in proclaiming that rearmament was...their policy and they set about bringing it into reality."¹⁵ While the first part of this assessment has been generally accepted, the second part requires qualification. According to evidence thus far uncovered, it appears that the rate of rearmament was not significantly altered in 1933 and was stepped up only in 1934. Even then the planned expansion of the army was not successfully carried out until mid-1935.

Plans for the expansion of the army beyond treaty limits had been made even before Hitler came to power, but this expansion was to be quite limited and gradual. Although the exact date is uncertain, in late 1932 the Reichswehr Ministry ordered that every infantry company was to be increased by about 20 men beginning in April 1933. This was to raise the strength of the army from approximately 100,000 to 102,500.¹⁶ After Hitler came to

power, little expansion of the army beyond these figures took place for about a year. In October, 1933 after Germany pulled out of the Disarmament Conference and announced its intention of withdrawing from the League, the army was increased by another 10,000 to 20,000. At about the same time, in late 1933, Hitler made his decision to treble the size of the army to bring about a 300,000 man force organized it to 21 divisions.¹⁷ But as a result of insufficient equipment and arms this goal was not reached for another 18 months. By the end of the summer of 1934 the army had about 170,000 men in the service, which was raised to 240,000 by the decision of October 1.¹⁸ Before the 21 division goal had been reached, however, Hitler announced a new goal--in his public pronouncement of March 16, 1935--that the army was to be increased to 36 divisions or 550,000 men.

According to a recent study of Hitler's prewar military plans, the turning point in German rearmament came in March, 1935, with the successful resolution of the Saar issue. Prior to the plebiscite in January 1935, the Germans were afraid that any serious treaty violation might prompt France to occupy this valuable region. "Until it was securely in German hands after 1 March 1935, Hitler's policy was perforce that of the first offender waiting for his terms of probation to end before committing his next offense." Indeed, after the Saar plebiscite, it was no longer Hitler's aim to conceal German rearmaments, but to exaggerate them.¹⁹

Verification: the Issue of Reliability. That the French and British had knowledge--and often detailed knowledge--of German violations prior to 1935 is clear. Although data on military intelligence operations for the period is slight, the evidence which is available reveals that the attachés and other intelligence sources possessed a remarkably complete picture of German rearmament.

On October 25, 1933 the British military attaché in Paris met with General Weygand and General Gamelin, where they discussed, among other things, the state of German rearmament.²⁰ Gamelin noted that on the basis of French General Staff figures Germany was definitely rearming and "at a much faster rate than one might think possible." As regards war material, the French had evidence to indicate that Germany had passed through the prototype stage and was manufacturing on an experimental scale; indeed, it possessed enough to equip experimental units. He was

certain, however, that Germany had not yet entered the manufacturing stage, which would denote preparation for war.

Referring to personnel, General Gamelin noted that the French General Staff estimated that the Reichswehr had at that moment about 140,000 men, including a certain number of short-service men and exclusive of reserves, which on the basis of later evidence was quite accurate. And while he believed that some million members of various Nazi organizations and societies were receiving military training, he did not include them in his calculations on military manpower. Though these men had obtained "a certain degree of military training" and had uniforms, they were equipped--and incompletely at that--only with small arms.

The French General Staff had concluded that the Germans were working on an army of twenty-one divisions, which at that moment could be fully provided with field artillery and small arms. (On the basis of later evidence, this probably exaggerated the amount of artillery available.) According to the military attache, both generals seemed to take the situation very calmly. While Weygand wanted to administer what he termed a "fessée" to the Germans in order to stop their rearming, Gamelin "seemed content to rely on the effect of time combined with a show of unprovocative strength."

On November 10, 1933 a considerable stir was caused by a speech in the Chamber of Deputies by M. Mandel, a Deputy from Alcase, who accused the Germans of violating the military terms of the treaty and backed up his charge with a long list of facts and figures. The British attache was, in fact, so impressed with the detail of the speech that he assumed it to be based on semiofficial, if not official sources. That this was not the case indicated the amount of information available outside of secret intelligence agencies.

Immediately after the speech the British military attache went to the French General Staff to get confirmation of the data; later he went over the speech point by point with the head of the Deuxième Bureau of the War Ministry. His reports on these two conversations indicate that the French had a great deal of detailed information on German rearmament. Mandel had referred to Rohm's claim that, in addition to the Army, the Nazi organizations had 18 divisions with a total of 800,000 to 900,000 men, equipped in part with the latest weapons. These forces provided for a semi-permanent force double the size of the French

Metropolitan Army. He had also claimed that the eighteen aircraft factories which existed at the end of the war were at that time working at full speed and that there had been an enormous increase in the import of raw materials which were being stockpiled for war. According to Mandel, Krupps was manufacturing a silent 77mm gun and the Daimler and Bussing factories were producing armored cars and tanks. Finally, he maintained that Germany was in a position to mobilize 45 divisions fully equipped and organized for war in less than five days.²¹

While the French General Staff did not accept all of Mandel's figures, it concluded that for the most part it "passed as correct," and was even in parts understated. It did not accept Mandel's contention that the full 800,000-900,000 men in the Nazi organizations represented a semi-permanent military force; rather, it noted that 145,000 of these men served permanently, as distinct from the majority who received merely week-end training. The General Staff, on the other hand, was concerned over the "enormous increase in imports of raw materials required for war" which had taken place since the consolidation of the Hitler regime. It also confirmed that German aircraft industries "were making all the necessary arrangements to turn out aircraft en série," that is on a mass production basis, which neither France or England was at that time capable of doing. All eighteen aircraft factories which existed in Germany at the end of the war "were working again" and the construction of aircraft engines was taking place even in automobile factories. In addition, the General Staff supported Mandel's contention that Germany was rapidly increasing the number of guns available. Although they acknowledged that this was a point about which their information was least precise, they were certain that the Germans had at least 2000 divisional artillery guns ready, including the "normal number" of 155mm calibre weapons.²²

About three weeks later the British military attaché met with Colonel Koeltz, the head of the Deuxième Bureau of the War Ministry. The subject was again Mandel's speech and again his charges were, with qualification, confirmed. Colonel Koeltz rejected the implication that Germany had 18 divisions staffed by Nazi paramilitary personnel. He noted that the divisional organization of the Nazi movement was not a military designation, but rather a translation of the term used by the Nazis themselves, which referred more to territorial subdivisions. These forces, he

noted, merely had part time training and were somewhat similar to the British Territorial Army.

Koeltz did not support Mandel's contention that the 18 aircraft factories were operating "at full speed." He did agree, however, that these factories were in operation and that their activity had recently increased. On armaments production, he indicated that their intelligence had not confirmed evidence that Krupps was manufacturing a silent 77mm gun, but they did have information on the operations of the Daimler and Bussing factories. They knew definitely that Daimler was producing an armored car and had strong suspicions that Bussing was turning out tanks. With regard to mobilization, Koeltz disputed Mandel's claim that Germany could mobilize forty-five divisions in less than five days. It was the General Staff's contention that Germany possessed "the men, the equipment and the organization necessary to mobilize in the spring of 1934 an army organized into seven army corps, comprising twenty-one divisions, with their complete allotment of divisional artillery."²³

Assessment: Evaluation and Enforcement. It has been suggested that the crucial problem in German rearmament was not verification but enforcement.²⁴ It was not that the British and French did not know about German treaty violations; rather it was that they were unable or unwilling to enforce compliance. In part this "crisis of will"--as it has sometimes been called--can be traced to the Paris Peace Conference and to the fundamental differences which arose between the Allies over the type of treaty to formulate. For many, particularly in Britain, the treaty turned out to be unnecessarily punitive. Marshall-Cornwall reflected this when he noted in his 1932 Report that "petty restrictions engender petty evasions." Even General Milne referred to the peace as "the dictate of the Treaty of Versailles." That German rearmament was a violation of the treaty there was no doubt; but this unilateralism was considered justified and reasonable, given the nature of the peace treaty. Thus, while enforcement was legally permissible, it was not, at least for many of the British, morally or politically justified.

Not only were there historical factors accounting for the failure to react to German rearmament, there were more immediate diplomatic concerns. In 1932 the long-awaited Disarmament Conference opened in Geneva; but almost

immediately a conflict arose between the French and the Germans.²⁵ The British, hoping to promote unity, could see no diplomatic advantage in threatening the Germans with sanctions which would, they reasoned, only disrupt the conference and perhaps undermine the League as well. This reluctance on the part of Britain to challenge the Germans during the Disarmament Conference created the backdrop for a minor drama which might have been entitled the strange case of the French dossier.

The French had prepared a dossier on German rearmament during the early summer of 1933 which they sent to the British Foreign Office for comment on August 4. The British, however, did not respond and on September 15, France's Ambassador Corbin raised the issue again, without success. Up to the time the British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, met with French Premier Daladier in Paris on September 22, the British had not even acknowledged the French dossier. Therefore Daladier confronted Simon with the issue diplomatically but firmly. Simon, however, refused to be pressed.²⁶ Following the British ambassador's complaint on November 6 that the French "cannot understand our reluctance to respond," Simon relented. "His Majesty's Government has never been insensitive to the importance of this request," he explained. "Their difficulty has been to come to a decision upon it in the changing circumstances at Geneva during the last few months." As the negotiations were still in progress, in spite of Germany's withdrawal, "it would be unwise to contemplate the course of arraigning Germany before the League of Nations under Article 213 of the Treaty of Versailles. It is, therefore, difficult to see what immediate purpose the proposed examination would serve. Indeed, in present circumstances, the institution of such an examination might...prove most embarrassing and seriously prejudice the impending conversations between Governments on disarmament."²⁷

The British ambassador in Paris was slightly put out by the Foreign Office reply. "All that the French Government desire," he wrote, "is that their evidence should be checked." As the War Office concurred in 90 per cent of the French evidence anyway, "would it not be possible for the Military Attaché to be authorized to inform the Ministry of War of this large measure of concurrence and at the same time to point out any important discrepancies?" This would appease the French, "who are at a loss to understand our refusal to check the evidence." When Simon met with Paul

Boncour at the Quai d'Orsay on December 22, the first topic was the French dossier. And Simon had another explanation for British opposition. The information in the possession of the British "was not such as would, for the most part substantiate definite charges--in other words, their indicators were not of a sort which they would be willing to offer to prove."²⁸ Given the secrecy of the sources of information, they could not cooperate in bringing the matter before the League.²⁸

The French decided to go ahead without the British and began preparing their case for submission to the League. The British continued to oppose French plans, assuming that this would wreck the League. On January 22, 1934 the Foreign Office wrote to the British ambassador in Paris instructing him to indicate that if the French insisted on bringing the matter to the League this would bring about "a direct conflict between our two countries."²⁹ With that the matter was apparently dropped. The British had successfully prevented the French from seeking sanctions for German treaty violations.

In a rare moment of self-criticism, the British Foreign Office three months later acknowledged that in their desire to get a general disarmament treaty, they had been "inclined to ignore the manner in which Part V was being infringed." "We had hoped," the memo noted, "to solve the problem raised by the illegal rearmament of Germany, before it became unbearably acute, by the negotiation on a Disarmament Convention, which would cancel Part V of the Treaty and legalise some measures of German disarmament." This position led to a situation, the Foreign Office conceded, where "it might almost be said that we were inclined to take the violations for granted and to regard them as inevitable." But even with this insight, the Foreign Office did not recommend sanctions against the Germans, but a compromise. In a final effort to save the Disarmament Conference, a quid pro quo might be arranged which would legalize "Germany's illegal armaments, in return for her acceptance of certain temporary restrictions with regard to them." But as neither the French nor the Germans would accept the British compromise, the Germans escaped both sanctions and "certain temporary restrictions" on their rearmament.

Aside from the historic differences that can be traced back to the Peace Conference over the peace treaty and the more immediate differences that arose over the proposal to

challenge Germany during the Disarmament Conference, several other factors may account for the failure to enforce the treaty. One was suggested by Simon in his conversation with Paul Boncour. Although the British had information on violations, this information was based on secret sources and could not be introduced as proof. What was lacking was an agency which could produce the necessary proof publicly and officially. This, however, was not the case with information derived from attaché reports, informers and spies. Thus, although information was available on German violations, the nature of the sources were such that it could not be easily used for enforcement.

A final factor affecting the failure to react to German violations stems from the faulty assessment of intelligence information. During 1933 and 1934 many French assessments of German strength included the paramilitary organizations of the Nazi party as part of the trained armed forces of Germany, thus greatly exaggerating the strength of its army. In February 1934, Marshal Petain informed the French government that Germany already had 840,000 men militarily trained.³⁰ At the time of the German entry into the Rhineland in March 1936, the French did not realize the full extent of French military superiority. They had, to a certain extent, become victims of a faulty assessment of essentially correct information.

The great divergence in Allied approaches to the problem of German violations resulted in a fatal impasse. Either the English policy for implementing the terms through accommodation or the French plan of compulsion might have worked if carried out consistently. To attempt to carry both approaches out at the same time was hopeless.

Summary of Violations

Beyond question Germany's armed services, with the passive or active endorsement of civilian leaders, willfully violated the Versailles disarmament clauses. These evasions took many forms: the retention of the General Staff; the illegal training of personnel and the retention of military personnel in excess of stipulated limits; the creation of paramilitary groups for reserve duty; the maintenance of weapons in concealed depots; the development and manufacture of prohibited weapons.

Statistics regarding Germany's actual violations are too fragmentary to provide a clear picture of that nation's clandestine activities. One recent commentary noted that "We do not know exactly how many men received illegal military training, nor exactly what numbers of arms and ammunition were preserved from World War I, or imported from abroad, nor the total numbers of weapons illegally produced in Germany, and so forth." Nor is it likely that complete statistics regarding these evasions will ever be found.³¹

Perhaps the only meaningful estimate of the overall extent of German violations is to examine the Reichswehr's mobilization plans. From 1925 to 1932, the German army pegged its mobilization scheme at twenty-one divisions or approximately 300,000 men. (This would mean that, fully mobilized, the German forces would still be smaller than the standing armies of either England or France before their mobilization.) But even the plans for this modest force were considered unrealistic by the Reichswehr's Ordnance Office because of the shortage of arms and equipment. Therefore, the German army concentrated on preparing for an emergency force of sixteen divisions. In 1933, Hitler secretly ordered that the Reichswehr's plan for raising twenty-one divisions be implemented as quickly as possible. While in emergency conditions the army might have responded more rapidly, it took the Reichswehr more than 18 months, after Hitler's directive, to bring its forces up to the 300,000 man figure. Weapons and materials were found to be in short supply; nor, indeed, was the training of the "reserves" satisfactory.³²

In comparison with its neighbors, Germany possessed little relative military power--even with its evasions--during the 1920's. The League's Armament Yearbook shows that for 1929, as an example, England maintained an army of over 400,000 men (plus troops in India), France had over 350,000 men in Europe (and nearly 200,000 more in North Africa), and Poland possessed an army of over 250,000 men. Czechoslovakia maintained an army of 100,000 men during the summer and 140,000 during the winter, while it possessed materials for a 400,000 man force in case of war. Thus even if Germany had managed to maintain men and materials twice the allotted quotas, its armed forces would have still been lower than its neighbors. While their evasions of the Versailles arms restrictions undoubtedly facilitated the expansion of its

military services, Germany's standing army was still in March, 1935, smaller than those of England and France. Moreover, in terms of naval and air forces, Germany was even more deficient.

The General Staff. Allied efforts to abolish the General Staff were markedly unsuccessful. This failure stemmed from the imprecise nature of what this restriction was meant to accomplish. Thus, while the Versailles restrictions prohibited the "Great General Staff" it said nothing about the Truppengeneralstab or operational general staff.

Determined to preserve the spirit, if not the form, of the prewar command structure, the German Army retained--in revised structure--many of the former imperial institutions. Of the newly-created offices the Truppenamt was the most important. It was divided into four major sections: Home Defense (T₁)--operations and later, mobilization; Organization (T₂); Statistical (T₃); and Training (T₄). An illegal air force section existed within T₁ which started with three men, and, after the Ruhr invasion, was expanded to fifteen. Also within T₃ was located the notorious Sondergruppe R which dealt with the illegal Russo-German military collaboration and which was instrumental in the establishment of other illegal agencies (the GEFU and WIKO) designed to continue this evasion through activities in foreign countries.³³

Whether or not this new command structure actually violated the Versailles stipulations is not entirely clear. In their note of May 30, 1925, the Allies complained that the Germans had evaded their responsibilities by illegally creating the Chef der Heeresleitung and its subordinate section, the Truppenamt, as a substitute for the prewar General Staff. But Harold Gordon, in his exhaustive study of the Reichswehr and the German Republic, argues that "Actually, a close study of the Treaty and of the organization and function of the Truppenamt makes this assertion questionable." Indeed, Gordon concludes that "technically and practically, the existence of the Truppenamt was legal and necessary."³⁴ Despite their subterfuges, German efforts to salvage the General Staff concept was far from satisfactory. Favoritism, lack of opportunity, limited number of posts, and other factors contributed to restrict the success of the effort: there is no question but that when Hitler undertook to expand the Army there was an extreme shortage of trained staff officers.

Military Personnel. The Reichswehr was repeatedly charged with exceeding its strength levels (Articles 159 and 160) and with the excessive early discharge of officers and men. As late as 1925 the Interallied Military Commission estimated the number of German effectives to be at least 180,000. The report emphasized that the practice of discharging men before the legal expiration of their enlistment had reached 25 per cent of the total Reichswehr strength, the effect of which was "to allow the greatest possible number of men passing through the army".³⁵ But the Control Commissions' objections were either met or overlooked by the end of 1925 for, on November 14, the Conference of Ambassadors announced that agreement had been reached on these issues.

Some writers have claimed that the Reichswehr contained 40,000 non-commissioned officers within its 100,000 man limit and that "of these a considerable proportion...were being trained as a cadre of 'aspirant' officers."³⁶ If these figures are correct, the Reichswehr was in great imbalance for the old Imperial Army, at the beginning of World War I, had approximately two million men of which some 120,000 were non-commissioned officers.³⁷ The Conference of Ambassadors ruled, on March 4, 1926, that senior officers should comprise not more than 20 percent of officers and that non-commissioned officers should not exceed 25 per cent of the enlisted personnel.³⁸

There is no question, however, but that the Reichswehr expanded rapidly after 1932. The rate of this growth has been variously estimated. While at least one contemporary view held that Germany possessed trained military forces upwards to two and one-half million,³⁹ the following tables reflect a more considered judgment.

	(1) Size of Army	(2) Size of Army
1930	-----	96,000
1931-1932	ca. 100,000	96,000
April 1, 1933	" 102,000	130,000
Oct.-Nov., 1934	" 110,000	160,000
April 1, 1934	" 170,000	215,000
Oct.-Nov., 1934	" 240,000	290,000
March 15, 1935	-----	380,000

Column (1) is from B. Mueller-Hillebrand's Das Heer, 1933-1945, I (1954); column (2) is from Georges Castellan's Le réarmement clandestin du reich (1954);

see Gerhard Meinck, Hitler und die deutsche Aufrustung, 1933-1937 (1959), p. 89.

Paramilitary Groups. The most extensive area of German personnel violations regarded paramilitary groups which the Reichswehr, at times, used as supplementary forces. The Versailles Treaty was clear on this point: Article 162 stipulated that the number of German police, border guards, etc., were not to exceed similar 1913 figures, nor were these men to be given military training; Article 177 declared that "associations of every description" were to abstain from military activities and private societies were specifically forbidden to train in the use of arms; and Article 178 prohibited the use of paramilitary groups as Army reserves.

Essentially, German paramilitary organizations may be divided into two broad groups: the "official" (i.e., government supported and directed) and the "unofficial" (i.e., private groups with limited governmental support). The "official" forces included the Volkswehren (Home militia and urban police); the Einwohnerwehren (civic guards); the Zeitfreiwillige (short-term volunteers of three months serving as a Reichswehr reserve); the Technische Nothilfe (technicians providing emergency service to public utilities); the Schwarze Reichswehr or Arbeitskommandos ("labor" troops); the border guards (including the Grenzschutz Ost); and the Sicherheitspolizei (central police force).

The Schwarze Reichswehr, which had a membership estimated from 20,000 to 80,000, was officially disbanded in late September 1923 when Major Buchrucker sought to use his force to carry out a putsch.⁴⁰ German violations of the Versailles Treaty before the Ruhr crisis were limited to attempts to rebuild the Army and to weaken the force of the treaty's disarmament through acts of sabotage. Only after the Ruhr occupation was there systematic effort to circumvent the treaty. This transformation can be traced in the development of the Grenzschutz Ost. This organization of guards on the eastern border, originally numbering possibly 30,000 men, was founded in 1919 and received considerable attention during the Polish crisis of 1920-1921. Although the Grenzschutz Ost was under Reichswehr direction before 1923, after the events of that year these border guards drew heavily on the Stahlhelm for recruits. The Eastern forces eventually consisted of thirty brigades of

regiment strength with a light artillery detachment,⁴¹ totaling approximately 45,000 men.

Charges that the state-controlled police also provided the Reichswehr with a substantial military reserve are common. Because of its semi-military organization and equipment (including machine guns and armored cars), the Sicherheitspolizei, established in 1919, was disbanded in May 1921. Meanwhile, Berlin authorized an increase in the Ordnungspolizei from 92,000 to 150,000 and gave them permission to possess heavy machine guns. In October 1920, the former Sicherheitspolizei emerged as the Schutzpolizei and rapidly assumed a military character; it was led by former military officers, who were quartered in barracks, and participated in Reichswehr maneuvers. The Conference of Ambassadors, on December 3, 1926, decided to limit the police to 140,000 which were to consist of 105,000 state police and 35,000 communal police. To what extent the German government complied with this ruling is not clear; however, as late as March 1931, the Allies were yet not satisfied with German police strength. In 1933 all police "reserves" were reorganized, trained, and armed as infantry; by the summer of 1935 these men were incorporated into the Army as three infantry divisions.⁴²

There were numerous "unofficial" paramilitary organizations. These groups defy rigid quantification for their membership fluctuated, and often overlapped. The following table represents a 1926 estimate of the numerical strength of these paramilitary groups for 1923-1926.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Members</u>
Stahlhelm	65,000	117,000
Frontbahn	11,000	330,000
Reichsflagge	5,000	240,000
Oberland	8,000	270,000
Jungdo	3,000	152,000
Organization Con sul	1,000	80,000
Possbach	800	62,000

Cited in Emil J. Gumbel, Vom Femenord zur Reichskanzlei (1962), p. 38.

Gumbel believes that in numbers and membership these paramilitary groups reached their peak around 1924 and declined from 1924-1929. With worsening economic conditions in 1929, a new period of organizational expansion took place.⁴³

Of the "unofficial" organizations, two were of particular importance--the Organization Escherich (Orgesch) and the Stahlhelm. Trained and drilled, the Orgesch was believed to have 320,000 members in April 1921, equipped with 240,000 rifles, 2,780 machine guns, 44 cannons and 34 howitzers. In late 1923, however, the Orgesch faded from importance. The Stahlhelm and other veterans' organizations, such as the Bund Deutscher Offiziers (100,000 members), were of longer duration. A recent analyst notes that the Stahlhelm, founded on Christmas Day, 1918, was regarded "almost as an extended arm of the Reichswehr" up to 1933. The Stahlhelm was prominent from 1925 until its fatal conflict with the Nazis' S.A. early in the 1930's. Until then, it influenced the selection of Army recruits, made up the main force of the Grenzschutz Ost and Zeitfreiwillige, and helped the Reichswehr to establish a secret air force. In the latter instance, the Stahlhelm organized a fliers' section which in 1931 merged with Captain Wilberg's Ring der Flieger to form the Wehrflugorganisation. Thus between 1925 and 1933 most of the army-trained personnel outside of the Reichswehr were found in the Stahlhelm.⁴⁴

Weapons Stocks. The Allies, though hampered by German evasions, had considerable success in reducing Germany's stockpile of military equipment. General Nollet acknowledged that by 1923 the Allies had destroyed more material than Germany possessed at the outset of the war and domestic manufacture of heavy military hardware, such as tanks and aircraft did not resume until 1931, and only in large quantities after 1933.⁴⁵ The lack of reliable Allied intelligence on the size of German stocks at the time of the Armistice or on their production during 1919, and the failure of German authorities to provide the relevant documentation to accurately establish these figures constituted the major problem. The essential puzzle confronting Allied control commissions has subsequently become the historians; what value is to be placed on the lists of destroyed material as they cannot be compared with the amounts manufactured?

Perhaps the most reliable estimate of illegal stocks is contained in a report to the German cabinet by their military chiefs on February 26, 1927--about one month after the abolition of Allied controls. This presentation does not establish, however, what proportion of the clandestine equipment was of W.W. I vintage and what had subsequently been manufactured or imported. General Wilhelm Heye informed the cabinet that most illegal material was now under army control and that this amounted to about 350,000 rifles, 12,000 light and heavy machine guns, 400 mine

throwers, and 600 light and 75 heavy guns. He estimated that existing ammunition supplies were sufficient for only a single day's battle, although he hoped that increased illegal German production would ease this deficiency. Additionally, he reported the existence of secret depots containing clothing and moving stock (Fahrezeuge).

However, it was General Heye's conclusion that these stocks were insufficient for Germany's defense because the Reichswehr possessed neither heavy artillery, pilots, tanks, nor gas weapons. His complaint was echoed by Admiral Hans Zenker who stated that the Navy also lacked critical equipment such as aircraft and submarines.⁴⁶ Thus while the reports of the Military Control Commission and of General Heye make it clear that evasions had taken place, they also indicate that Germany was hardly an aggressive threat in the mid-1920's. The Allies had largely accomplished their disarmament objectives, for Germany was without tanks, military aviation, heavy artillery, chemical weapons and submarines.

Development and Manufacture of Weapons. Article 168 declared that three months after the Versailles treaty came into force all establishments--other than those specifically authorized--" for the manufacture, preparation, storage, or design of arms, munitions or any gas material whatever shall be closed down." Article 171 prohibited the manufacture or importation of chemical warfare equipment, armored cars, tanks and "all similar construction suitable for use in war." It is clear that the German armed forces and private industrialists evaded these restrictions; however, the extent and significance of these evasions are less evident.

As literal implementation of Article 168 would have required the razing of broad segments of Germany's industrial complex, Allied engineers limited themselves to reducing its capacity to produce the more conventional implements of war. They ferreted out about twice the number of facilities reported by German authorities and ordered certain installations to be destroyed while others were allowed to convert to civilian production. The engineers concentrated their activities in Westphalia, where the Krupps works were located, because this region built nearly seventy per cent of Germany's military hardware. They destroyed shell presses, gun lathes, gun shrinking pits, chlorine cells, gun powder plants and test sites. General Bingham reported in 1924 that nearly 7,000 factories had been inspected and that of those 6,920 had complied with

Allied revisions and were cleared for renewed operation. Of course, he added, "I am not going to say...that in war time you could not turn the factories back again for the manufacture of war material."⁴⁷

The designing and testing of prototypes during the 1920's often has been cited as the major reason for Hitler's rapid rebuilding of Germany's armed forces. However, German officials always took the position that such activities were undertaken in foreign countries, usually by private firms, and hence did not violate the letter of the Versailles Treaty yet most of these enterprises were subsidized, at least in part, by government funds supplied by the armed services and utilized the services of "retired" German officers with closed connections to their respective services.

To coordinate the design of aircraft prototypes the Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft Luftfahrt was established in Berlin in 1923. It assisted Hugo Junkers in setting up a plant in Russia as early as 1923, and later assisted another in locating in Malmoe, Sweden. German aircraft companies extended their research and development activities for the armed services through established foreign branches; Junkers in Russia, Fokker in Holland, Rohrback in Denmark, Dormier in Switzerland, and Heinkel in Sweden. Admiral Raeder later wrote that the Navy had designed, by 1932, "a multiple-purpose plane for dropping bombs, mines and torpedoes, as well as a pursuit fighter plane," and was developing "a promising dive bomber design."⁴⁸

To preserve its knowledge of submarine construction, the Admiralty maintained close liaison with private German ship-building firms, and even financed some of their developmental projects. Retired naval officers were employed in submarine construction in Holland, Finland and Spain. In 1922 Krupp established a dummy Dutch company--the Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw, staffed with Krupp's naval designing team from Kiel--at Rotterdam to work on submarine and torpedo components "for the preservation and further implementation of German U-boat experiences." Also secret agreements with the Japanese resulted in the exchange of technical information regarding submarine construction. However, most important to the Admiralty was the actual building of submarine prototypes: a 750-ton boat built at Cadiz became the model for the later German submarines of the U-25 and U-26 classes, while

the 250-ton boats constructed in Finland (from drawings made in Holland) served as prototypes for the later German series from U-1 to U-24.⁴⁹

The Reichswehr became increasingly interested in experimental models of armored vehicles, tanks, and heavy artillery. Allied prosecutors at Nuremberg charged that Krupp began producing tanks in 1926 under the guise of "agricultural tractors." Whether actual construction began this early is open to question, but Krupp, Daimler and Rheinmetall received funds from the Reichswehr in 1928 to each design and produce two light tanks of 7.5-tons, armed with a 3.75 cm. gun and a heavy machine gun. A year and a half later the Army authorized the same firms to develop a heavier tank armed with a 7.5 gun and three heavy machine guns. Gustav Krupp boasted in 1942 that "with the exception of the hydraulic safety switch, the basic principles of armament and turret design for tanks had already been worked out in 1926." In addition, Krupp appears to have designed and tested at least eight new artillery prototypes, including a self-propelled gun. Some of this work was carried on at the Bofors works in Sweden, which Krupp controlled from 1925 to 1935, while other efforts were undertaken in Berlin and in Essen.⁵⁰

Beginning in 1922, the Germans sought to experiment with gas warfare in Russia. With funds provided by the Gesellschaft zur Foerderung gewerblicher Unternehmungen (Gufu) through offices in Berlin and Moscow, the Trotsk factory was built near Samara to produce chlorine, phosgene and other gases. However, this venture ran into serious difficulties when the Russians complained that they were not being provided with sufficient information, and the Trotsk works closed down in 1925. Efforts to produce chemical warfare equipment at home proved equally unsatisfactory. Apparently fearful of jeopardizing their international connections, the big firms, such as I.G. Farben, refused the Reichswehr both information and cooperation regarding the development of gas devices. Consequently as late as 1931, Truppenamt officials questioned whether the Reichswehr should even continue its efforts on this direction.⁵¹

Several writers--before, during and after the Second World War--have charged that extensive collusion existed between the arms-makers and the German military during the 1920's. Wheeler-Bennett has claimed that the period of 1924 to 1927 was given to the design of prototypes and

that, with the departure of the Allied Control Commission the second phase of rearmament began with "the centres" of German industry being adapted for the "mass-production" of these models.⁵²

A cursory examination of existing production statistics fails to reveal that mass-production began in the 1920's. A top secret German survey of industrial mobilization in 1928 indicated that only three unauthorized firms were actually producing rifles, machine-guns, artillery and munitions. Although the amounts of guns and munitions these three plants (together with the authorized factories) are not given, the production capacity estimates were often considerably below the requirements stipulated by the Truppenamt for expansion to 21 divisions. For instance, both current and planned munitions production in 1928 was about 90 million cartridges per month, while Truppenamt required 250 million.⁵³

The deliveries of tanks, aircraft and submarines indicated that extensive German manufacture and stockpiling of heavy military hardware began in 1931 and increased during 1933. Krupp did not switch from designing tank prototypes to production until 1933; in August the firm delivered five tanks, followed by 100 more in 1934. Not until 1934 did the Army form its initial tank battalion. Germany's aircraft industry, according to Klein's figures, was producing 30 units per month in 1933; this jumped to 425 in 1936.⁵⁴ Germany's first submarines were not fabricated until 1935, in spite of much earlier prototype design.

Available evidence, then tends to support Carroll's contention that Germany's illegal production of armaments and munitions during the 1920's was "not as great quantitatively as is sometimes contended...The German effort was concentrated rather on making preparations for a rapid increase in production to take place in the event of a war or of diplomatic nullification of treaty restrictions."⁵⁵

Air Forces. German compliance with the Versailles air clauses was marred by various evasions, yet none of these violations appeared sufficiently alarming to draw protests from the Allied governments during the 1920's. Article 198 declared that "the armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces", while Article 199 specified that, two months after the treaty

came into force "the personnel of air forces on the rolls of the German land and sea forces shall be demobilized." The Aeronautical Control Commission had accomplished the destruction of Germany's air forces by May 1922. Germany's evasions consisted largely of training pilots and air crews; actual possession of military aircraft was much less frequent. Additionally, both the Army and Navy invested in experimental aircraft and secured some technological advantages through the violation of the treaty's intent.

Germany's armed services augmented their knowledge of aviation by encouraging private flying clubs and by cooperating with leading commercial aviation firms. In 1920, former wartime pilots organized the Ring der Flieger to continue their interest in flying; later this group became affiliated with the Stahlhelm as the Wehrflugorganization. Between 1925 and 1933 most of the army-trained aviators not on active duty belonged to this latter organization. In 1925 a commercial airlines, the Deutsche Lufthansa, was founded as the nation's official aviation agency. This company began testing aircraft and established a communication network throughout the world; both activities were, of course, followed closely by the armed services. One affiliate of the Lufthansa, the Deutsche Verkehrsflieger Schule D.V.S. (School for Commercial Aviators), apparently trained a number of military pilots.⁵⁶

Germany's armed services began their evasions of the aerial clauses almost immediately after the treaty was signed, although it was not until the mid-1920's that the training programs were organized and not until the early-1930's that the Reichswehr possessed a sizeable number of aircraft. A Fliegerzentrale (flying center) was first organized in the defense ministry. Over the objections of the Personnel Office, von Seeckt ordered, in 1923, that 180 experienced pilot-officers be added to the new Reichswehr and that within each army division an officer be responsible for air force matters. In 1924 the defense ministry lent its support to the Sportflug G.m.b.H.; this agency soon established ten flying schools where officers, on active duty or discharged, could maintain their flying skills. After 1925 the Army budgeted nearly ten million marks for the flying units; according to Carsten, "about one-half was spent on the flying schools, the maintenance of aeroplanes, and A.R.P. measures; about three millions went into research, development, and tests; and the remaining two millions was the cost of the establishment at Lipetsk." Founded in 1924, the German airdrome at Lipetsk in Russia became one

of the Reichswehr's major training cities. Up to 1933 about 120 fighter pilots had trained at Lipetsk and nearly 100 observers up to 1930; this latter activity was then shifted to Brunswick where another 80 observers received schooling. The Reichswehr listed 167 flying officers among its active personnel in November 1930.⁵⁷

The Navy approached aviation matters on a more limited scale. From 1924 the Severa--navy-sponsored company--organized refresher courses for experienced observers, and observer training courses for young naval officers. Six pilots and six observers a year were trained for military service. "We did not," Admiral Raeder later recalled, "limit ourselves to the technical and piloting aspects of aviation, for both the Admiralty and the Fleet Command endeavored to familiarize all active officers with the new problems that would result from the introduction of a naval air arm." From 1925 on, the Admiralty slowly developed various aviation equipment in violation of the treaty.⁵⁸

Even with trained personnel, Germany's armed services possessed few aircraft prior to 1930. At that time the government decided, unilaterally, to waive the Versailles restrictions against maintaining aviation stocks in order to begin secretly storing military aviation units. The total number of aircraft actually on hand during the early 1930's is difficult to estimate. One writer claims that the German airforce grew from 36 planes in 1932 to 5,000 in 1936; however, the early figure seems too small and the later one too large.⁵⁹

<u>1931*</u>	<u>1932**</u>	<u>1934***</u>
15 fighters	185 fighters &	167 fighters
26 bombers	recon.	67 bombers
29 recon.	36 bombers	42 recon.

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*Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, p. 385.

**Br. estimate, D.B.F.P., 2, V, 204-205.

***Br. estimate, D.B.F.P., 2, I, 479.

Naval Forces. The German Navy apparently refrained from extensive, systematic evasion of the Versailles restrictions until Hitler's decision to rearm; this latter phase was promptly legalized by the Anglo-German Naval Pact of 1935. Minor violations did occur as Admiral Erich Raeder

testified during the Nuremberg Trials, but these evasions provided few long-range advantages. "All our evasions of the Versailles treaty were due to our desire to be able to defend our country more efficiently than we had been allowed to," Raeder told the tribunal. "To do this was a matter of honor for every naval man." The German admiralty, however, did subsidize the design and construction of new naval weapons and warships in foreign countries. From these activities, which certainly violated the spirit if not the letter of the Versailles restrictions, the Navy harvested more lasting technical advantages.⁶⁰

German naval forces were limited, by Article 181, to six battleships (1902-1906 design), six light cruisers (1899-1903 vintage), and twelve destroyers and twelve torpedo boats (1906-1903 vintage). Subsequently the Allies added a reserve quota: two battleships, two cruisers, three destroyers, and three torpedo boats.⁶¹ Also provisions were made, in Article 190, for the construction of new vessels as replacements, subject to certain basic restrictions.

Germany built no secret navy. During the 1920's and 1930's replacements were constructed, but nowhere the number authorized. At the Nuremberg tribunal the defense declared, without contradiction, that "under the Treaty Germany was allowed eight armored ships, but it built only 3; it was allowed 8 cruisers, but it built only 6, and it was allowed 32 destroyers and/or torpedo boats, but it built only 12 destroyers and 5 E-boats." Lack of funds and the Weimar Republic's disinterest in naval affairs held down the construction of warships.⁶² The size of the German fleet, according to the British Admiralty's annual reports, is summarized on the following pages.

Minor violations were sanctioned by German naval officials during the treaty period. In 1923, for example, the Navy decided to evade the restrictions against a naval reserve (Article 194); consequently from 1924 to 1925, nearly 600 men were trained. To further offset personnel limitations, the Navy used former seamen as civilians to fill onshore jobs. To avoid conflicting with the letter of the treaty, young men were given flying training one year before their induction into the Navy. The Navy managed to keep a nucleus of veteran aviators in the service, but in 1933 Marshal Herman Goring collected most of the flyers for his Luftwaffe. With the general rearmament program in 1934, the Navy had 25,000 men in uniform and the following year 34,000.⁶³

In Commission
for Years 19-*

	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35
Battleships	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	4	5	6	7	5
Cruisers	3	2	2	8	9	8	8	7	8	6	8	8	7	6
Destroyers	-	-	16	16	16	17	17	13	16	16	16	16	16	12
Submarines	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14

*Great Britain, Admiralty, "Fleets--The British Empire and Foreign Countries", Accounts and Papers (for years 1922-1935).

Weapons evasions consisted of retaining 3,675 sea mines when the Naval Control Commission had authorized 1,665. The Navy also maintained small arms, machine guns, coastal artillery and ammunition (for all weapons) in excess of the Commission's established limits. For example, only ten of the ninety-nine guns taken from surplus warships were actually scrapped; the remainder were stored for future use. In 1932, Raeder ordered the new S-Boats to be built with torpedo-tubes but, to conceal this evasion, he instructed the tubes be removed and stored in the Naval Arsenal ready for instant refitting.⁶⁴

Working within the Versailles limitations, the German navy in 1928 laid down its first 10,000 ton Panzerschiffe or "pocket battleship". Utilization of new construction methods, such as an electrically welded hull, saved sufficient weight to increase the vessel's armament, while the use of diesel engines provided for a greatly enlarged cruising radius. Armed with six 11-inch guns in its main battery and capable of 26 knots, the pocket battleship, according to Raeder, was "in firepower and armor protection... superior to 10,000-ton cruisers of foreign navies."⁶⁵ New American, British, and French cruisers had to conform to more extensive qualitative restrictions than did the German, as the Washington Five Power Naval Treaty (1922) contained more refined prohibitions, such as limiting guns to 8 inches. Germany's advantage was narrowed, however, as their pocket battleships could make a speed of only 26 knots while their foreign counterparts cruised above 32 knots. That these new warships did not fully satisfy the German admiralty is attested to by the fact that they built only three (none were laid down after 1932) and that they accepted, without argument, the Washington treaty restrictions on cruisers in the Anglo-German pact of 1935.

Hitler's rise to power spurred the growth of the Navy. In 1933, the Navy budget was 186,000,000 marks, little more than preceding budgets; however, Hitler provided an additional 115,700,000 marks during April. The Nazi chancellor also authorized, for the 1934 budget, the construction of two 26,000 ton battleships, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, vessels that would ultimately weigh 31,000 tons. Finally, at the beginning of 1935, some six months before the signing of the Anglo-German treaty, Hitler granted permission for the assembly of twelve submarines. Both the new battleships and submarines were subsequently legitimized by the 1935 naval pact.

Chapter 7 -- Footnotes

- 1 National Archives, U.S. Army Intelligence (Attaché Reports), Record Group 165, doc. #2657-B-591/84.
- 2 Ibid., doc. #2657-B-591/82.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 Ibid., doc. #2657-B-591/89.
- 6 Ibid., doc. #2657-B-591/103.
- 7 Ibid., doc. #2657-B-591/110.
- 8 Ibid., doc. #2657-B-591/112.
- 9 Ibid., doc. #2657-B-591/111.
- 10 Ibid., docs. #2657-B-591/113.
- 11 Ibid., docs. #2657-B-591/123 & /132.
- 12 D.B.F.P., Ser. 2, I, 598-603; II, 515-524.
- 13 Francis L. Carstens, The Reichswehr and Politics (1964), pp. 357-59; E.M. Robertson, Hitler's Pre-War Policy and Military Plans, 1933-1939 (1967), p. 10.
- 14 See Berenice A. Carroll, "Germany Disarmed and Rearming, 1925-1935," Journal of Peace Research (1966). Her dissertation gives a more complete explication of this point, "Design for Total War: The Contest for 'Wehrwirtschaft' under the Third Reich," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Brown University, 1960).
- 15 Robert J. O'Neill, The German Army and the Nazi Party (1966), p. 84.
- 16 Gerhard Meinck maintains that it occurred after the Dec. 11, 1932 Five Power Declaration giving Germany "equality of rights," Hitler und die deutsch Aufrustung, 1933-1939 (1959), pp. 86-88. Carsten notes that the order for expansion was communicated to the commanding officers of the Wehrkreis in August 1932, Reichswehr and Politics, p. 357.

- 17 Meinck, Deutsch Aufrüstung, pp. 86-88; Robertson, Hitler's Pre-War Policy, p. 21; O'Neill, The German Army, pp. 85-86.
- 18 Ibid., p. 88; Robertson, Hitler's Pre-War Policy, p. 33; Carroll, "Germany Disarmed and Rearming," p. 117.
- 19 Robertson, Hitler's Pre-War Policy, p. 45.
- 20 D.B.F.P., Ser. 2, V, 732-37.
- 21 D.B.F.P., Ser. 2, VI, 49-51, 158-65.
- 22 Ibid., pp. 49-51.
- 23 Ibid., pp. 158-65.
- 24 Robert Lambert, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, comments on Carroll's arguments at the American Historical Association meeting, Dec. 30, 1965, mimeograph.
- 25 For an excellent review of the Conference, see Tyler Deierhoi, "The Conduct of German Policy at the Disarmament Conference of 1932," unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Duke University, 1964).
- 26 D.B.F.P., Ser. 2, V, 612-21; VI, 45-46.
- 27 D.B.F.P., Ser. 2, VI, 8, 137.
- 28 Ibid., p. 145, 217.
- 29 Ibid., pp. 300-01.
- 30 Edouard Herriot, Jadis: d'une guerre à l'autre (1952), II, 408.
- 31 Carroll, "Germany Disarmed and Rearming," p. 115.
- 32 Ibid., pp. 115-18.
- 33 Harold Gordon, The Reichswehr and the German Republic, 1919-1926 (1957); Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945 (1933), pp. 225-27.
- 34 S.I.A., 1925, II, 187; Gordon, Reichswehr and Republic, pp. 178-79.
- 35 The Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control, Report No. 46, "General Report on the General Inspection," (Sept. 6, 1924-Jan. 5, 1925), p. 10.

- 36 John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power (1954) p. 98. See also W. M. Knight-Patterson, Germany from Defeat to Conquest, 1913-1933 (1945), p. 287.
- 37 Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World (1962), p. 255; William Langer, ed., An Encyclopedia of World History (1952), p. 913.
- 38 F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, XIII, 320-21.
- 39 See Dorothy Woodman, ed., Hitler Rearms; An Exposure of Germany's War Plans (1934), p. 104.
- 40 Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, p. 222; Robert E. L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism (1952), p. 242; Knight-Patterson, Defeat to Conquest, p. 322; Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 92; Gustav A. Caspar, Die Sozialdemokratische Partei und das Deutsche Wehrproblem in den Jahren der Weimarer Republik (1959), pp. 42-43.
- 41 Wolfgang Sauer, "Die Mobilmachung der Gewalt," in K.D. Bracher, W. Sauer and G. Schulz, Die Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (1962), pp. 779-81; Gordon, Reichswehr and Republic, p. 187; Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, pp. 231-32.
- 42 See Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 98; Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army (1955), pp. 404-5 and Knight-Patterson, From Defeat to Conquest, pp. 198-99. Knight-Patterson quotes a 1942 German article which claims that the police provided a large number of officers, including 135 general officers, for the Reichswehr, ibid., p. 424. F.R.: Peace Conf., 1919, XIII, 322.
- 43 Emil J. Gumbel, Vom Fememord zur Reichskanzlei (1962), p. 38.
- 44 Knight-Patterson, Defeat to Conquest, p. 290; Gordon, Reichswehr and Republic, p. 257; Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, pp. 151 ff, 156-57; Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, p. 198, 201; Goerlitz, German General Staff, pp. 230, 255, 277; P. Pilant, L'état actuel: armements allemands (1932), p. 38.
- 45 General Charles N. Nollet, Une expérience de désarmement, cinq ans de contrôle militaire en Allemagne (1922), pp. 168-75; Steward Roddie, Peace Patrol (1933), pp. 316-16.

- 46 In Kurt Rosenbaum, Community of Fate: German-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1922-1928 (1965), pp. 238-39.
- 47 General Sir Francis R. Bingham, "Work with the Allied Commissions of Control in Germany, 1919-1924," Journal of the Royal Service Institution (Nov. 1924), pp. 754-59; for a more critical view, see General J. H. Morgan, Assize of Arms (1946), pp. 333-34.
- 48 Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, pp. 244-45; Admiral Erich Raeder, My Life (1960), p. 232.
- 49 Raeder, My Life, pp. 138-39, 230-34; Peter Batty, The House of Krupp (1967), pp. 144-48.
- 50 Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, p. 357; Batty, Krupp, pp. 150-51.
- 51 Ibid., p. 357; Carroll, "Design for Total War," p. 29.
- 52 Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 145. See also Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika (1952), p. 43; Knight-Patterson, Defeat to Conquest, p. 403.
- 53 Carroll, "Design for Total War," pp. 34-36.
- 54 Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, p. 357; Goerlitz, German General Staff, p. 274; Burton Klein, Germany's Economic Preparation for War (1959), p. 19.
- 55 Carroll, "Design for Total War," p. 33.
- 56 Carsten, Reichswehr and Politics, pp. 244-45; Heinz Pol, The Hidden Enemy (1943), p. 207.
- 57 Ibid., pp. 148-49, 221-22, 359.
- 58 Ibid., p. 245; Raeder, My Life, p. 232.
- 59 Goerlitz claims that "in 1926 Germany's Air Force consisted of two fighter squadrons, one bomber squadron and one auxiliary bomber squadron," German General Staff, p. 255. This does not seem to be substantiated in other accounts. Jacques Delarue, The Gestapo: A History of Horror (1964), p. 132.

- 60 At Nuremberg the Allies introduced, as Doc. 156C, a book entitled "Der Kampf der Marine Gegen Versailles, 1919-1935," (The Navy's Fight Against Versailles, 1919-1935) written by a Captain Schussler. (See Vol. 34, pp. 530-606). This document, according to Vice Admiral Erich Schuttle-Monting, was an apologia prepared to answer National Socialists who charged in 1934-1935 that the Navy had not resisted the Versailles restrictions with sufficient vigor. (I.M.T., Vol. 14, p. 298) Close Examination of Schussler's document, will in the authors' opinion, bear out their contention. See also, I.M.T., Vol. 14, pp. 145, 161. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg).
- 61 Raeder, My Life, p. 145.
- 62 Ibid., pp. 147-49; I.M.T., Vol. 12, p. 620, I.M.T., Vol. 14, pp. 249-52.
- 63 Ibid., p. 163; I.M.T., Vol. 34, pp. 549-50; Vol. 2, p. 325.
- 64 Ibid., p. 138; I.M.T., Vol. 2, p. 334 ff; Vol. 13, p. 270, 627-29.
- 65 Ibid., p. 147.